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PIAGETIAN OPERATIONS IN RELATION TO MORAL DEVELOPMENT
ABSTRACT
The investigation attempted to determine what tmplricaX linke 
might be present among cognitive and moral factors in the adolescent*e 
development* It was an attempt to elucidate and establish whether a 
relationship exists between operstivity, as conceived by Piaget and 
morel development as postulated by Kohlberg*
The sample consisted of 231 subjects; the variables controlled 
werei (i) CA, 14 to 15+ years (ii) subjects wore selected from urban 
areasf and (iu) sex* Piagetian stage groups of subjects (contrasted 
according to levels of logical reasoning) were selected end matched on 
finer discriminations with respect to age* social class and measured 
Intelligence*
The four Piagetian test© comprised: "Angles of Incidence and
Reflection”* "Equilibrium in the Balance”, "Communicating Vessels" and 
"The Projection of Shadows” (Inhelder and Piaget, 1958), patterned 
after Tisher (1962, 1971)* The moral development variable served as 
the dependent variable, as measured by Kohlberg1e Moral Dudgement 
Interview Schedules (1971*)#
Three statistical techniques wSre employed: (a) Student1s t teat,
(b) Correlations Coefficients and (c) Stepwise Multiple Regression 
Analysis*
The results indicated that:
1* A relationship exists between Piagetian operativity end 
moral development*
2* Logical reasoning ie a relatively more effective indicator 
of moral maturity than a traditional intelligence measure*
\Abstract
ftdiawlnilgnr.innt.s
CHAPTER OfC 
CHAPTiCn im
a w m : n  VrStt
CHAPTC8 rri,;i 
cHAPTca nuc 
chaptcs six
cmPTm nn/H;
CHAPTER C2GHV
iltntxmmi «f i!?» ProhXcs-i 3
The Grayth of Logical Thinking *~
Cancroin and formal Operations . 1 7
Tha Cognitive — PsvsiDpninnial
Approach to flomlity 70
Outline of the Irivestfnation 10<?
hcmcuirenani of thP l/ariabloe II8
Analysis of tha B&mltn 153
Snnliani-iorso nf tha fkisolin and 
Indications for future nosenreb 229
Sundry .23^
Hefoponans
Appendices
It io a pleasure to acknowledge my gratitude and indebtedness 
to my tutor and (supervisor, Professor T.Lee.
I would elao like to extend my sincere thank® tot
I wish to acknouiedg® my indebtedness to the Chief education 
Officer® for the Barth London Borough, and the head teacher® and 
staff merger® of the participating schools. There ore the 
indispensable coiioboratoto in a etudy of this kind - the adolescents 
who ware the subject®.
Professor Tiehsr, ftonash University, Australia 
California State University 
Harvard University 
London University
Professor Kuhn* 
Betsy Spelcher,.
3©ffrey Tandy,
state«) t or tic pasatgn
The main concern-in the problem tabs expounded* Is a cognitive . 
hypothesis that intellectual capacity has a charactabletic form at a 
given stage of development end that this form io parallel or learnerphic 
to the form of moral judgement'at a- corresponding ©tags* ■ . . .
Initially* the problem appears to relate to issues which were of , 
concern to the Ancient Sraeks and which era evident in a aUnfcar ■■•trif' ■ 
related philosophical doctrinaai first* about the significance of 
knowledge for the mind and secondly* about the relationship between ■■ 
knowledge end reality# hirst (1972)? elaborates. that in the first 
category there'was the doctrine that it is the distinctive activity- 
of the mind* because of its vary nature, to 'pursue knowledge# .the' 
achievement of knowledge satisfies end 'fulfils the mind which thereby 
attains its' o m appropriate end# ; The pursuit of knowledge ip thus . 
the pursuit of the'good of the mind and* therefore* ©n essential' ' 
element in the good life# . : furtherf that'the achievement of knowledge 
is not'only the attainment of the good of the-mind itself* but else 
the chief mesne whereby the good life m  a whole is to be found,' t o  
is more thin pure mind* .yet .mind'in hie- essential distinguishing 
characteristic* end it is in terms of knowledge that hie whole life is 
rightly directed# That knowledge is equal to it© teak use geatoteed 
fey the second group of doctrines, which asserted that the mind* in the 
right use of reason* comes to know the essential nature of things and 
can apprehend what is ultimately .real end immutable• All his 
experiences# life and thought can fee given, shape and perspective by 
what Is finally true* fey knowledge that corresponds to what is 
ultimately real* further* tho particular' way in which reason is hors.; 
represented as' attaining knowledge* reeulie io: a view' of the Whole of 
manfe understanding as hierarchically structured in various levels *
From the knowledge of mere particulars to that of pure feeing* ell 
knowledge has its place in a comprehensive and harmonious eebome* 
the pattern of which ie formed as knowledge ic developed in 
apprehending reality in its many different manifestations* Tbo Crook 
rationale.'- was therefore tho freeing of the mind to function according
to its true nature, freeing..reason,from error end Illusion end freeing 
man *© conduct from wrong* Such linos of inquiry have boon the oemoern 
of philosophers throughout timt#
. Tho boundary between psychologyand philosophy has received 
attention in various .writings* for example Peters (1973) end j f t i & o f t o l  '■ 
(1971)* _ Piaget (19t$) comment a* that it has taken a long time to 
determine tho specific research alma of the ocionc# Of psychology*
Ho attributes this to ths early aeaocieiicn and tleubordination,i to 
philosophy* which reaolted In'the slow ceaXiEafclon of iho limits of ■ 
the'.introspection method end.of the heed t© aselp a place to ' 
Kwnmlzmmm* in the general scheme of foshaviour* further* ©nee 
approaches ceased to;centre .excluoiveiy .on introspection* ths eciencG ' 
of psychology first' found in m m  only a mixture of biological and 
social elements* 'Piaget f m m m  on the ^ attitude of reserve** which 
exists between Philosophy end Psychology* despite tho existence Of 
persons thinking psychological icioncee alone cannot attain a 
knowledge of man- and needs the support of ^ philosophical psychology*w
Pisgofc elaborates i ^fctmaoy writers, particularly those with 
positivist leanings, the' difference between psychological m i m m  and 
philosophical psychology (and then they generally dispute the latter - 
has any meaning) lies in the nature of tbs problems they ere concerned 
with* for psychological setoca# like .'any . ether acianca# ie ©upposed 
to be concerned only with •observables *. wheraao philosophy supposedly 
seeks to arrive at the.nature of thing© and •esssTice1*” Piaget 
emphasises however* that the very history, of psychology shows at m m  
■the boundary featvisoo -what are regarded m  philosophical problems and 
scientific problems, has ccmoiantly shifted in unforossen directions* 
He cites m  an example* -that-towards the end of ths l§th century* 
psychologist© were little concerned with the- working of judgement 
ia •bofifteoiloh with the intelligence, or dismissed it as relating'to 
the ssoocietion of ideas* leaving it for logicians to enlarge on the 
oubjoct# Today, on the other hand* there are numerous theories of 
the Inislligenco, and no one contemplates excluding judgement from 
the purview of psychology* tt can therefore fee considered. extremely 
hasardGus at ths present time to divide up psychological problems
into scientific end philosophical ones# and the most m m m  tendency ■ 
is to regard ©elence os .infinitely open end deciding at woty moment ■ 
with which problems it-is concerned#
Piaget (1057) ■. referring to the classical logic of pro-ninatoenth 
century, intent - to discover, the. structure of; thought p m m m m  -and ihs 
normative laws of the mind and classical philosophical psychology, 
considering the M m  of logic and the M m  of ethics to bo implicit- 
' in the mental functioning of each individual* further emphasises his 
regret with respect to the lack of collaboration between logicians : .'
■ and psychologists*.’ With the development of experimental psychology, 
logical theory has bean excluded and concomitantly an increase in 
the deductI m  rigour and formal Cheroots? of logical systems has 
allfidnatsd ,any appsal to psychological factors# Piaget (1973) 
acknowledges that, superficially there doss: not appear to be-any' ■ 
relationship between logic* which is © formal, deductive and normativo 
sciancs and psychology, which is concrats, axpsritssntal and in no--way 
normative# However, two kinds of considerations wake it'necessary to 
establish’ some relationship' between them? %ecifit trends oblige ua to 
examine these considerations attentively*” Although symbolic logic 
has bean called wl©gic without a subject” there cannot be any subjects 
without logic* This ^natural0 logic poses a problem for psychologists 
.who ere then obliged to compare it to the formal.logic of logicians*
The other, considerations which necessltatn m mmpsfcMWi. derive not 
■from’ the ■ techniques of logic but from Its spietsmology# %hert 
spisicmoXoglcal logicians claim that logic lo cnly a language (syntax 
and strippsd down and generalized semantics), they are. drawing nearer 
to psychology* Evan when they ere Platonists, at Bertrand ftessXX 
was at ths beginning of his Ceres*,, they’ are still bordering on, 
psychology, for it remains to. be discovered how man, in hie mortal 
life con comprehend eternal’ Ideas? . and for this .purpose Russell. 
invented a special mental function called •conception1* which, applied 
to ideas'os perception does to objects* Hie apietomology of logic 
therefore implies a comparison with psychology*”
Plsgpt has Invoked the term genetic epialemolpgy be describe hie 
theory of Intellectual development in the individual# A term, although 
criticised, (Hamlyn’1971), incorporating developmental psychology
and philosophical implications, without appearing to draw a hard 
and fast line between psychology and philosophy* Hamlyn (1971, 1973) 
defines Piagets position a© a kind of Kantian reconciliation of the 
two opposing theories of empiricism and rationalism (Hamlyn, 1973, 
defines empiricism as that approach which views the mind as passively 
receiving reflections from without, while rationalism sees the mind 
as more active in its own operations)? though a reconciliation that 
can be achieved only by the recognition of new elements, in particular, 
the recognition of the importance of the active role played by the 
individual* Piaget1© rQconciliation comes through the idea that 
experience develops according to structures, which are, likewise, a 
function of the human mind in its relationship to the world.
Elkind (1967) describes Genetic Eplstemology as essentially 
an experimental philosophy which seeks to answer spistemelogioal 
questions through the developmental study of the child. Like any 
new discipline, genetic eplstemology presupposes its own unique 
problems, method and theory* Ths problems are to discover the 
psychological structures that underlie the formation of concepts 
fundamental to science* Piaget’s method is the semi-clinical interview, 
a form of non-directive inquiry, centred about a verbal or practical 
issue. Finally, 010901*© theory in the most general sense, is that 
of "subject-object equilibrium, the view that mental growth is 
governed by a continual activity aimed at balancing the Intrusions of 
the social and physical environment with ths organisms need to conserve 
its structural systems.1* Piaget*s theory has also been associated with 
cognitive-developmental or interactional theory, first clearly 
formulated by 3ohn Dewey (1903) and Baldwin (1906*13)* Kant outlined 
the structure of concepts and categories by means of which order is 
imposed on the flux of experience and Piaget has been concerned in 
mapping the stages at which the categorical apparatus of the Kantian 
mind develops and for example the approximate ages at which for instance, 
reversibility and seriation are possible mental operations for the 
child* He demonstrates when children emulate Aristotle in classifying 
and ordering the objects of the natural world and how they later 
proceed to the hypothetics-deductive form of thinking, characteristic 
of Galileo* Piaget further demonstrates the procedure of learning from
the simple to ths complex end thct concrete operations with objects 
precods abstract thought about them* The morel development of ths 
child is elco sketched in Kantian terms* the child passing from the 
stage of hetcronomy to a stage of autonomy* Piaget claims that 
symbolic logic parallels the expediency of statistics as an instrument 
for psychologists and in hie Trait© do Logiquo (1949) ho systematically 
outlined the logical principles which can be applied to the intellectual 
activities of the child* Piaget (1957) claims to have applied logical 
techniques to the psychological facts and has employed a psycho-logic 
to explain ths psychological findings* Piaget (Inhslder end Piaget, 
1958) further claims to have located a period of structuring leading 
to a level of equilibrium at 14 - 15 years, involving a est of 
operational structures based on propositions! logic end a ’formal1 
mode of thought#
Research by Kohlberg and his associates has elaborated a 
cognitive approach to moral development (Blatt and Kohlberg, 1969$ 
Kohlberg, 1963, 1964, 1969$ Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969$ Kohlberg and 
Turiel, 1971$ Turiel, 1966)# Inspired by psychological end philo­
sophical traditions represented by Kent’s ethical analysis,
3ohn Doway’o genetic, experiential- and purposive reasoning 
(1910, 1916, 1930) and Piaget’s structure! approach to cognitive 
thought and moral development, its major emphasis is that the 
development of moral thought follows a ^ niversal sequence of distinct 
stages# Each etags represents a qualityvely different organisation 
of thought, not a set of specific beliefs# The individual does not 
model himself on his environment, he interact© with it* Kohlberg*© 
assertion that universal Justice is the highest form of moral 
development even in on imperfect society is rooted in the assumption 
that the individual has the innate capacity to recognise justice end 
to eeek it (reminiscent of Ploto)# Kohlberg is also concerned with 
the relation between philosophy and psychology? Kohlberg (1971) 
deliberates that "the opiotemological blinders psychologist© have 
worn, hove hidden from thorn the fact that th© concept of morality is 
itealf a philosophical (ethical) rather then a behavioural concept*"
Hs believes that it was because of hio awareness of th© necessity for 
orienting bo philosophic concept© of morality when he started hi© 
research on the psychology of moral development (Kohlberg, 1956), that 
he has uncovered some quite important facte not previously noted*
Miechal (1971) draws attention to Piaget’© "Los Relations entre 
I’&ffectivite at l’lntolligonce done le Devoloppmont mental do 
1’Enfant", which defends the general thesis that affect, and intelli­
gence are complementary facets of mental development, distinguishable 
but inseparable ^aspects" of all conduct (Piaget 1954a)# References 
ere made to this in many other works* Piaget uses "affect" in a very 
broad cense to cover feelings, emotions, desires, needs, interests 
and values and will, just m  ho uses "intelligence11 broadly to cover 
all sorts of cognitive structures# Piaget’s thesis states that
(a) "there are no purely affective states without cognitive elements" 
to provide "structure" end (b) "there ©re no cognitive mechanisms 
without affective elements" to provide "energy". Plaget tries to show 
that "in ths normal davelopmant of ths individual, wa observe, at teach 
tart, a eost of partial*, or strict correspondence bct.ecn the 
transformation of ©ffestivity end the transformation© tif cognitive 
functions#" floral feelings liko truthfulness, justice, treating 
similar cases in similar ways, become the "Invariants" of affective 
life, end the child develops a stable system of values which le, says 
Piaget "ths logic of values or of action among individuals, just ©a 
logic is a kind of morel for thought#" (Piaget, 1967). Similar 
contentions os those above ora expressed in Piaget, 1932, in which
of equilibrium of thought operations,, justice represents an Ideal equilibrium or
Pleget further ©rguso that Just os logic reprosent© on ideal^eociol 
interaction, with reciprocity or reversibility being cor© condition© 
for both logical end moral equilibrium* While the eense of justice 
would not develop without the experience of social interaction,iiuiaanot 
simply an inward mirror of sociologically prescribed forints of thee© 
relations, any more then logic is an internalisation of ths linguistic 
form© of the culture# In Piaget’s theory, th© notion that logical 
and moral stages ere interactional is united to the notion that they 
are forms of equilibrium, forms of integrating discrepancies or 
conflicts between the child’sschemata of action and tho actions of 
otherte# The development of formal ("hypothotico-doductlvo") thought, 
with ite shift of emphasis from the real to the possible, again 
transforms effective life in adolescence, since it is "tho source of 
the living responses, always eo full of emotion, which th© adolescent 
uses to build his ideals in adapting to society," (Inhelder and Piagot, 
1958). Formal thinking makes possible the adolescent’s new interest
in abstract, collective ideals like social justice, political reform, 
etc*, ideals which presuppose an understanding of possibilities rather 
than actualities* "Ws must recognise,states Piaget, that? "there is, 
in truth, as much construction in tho affective as in ths cognitive 
domain*11 flischel (op*cit») comments that philosophers also have come 
to see that emotions, desires, end even feelings have a previously 
unsuspected conceptual complexity! these concepts were found to bo 
such, that their application normally presupposes temporally extended 
and complex patterns of intelligent social life* (Hirst and Petere,
197 D and Peters, 1972, write in thic vein)*
It is of interest that Ourkhelm (192S) stresses that tho teaching 
of physical and natural sciences plays an enormous role in determining 
the way we see things* A child is assisted in understanding how laws 
are evolved, through experimenting, failing, hypothesising, in 
realising thfct knowledge is provisional and needs to be modified and 
that truth cannot bo discovered "at a single stroke*11 Societies are 
part of nature and natural sciences can help individuals "to better 
understand the human realm and equip us with precise Ideas, good 
intellectual habit© which can help us in directing our behaviour*"
Kohlberg (Kohlberg and Gllligan, 1971) identifies himself with 
Piaget’s formulations? "In Piaget’s and our view, both types of 
thought and types of valuing (or of feeling) are schemata which 
develop a set of general structural characteristics representing 
successive forms of psychological equilibrium* The equilibrium of 
effactive and interpersonal schemato, justice or fairness, involvas 
many of the same basic structural features as ths equilibrium of 
cognitive schemata logicality*99 Kohlberg elaborates that what lo being 
asserted, is not that morel judgement stages are cognitive «* they are 
not the mere application of logic to moral problems - but that the 
existence of moral stages implies that normal development has a basic 
cognitive - structural component* By the insistence on tho cognitive 
core of moral development is meant rather that the distinctive 
characteristics of the moral is that it involves active judgement*
This therefore suggests that cognitive maturity is a necessary but not 
a sufficient condition for moral judgement maturity* Kohlberg
elaborates that though formal operations may be necessary for 
principled morality, one may be a theoretical phyaiciet and yet 
not make moral Judgements at the principled level* Kohlberg (1972) 
speculates that moral development may be partly interpreted as 
"riccolego" but not "mere',decalege,n of cognitive development*
Kohlberg (1971) further deduceo that logical stages must be prior 
to moral stages because they are more general* This receives further 
support from Harrison (1971) in considering whether moral judgements 
can be regarded ec fla priori" and analytic? of the same typo as that 
two and one is three, or that if two things era each equal to a , 
third being, they are equal to one another* He concludes that logical 
reasoning alone will enable us to keep our beliefs consistent with 
one another end yob be false* Hence logical reasoning alone, in 
morals will not tell us whet to believe? it will merely tell uo which 
combinations of beliefs are impossible, without enabling us to choose 
among the many logically possible combinations*
Various replications of the Piagetian approach to moral 
development (e*g* Whiteman and Hosier, 1964) report IP to bo associated 
significantly with level of moral judgement* Using Kohlberg•© 
measuring approaches, Simon and Ward (1973) and Graham (Unpub*) report 
significant relationship©* Kohlberg (1964) reports moderate 
correlation with 16 (r *» *31), but that moral judgement io highly 
related to ago with intelligence controlled (r *= *59). Kohlberg (1971) 
ototee that while 16 tests correlated with moral maturity, they do not 
correlate m  well as Piaget test© (Kohlbsrg and DaVrieo, 1969)* 
tee (1971) among other© discusses the superiority of Piaget test© os 
measures of cognitive capacity*
Arbuthnot (1973, cited in 1974) demonstrated a relationship between 
level of moral judgement maturity end the specific cognitive style 
field despondence - independence of uitkin et*al* (1962)* Sehleifer 
and Douglas (1973) in e pre-school sample found children highest on 
morel maturity were least impulsive in cognitive style end more? field 
independent* Qrookc-Ualeh end Sullivan (1973) from an investigation 
among tuonty-eight boys from 8 years to 11 years, using e Piagetian 
moral judgement situation, together with a general reasoning task and 
Piagetian causal Judgement, after finding no relation between moral 
judgement with causal reasoning and general reasoning, concluded that 
there Is consistency in level of response to various task© if th©
general level of reasoning is high* P«o support is available when 
low general reasoning ©cores are used ao predictors of level of 
response for the other tasks* Hardeman (1972) among 142, 1st Grade 
children using moral reasoning etoriee from Piaget and conservation 
end class inclusion tasks, found no direct relation between 
conservation and moral reasoning and class inclusion end moral 
reasoning, but identified great variation in moral reasoning scores 
for children who succeeded in all conservation tasks, than for those 
who succeeded in none? suggesting that the ability to give etructure 
of an operational kind to inanimate, visible objects may bo a 
prerequisite to the ability to give e corresponding etnecturo to 
moral situations* tea (1971) using adaptations of Piagstien and 
Kohlberg*e approaches to moral development and six Piogstion cognitive 
tasks, among 195 boys of 5 - 17 years, supported Piaget’s contentions 
that cognitive development and moral judgement "co-vcry according to 
tho different modes of conceptualization within the two dimensions of 
thought*11 Stephans at# al* (1969, 1972) in a longitudinal ctudy of 
the development of reasoning, moral judgement and moral conduct in 
raterdatec and normals, reports significant but moderate relationships 
between measures of reasoning, moral judgement end moral conduct* 
Kimball (1974) has focused on the dependence of cognitive development 
upon effective development end reports a high correlation between 
measures of Piagetian thinking end feeling* He concludes that if tho 
affective atmosphere can be conducive to inquiry through resolution 
of tension at the feeling level, cognitive growth can be enhanced*
Rubin end Schneider (1973) claim to have provided clear support 
for the hypothesis, that among 7 year olds there is a positive 
relationship between riecsntration skilly, as indicated by score© 
on communicative egocentrism and moral judgement and the incidence 
of altruism. Broun1© ot.cl. (1973) investigation suggested that 
accurate oppreieel of the interpersonal elements of a social situation 
io related to accurate perceptual activities in the impersonal world 
as well. Selman (1971) supported ths hypothesis that In middle 
childhood (8-10 years) ths greater ability to take another’© 
perspective is related to higher levels of moral Judgement (i*©» 
Kohlberg1© pre-conventional and conventional levels)* Further, that 
although reciprocal role-taking le a necessary condition for th©
development of conventional morel thought, it is empirically possible 
to obtain tho level of role-taking reciprocity end ©till remain at a 
preconventionol moral level. For empirical validation for the 
isomorphism or "one-to-one parallelism" of cognitive and moral stages, 
Kohlberg cites De Vries (1969), Selman (op.cit.) and Kuhn, Longer end 
Kohlberg, (1971)t
(a) Almost (03$) of children aged 5 - 7  who passed a moral 
reasoning task at Stage 2 passed a corresponding task of 
logical reciprocity or reversibility. However, many (82$) 
children who passed a logical task did not pass the moral 
task* (Kohlberg and Da Vries op.cit.)
(b) Feu, 16$ children ©god 0 - 11 at tho conventional stages 
(Stages 3 and 4) of morality, failed a corresponding took 
involving the inversion of reciprocity in a cognitive 
role-taking task. Some (25$) children who passed the 
role-taking task, did not achieve conventional moral 
judgement. (Solmen, op.cit.)
(c) All adolescent© and ©dulte using Stags 5 or 6 reasoning 
arc capable of formal reasoning on the Inholder and Piaget 
pendulum end correlation problems* Many adolescents 
capable of the latter showed no Stage 5 or 6 moral reasoning 
(Kuhn, Longer and Kohlberg, 1971). (From the findings of 
Kuhn, Longer and Kohlberg, Rest (1073) concludes that 
Stags 4 requires low-level operational reasoning).
Additional to Kuhn, Longer and Kohlberg (op.cit.) the only other 
known study exploring the relationship between the period of formal 
operations and moral reasoning is Keasey and Keasey (1974). Employing 
six Kohlberg dilemmas and throe formal operational tasks among 30,
Cth Grade girls and 24 "Co-Eds", Keasay and Keasey conclude that their 
study supports a hypothesized "centrality" of cognitive development.
U&th age held constant, the level of moral reasoning varied as a function 
of cognitive development. Further, logical operations ware generally 
confirmed as © pre-requisite to principled moral reasoning. Finally, 
there was a "docalage" between functioning in the cognitive realm ©nd 
that in the moral realm.
That there is parallelism or isomorphism between the development 
of the forms of logical and ethical Judgement has been stated 
emphatically by both Piaget and Kohlberg# However, the empirical 
validation appears insubstantial end further evidence ie required#
The provision of euch evidence ie the primary objective of tho present 
investigation, but it is hoped that it will also help to resolve a 
number of theoretical uncertainties in the area# for example?
1# The formal stage of cognitive development is a period in
Piaget*e theory that has received relatively little empirical 
attention* Uhen put to experimental test, a number of serious 
questions have emerged concerning the empirical status of 
formal operations# Piagot, (Jnheider and Piaget, 1958) stated 
that formal thinking develops between tho ages of 11 and 15*
An equilibrium point, should be reached ©t ago 15 years* A 
number of studies have reported low percentages of adolescents 
exhibiting formal thinking at ©go 15 years or at other ages 
during edoloocente or adulthood* (3ackson, 1958? Tieher, 1971, 
Lunzer and Pumfrey, 1966? Lovell, 1961? Tcralinson-Keesey, 1972? 
Ross, 1973? Dulit, 1972)#
2. Piaget has recently (Piaget, 1972) acknowledged research 
indicating differing results from the norms indicated from 
his ^snevan subjects (which he here states to be from ths 
"better" schools end which use "perhaps, based on a somewhat 
privileged population")* Discussing the effoegs of varying 
environmental stimulation end the point that the formal stage, 
being th© final stage, would ©how a greater; retardation Piagot 
concludes with ths hypothesis that "if the formal structures •*••« 
do not appear in ©11 children of 14 - 15 ysarc end demonstrate 
a loss general distribution than the concrete structures of 
children 7-10 years old, this could be duo to the 
diversification of eptitudes with ©go ••«•••*••• The span 
of aptitudes being greater ct the leva! of 12 - IS years and 
©hove all between 15 - 20 years, then at 7 - 10 years* in 
other words, our fourth period con no longer bo characterised 
os a proper stage, but would already seem to be © structural 
advancement in the direction of specialisation*" However,
a reconciliation of tho concept of stages with the idee of 
progressively differentiating aptitudes would state "that all 
normal subjects attain the stage of formal operations or 
structuring if not between 11 - 12 to 14 - 15 years, in any 
case 15 and 20 years# However, they reach this stag© in 
different areas according to their aptitudes and their 
professional specialisations (advanced studies or different 
types of apprenticeship for the various trades)? tho way in 
which these formal structures are used, however, le not 
necessarily the same in all cases#11 Piaget concludes "If 
we wish to draw a general conclusion from these reflections 
wo must first say that, from a cognitive point of view, the 
passage from adolescence to adulthood raises a number of 
unresolved questions that need to be studied in greater 
detail."
Kohlberg (1965) and Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) with respect to 
the development of moral judgement report at age 10 years,
Stage 1 responses are most frequent, followed by Stage 2, etc# 
Stages 5 and 6 responses are equally infrequent* By tho age 
of 13 years, tho sequence patternst 4-3, 5, 2, 1, 6, with 
Stag© 4 responses most frequent and Stag© 3 not very far behind* 
Appreciably less frequently used are Stages 5, 2 and 1, all 
about the same, with Stag© 6 least used* By the ego of 16,
Stage 4 and Stage S responses have increased further while 
Stage 6 responses remain at a low level of frequency* It 
seems very likely that with increasing ago beyond 16, there will 
be some tendency for a relative increcse in the frequency of 
Stage 5 and 6 responses* Kohlberg and Kramer, in fact, report 
a (barely significant) increase in Stag© 6 thinking botween 
16 end 25, Stags 6 responses remaining rare* Kuhn, Longer 
and Kohlberg (op.cit*) report that only 10$ of subjects over 
16 years, showed clear principled (Stages 5 and 6) thinking*
Kohlberg additionally reports (Kohlberg and flayer, 1970) that 
moral maturity at certain ages predicts adult terminal level* 
Children who do not utilize conventional moral reasoning by
13 yoar© are unlikely to attain principled reasoning or 
behaviour in adulthood* Tho second transition appears to bo 
In late adolescence, IS - 19 years* Research suggest that 
subjects who do not use principled thinking at least 20$ of 
ths titne by th© end of "High School" are unlikely to develop 
principled thinking in adulthood* Kohlberg (1970). and Kramer 
(1966) elaborate that the correlation between moral maturity at 
age 13 and at age 28 years was *78* In a small sample (12) of 
subject© followed from 12 years onwards, the correlation between 
morel maturity at age 12 years and age 25 years was *92*
8* Uhsn etudioe attempting to relate cognitive development to 
functioning in other areas ore examined, it is found that age 
rather than cognitive level has been relied upon m  the 
independent variable* while there is little doubt that 
cognitive, social and affective progress are systematically 
related to age, it would appear that studies are needed which 
employ stag© of cognitive development, rather than age, es the 
independent variable#
Post-conventional reasoning, th© highest level of Kohlberg1© 
hierarchy, presupposes tho capacity to form tho formal operations 
of abstract thought* The development of formal operational thinking 
ha© boon shown to bo prone to great variability, although 
replication© do not detract from th© essential validity of Piegst’s 
formulations, it would appear that clear principled thinking 
display© e greater degree of rarity and roaches equilibrium at later 
ago© than formal operation©* However, tho passage from concrete to 
formal operations end the transition© from th© various level© of 
moral judgement ere not all-or-none phenomena and it ie apparent that 
a study of a transitional period, within a narrow eg© range, with 
Isvol of cognitive development being the independent variable, allowing 
finer degrees of measurement rather then broad categorisation, from a 
mors extensive battery of formal operational tasks, would enable further 
illumination of the development within the logical thinking and moral 
areas* Further, additional data with respect to tho development of 
formal operations among British adolescents will be obtained together 
with tho collection of data emanating from the application of Kohlberg1© 
moral judgement interview to a British ©ample* (Graham (unpub.) and
Kotalewala (1971), Langford (1975, private comm*) ere the only known 
British studies involving the use of Kohlbergfs measure©)#
Therefore th© problem under investigation focuses on the 
relations between development© in the two domains, logical and morals 
to examine the actualized ontogenetic relation in middle adolescence 
between ©tages of logical reasoning and stages in a © o d d  domain, 
namely moral Judgement# Evaluation© will bo mads on ths general 
theoretical question of the interrelations among stage developments
a© they occur in different conceptual domains, involving an attempt
-0.1
to logically or conceptually relate developmentAStages in the 
logical and moral domains* Further light should be shod on the 
isomorphism of the two areas, together with further speculation 
with respect to the notions of the centrality of cognitive develop­
ment and a decalege between the acquisition of logical operations 
and their application to other areas of development# The hypotheses 
to bo tested may bo stated formally a© followss
1# That a relationship exists between Piagetian operativity 
and moral Judgement#
2* That measure© of logical reasoning ere relatively more 
effective Indicators of moral maturity than traditional 
measures of intelligence#.
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ft* INTRODUCTION
Piaget’s creation of a new discipline of genetic epietemology is 
essentially an experimental philosophy which seeks to answer 
epictemologicsl questions through tho developmental study of the 
child. Elkind (1567) defines Piaget*© theory in the most gensral 
sense, as "subject - object s$yilihration, the view that mental, growth 
is governed by a continual activity aimed at balancing the intrusions 
of the social and physical environment with the organism*© need to 
conserve its structural systems"* Piaget’s genetic epistemology can 
be seen to have evolved through three more or less distinct phases* 
initial focus on the parallels between the notions constructed by 
children and those maintained by the philosophers of antiquity* 
suggesting constancy-of modes of conceptualisation relatively indepen­
dent of historicultural conditions* together with demonstration that 
ths child spontaneously constructs ideas about the world which are 
erroneous from the adult view* provided a challenge to the "all - 
nurture" and extreme environmentalist views prevalent at the beginning 
of the century* The second phase involving a detailed study of the 
sensorimotor coordinations of infants* demonstrated the infantile 
forerunners of cognitive structures. The current phase* commencing 
about 1940, has bssn^ .concernsd with delineating the development of 
logics - mathematical thought from infancy through adolescence, with 
a recent extension to adulthood (Piaget, 1972)
Three themes Hava persisted throughout Piaget*© research: logic 
relativity and dialectics. Logic is inherent in the mind, in biological 
processes and in the lews that govern the physical world and ia therefor© 
the genotypic link between the phenotypic diversity of the sciences*
Ths inherence of logic in the primitive, psychic activity of the infant, 
to ths formal and systematic logical system of ths adolescent, is the 
basis of npistemology, Epistemological relativism permeates Piaget*©
thinking about the construction of reality? if an Eidstein had 
shown, conceptual judgements ware always relative to ths position 
of ths observer making those judgements, then the observer could 
never be left out in the construction of concepts. Therefore* 
reality can be seen as always Involving a subjective element, in 
the sense that it is in part* a projection or externaliEation of 
thought or action# Dialectics is synonymous with the dynamics of 
the acquisition of knowledge and Piaget introduced th® notion of 
equilibration as being the overriding factor that determines the 
mods of interaction of maturation* physical experience and social 
experience, Qklnd (op# eifc) paraphrases that "at each level of 
development there arc two poles of -activity? changes in the structure 
of the organism in response to environmental intrusion (accommodation) 
and changes in the intruding stimuli due to the existing structure 
(assimilation)* These two poles of activity constitute a sort of 
thesis end antithssis whose eventual synthesis in  effected by a 
process of equilibration"* Piaget (1967) elaborates that in the case 
of the lower* unstable (sensorimotor and perceptual) forme of 
equilibrium, the intrusion consists of real and actual modifications 
of the environment* to which the compensatory activities of the 
subject respond as best they can without a perparssnt operational 
system* In the case of ths higher or operational structures, the 
intrusion to which tho subject responds may consist of virtue! 
modifications; that is, in optimunr cases they can be imagined and 
anticipated by the subject in ths form of the direct operations of 
a system (operations expressing transformations)* In this case, the 
compensatory activities will consist Of imagining and anticipating 
the transformations but in an inverse sense (reciprocal or inverse 
operations of a system of reversible operations)#
0* PIAGET AND LOGIC
In alignmont with his emphasis on logic, Piegoi claims that 
symbolic logic parallels tho expediency of statistics as an instrument 
for psychologistsand in his Traits do Logiquo (1949) ho systematically 
outlined ths logical principles which cen bo applied to the intellectual 
activities of ths child* Piaget (195*?) emphasized that his aim is not 
to formalize psychological theories by means of logic but to apply
lexical techniques to tho psychological facts# The qualitative 
character of logic facilitates the analysis, specification end 
expression of the actual structures underlying intellectual 
operations as opposed to ths quantitative treatment of the behavioural 
outcome, tho concern of most conventional tests of intelligence# 
Referring to th© classical logic of ths pre-nineteenth century intent 
to discover .the structure of thought processes and the normative laws 
of ths mind and classical, philosophical psychology considering tho 
laws of logic together with the laws of cEthies to 'be implicit in the 
mantel functioning of each individual, Piaget regrate ths lack of 
collaboration between logicians and psychologists* Uith the develop­
ment of experimental psychology,- logical theory has boon excluded 
and concomitantly, an increase in the deductive rigour end formal 
character of logical systems has eliminated m y appeal to psychological 
factors# Piaget grants that from ths standpoint of. perfectly formalised 
axiomatic logic, logical relations are strictly applicable only to 
mathematical deduction, oinsoomry other form of thought merely has 
on approximate character#
Piaget in attempting to discover ths entities to which the logical 
structures correspond, dismisses three of ths possible explanations 
provided by ths progressiva formalization of logic."Platonism" 
cansidarlng that logic corresponds to a system of univassals existing 
independently of experience does not provide explanation with respect 
to ths discovery of tho universale; "Conventionalism", holding that 
logical entities cws their existence and I wm to a system of conventions 
ar accepted rules does not indicate reasons for tho effectiveness of 
application of those, conventions;and tfu8ll~far:;t3d language 
representing that logic is merely a language, cannot bs accepted on 
ths grounds that exporionco cannot bo interpreted in abstraction from 
ths conceptual and logical apparatus which make© such an interpretation 
possible end further, that logical relationships never appear as a 
simple system of linguistic or symbolic expressions. However* 
"OporaticnaliDm” providss raal ground on which logic and psychology 
can meat: sines logic is based on abstract algebra and made up■of
symbolic manipulations, operations play an indispensable rclo and ©a 
operations are actual psychological activities, all effective knowledge 
is based on such a system of operations#
Piagst (1957) thorofor© concludes* that in ardor to determine 
tho rotations between logic and psychology* it is necessary to 
construct a psychological theory of operations in terms of their 
cpnosin and structure; to examine logical operations* treating 
thorn oo algebraic calculi and m  ’^structured whole©” # and to 
compare tho results of those tub kinds of enquiries. • However* 
axiomatic logic is unsuitable due to its highly formalized 
mathematical character and linear order and as.psychological 
mechanisms contain elements connected in tho form of a•cyclical 
ssyofcem* Piaget considers it is necessary to interpolate between 
psychology and axiomatic logic* a ♦psycho-logic* or 1Lgq1co- 
paychology** constructing by means of tho algebra of logic* a 
deductive theory to explain some of the findings of psychology#
C* PXAG£T*SJLOGICAL mtEL
With' the publication of **The Growth of Logical Thinking? 
from Childhood to Adolescence (Xfihcl tier and Piaget, 1958), Piaget* 
•together with Xnhelder was able to present the most complete account 
of hi© ©tsgesin ths development of logical thinking* from further 
development© to .ths symbolic model by Piaget and a systematic* 
empirical study of the induction ofphysical laws in children and 
edolesconte by Inhelder* a- ♦striking convergence1 was found between 
the empirical and analytic results* Although'Piaget had previously 
©tressed a stags of development beginning at 11 -  12 years, Inhsldor*! 
data indicated a period of new.structuring leading to enothar level 
of equilibrium at about 14 - 13 years* ,This set of operational 
structure© were found to be based on prepositional logic and a 
9formal* mode of thought and further* the techniques of prepositional
* -vy a structured whole* ♦ctructura d’ensemble9 * ;LUigei refers 
to a system of elements4ofinod by a general sat of laws, ouch 
as the lauo which dofino a group or a lattice.,, for example* a 
logical groupemsnt is dofined by a set of five qpceatiana, end 
in this sense forms a *structure d’cttoamblG* (since the lays 
define the system as a whole) and io thus to be distinguished 
from the individual operations themselves” (flays* 1957)
logic were inadequate to analyze the integrated structures of 
operations, in attempting to explain tho additional presence- of 
0 series of operations! schemata* namely combinatorial operations, 
propositions* double-systems of reference, a schema of mechanical 
equilibrium* multiplicative probabilities and carrsXstlone etc** 
together with prepositional logic* Piegat found it necessary to 
refer to the ♦integrated structures’ on which they wore based; 
that is* to ths dual structure of tho laities and tho group of 
four’transformations. Further illumination was provided.for the 
earlier set of concrete structures and In holder and Piaget wore 
enabled to describe the changes in logical operations between 
childhood end adolescence, while analyzing and isolating the 
formal structures marking tho completion of tho operational 
development of intelligence*
The work records the results of fifteen separate experiments 
divided into those demonstrating ths dsvolopmant of prepositional 
logic and those concerned with the operational schemata of formal 
logic. Children aged from 5 1C years war© presentee! with 
apparatus which would enable thorn to daduce some more or less 
general principle by appropriate experimentation. By moans of ths 
clinical approach: tho experimenter recording tho behaviour of the 
child* questioning and prompting* the strengths and limitations 
of the strategies governing action were discovered# (Some of 
these experiments have imm utilised in ths present study and 
details arc? provided in Chapter Five end in the Appendices)*
The subjects* responses allowed categorization into four main ' :
groups? children of five or six years, approached tho problem 
subjectively due to thoir inability to dissociate their own action 
from their effects* From about seven years of ago, subjects worn 
more successful in initiating on event and judging the result*
•but wore unsuccessful in eliminating all ths remaining variables, 
using the method of wall other things equal*1* Even at eleven or
tm lm  years* unambiguous expsriiaants wars not’ spantansoualy 
davted? although adolaaccnts m m  able to realize the inadequacy* 
whan questioned# Only at -the ago of thirteen or fourteen m m  
adolescents able to spontaneously adopt iha strategy of dsiifsoratoly 
varying ©sch of iha factors in ten* holding all others constant#
From iha complete certe-ef ©xpertents, Piagai particularized the 
changes in logical operations beiusen childhood and adolescence*
At the end of the sensorimotor period- during which intelligent 
behaviour la limited to coordinating actions* the appearance of 
symbolic processes enables ths child 'to organize elementary 
representations and to develop a distinctive form of pro“operational 
'thinking betesn the ages of feo and eevsn to eight yaera* At thin 
level the child.is likely to explain static situations in terms of 
the characteristics of thsir configurations -at a given moment? uhen 
transformations are considered* they are assimilated to persons!' 
actions rather than reversible operations* Although there ©re 
tendencies toward the organization of integrated systems, the 
organization is dependent upon perceptual or incomplete end 
approximate compensations* in contra 3 t* to C.OC-SJ'3 1 oporafcions which 
entail complete compensations#
Piagot (Inhaldsr and Piaget* 1338} continues* "with the- 
eppearanoa of concrete thought* the eyetern of regulations* though 
maintained in on unstable stats until this point, attains an 
elementary form of stable equilibrium*' Ac it reaches the level of 
complete reversibility* the concrete.operations issued from iha 
earlier regulations a m  coordinated into dofinite structures 
(classifications, serial ortisra, correspondences etc*) which will 
he conserved far the remainder of the Ufa span”* the dichotomy 
batuson static situations and iron©formations no longer obtains as 
static situations ore subordinated to irons formations, in that 
evsry state io concreted of as the result of a transformation#
•Each position of a balance ©cole is soon os the result of previous 
additions and cub tractions of weight or of^^Litiss and Inequalities
introduced between the weights an the two arms of the apparatus 
and between tho dietanoos from the fulcrum, further* these 
transformations have a reversible form and the potentiality for 
coordination according to fired laws of composition* and are 
assimilated to operations resulting from the internalisation of 
actions and preparations! regulations from the earlier ©tags#
In comparison to ..the previous stages-, concrete operational' thought 
is characterized by on extension of the actual in the direction 
of the potential# In classifying a cat of objects, a oat of class 
inclusions is constructed to allow new objects to foe included in 
systematic relationship* new class inclusions being aontinually 
possible* However, the equilibrium field of concrete operations 
is limited both by the farm o f the operations involved.end the 
actual content of the notions to which they are applied* Concrete 
operations consist of nothing mors than a direct organization of 
immediately given dais? the operations of classification, aerial 
ordering* ogualization, corrospondDr.es sic* are means for inserting 
a set of class inclusions or relations into' a particular content 
(e*g* lengths, weights* etc#}, insane which ere limited to organizing 
this content in the same form in which it its presented# The role of 
possibility is reduced to a simple potential, prolongation of the 
actions or operations applied to the given content as, for example, 
%hen, after having ordered several objects in q cerieo, the subject 
knows that ho could do the seme with others, this by virtue of tho 
otme schema of expectation for serial, ordering that enabled him to  
perform his actual serial ordering”# from the standpoint of content, 
concrete thought has the limiting characteristic that it cannot bs 
immediately generalized to ell physical properties* It proceeds from 
one factor to another, sometimes with a lag of several years between 
the organization of ono, for example lengths, end the next, for 
example, weighto? due to the difficulty in ordering serially and 
equalizing objects whose properties are less easy to dissociate from 
personal action, such as weight, titan to apply tho same operations to 
properties which can be objectified ••more readily, such as length* 
Therefore, from the standpoint of content, ’’potential transformations
compatible with tho ©yafcsm Xinks’Vnioh determine the boundary line 
between real and possible operations, are atill marc limited than 
is implied by the form of the operations involved and again 
illustrates that tho form of possibility, characterising concrete 
operations is merely a limited extension of empirical reality® 
Additionally* the concrete equilibrium, although otable at the 
.interior of a given field* becomes unstable at its boundaries* 
instability occurs when fields have to foe coordinated* There is 
no general concrete compositions concrete thought is unable to 
solve ”all the problems rained by the interference of heterogeneous 
operations or by tho intersection of different properties”? only 
a limited set of potential transformations can bo employed# The 
elementary ^groupings” which constitute the only Integrated 
structures accessible at the concrete operational level are 
therefore eye toms of simple or multiple class inclusion or linkage 
and do not include a combinatorial system linking tha various 
elements n by n* The mechanicis of reversibility consists either 
of inversion (for classes) or reciprocity (for .relations) but the 
two are not intootvatod into a simple system* The most complex 
groupings in concrete thinking* multiplicative groupings involve 
the construction, of four multiplicative classes ABf AB% A*B and 
A*B®« The concrete thinker is unable to enumerate the factors 
exhaustively* cr to demonstrate conclusively* ih$ effects of those 
festers which ere discovered; there is a lack of systematic method 
end an inability to vary a single factor, eb one time* while holding 
the other constant® Piaget anticipates, difficulty in the 
interpretation of his differenttation between the coordination of 
possibilities characteristic of tho concrete operational child end 
the forming of hypotheses and emphasises that sfc the concrete stage* 
the child'-structures only tho rnelity on which ho onto end it? 
incapable of imagining what tho rani situation would bo if various 
hypothetical conditions wsbo fulfilled#
The find stags of formal thought emerges at eleven to twelve
years, culminates in' lata adoloscance and extends to the mature 
thought processes of tho adult* The significance which Piaget 
attaches to the change from concrete operations to formal 
operations is reflected in a change in the symbols of logic? 
from tho use of ?A«ndDf to tho logical symbols fp*q8 for the 
earns formal operation* Tho most distinctive property of  
formal thought is the reversal of the direction of thinking 
between ’reality* and ’possibility8 in the subjects method of 
approach. “Possibility” m  longer appears merely as m  extension 
of an empirical situation or of actions actually performed? it 
is “reality” that is nm secondary to ’’possibility”. ‘’Henceforth, 
they conceive of the given facts as that sector of a sat of 
possible transformations that lias actually corns abaufcj for they 
are neither explained nor even regarded as facts until the subject 
undertakes verifying procedures that pertain to the entire sot of 
possible hypotheses compatible with a given situation”* Formal 
thinking is essentially hypofchetico-dsductiue? deduction is no 
longer in reference to perceived reality but to hypothetical 
oteterasnte, to propositions (formulations of hypotheses or 
postulations of facte or events, independently of whether or not 
they actually occur)* The dsductivo process consists of linking 
up the various assumptions, drawing out the necessary consequences, 
even when tho validity is only provisional* and subjecting them to 
empirical verification* tilth tho proviso that all verbal thought 
is not.necessarily formal' in character, Piaget considers that 
concern with verbal ©laments m  opposed to objects its a prominent 
feature of formal thinking* Piaget is intent to stress however, 
that propositions! logic, although presupposing an inner verbal 
thought, is not verbal logic, for it offers a much greater number 
of operational possibilities, disjunctions, implications, exclusions 
ate. It is e logic of all possible} combinations and its reel power 
lies not in verbal support but in tho combinatPPiol payor which 
makes it possible ’for reality to be fed into tho set of possible 
hypotheses compatible* with tho data8* Piaget commonis that uhsn it
him realized that a verbal criterion was insrioqunto to define 
formal thought^ a definition in terms of a system.of “second 
degree operations” was sssughtj the structuring of relations 
between relations#, formal thought constitutes n combinatorial 
system, multipiications of imi Xfciplicstions? furnishing tho 
total number of possibilities*
In equilibrium, the eue«soiofi: of mental acts is affectsd 
not only by tho operations actually performed, but also by•tho 
m b it® set of passible operations in so far as “they orient 
the isufejoots .searching toward deductive closure0* Piaget centres 
on the distinction betm m  a momentary end partial .disequilibrium 
relative to a 'single* now problem, the solution of which is not 
immediately ■. visible and disequilibrium! whoro tho necessary 
operations have not bssn acquired* Pizigat (135?) in considering 
the %oct equilibrated pitiiclurosH*' reiterates tho view that 
.equilibrium involves the total set of possible operations 
const!tufeing a aystom.of potential transformations which compensate 
each other in so. far as•they conform to the laws of reversibility* 
and further* that, the final psychological equilibrium of the 
cognitive eiructurns is confounded with tho.reversibility of the 
•opsjraiions* '"nine© the invsr.se operations exactly compons&fco the-. 
direct transformations0* f!s posits whether reversibility of the 
operations engender thnir equilibrium* or the progressivo 
equilibration of the actions engender their, terminal reversibility* 
However “genetic analysis” seams decieivs that since the 
compensations which respond to tho intrusion adjust themselves 
only progressively* tho operational reversibility expressed by the . 
complete compensations must bo the result and not the cause of 
gradual equilibration*
1* Xntororoocsi tlonsl Operations as lattice -
the Sixteen Binary Oneratiane and the Combinatorial System#
The.network of hypothetical possibilities which tho adolescent’s 
newly acquired combinatorial operations have generated, constitute©
a lattice and from this fact, derives Planet’s assertion' that 
formal-operations have lattice structure#.
An indicated in tho previous section, ihs concretes operational 
subject in able to observe and record a limited number of..associations 
ba tutsan occurrences and nanoccurrencss of variables and an event#
It might ho established'that all four of tho following associations 
are found, to occur at ora time or another? A X 0 (X occurs with 8 
present), • A X 8* (X olao.occurs with 8 absent)# A1' X .8 (X 
sometimes falls to occur when 0 is present).and A* X Bf (x can ©iso 
foil to occur when 8 is absent)* These associations can he 
symbolized as a totality! (A X 0} * (A X Bf) * (A* X 0) * (A5 X B*) 
and ore a product of s- ons**onQ close multiplication* The concrete 
Operational subject cannot houover proceed much farther bolnn 
preoccupied with the immediate reality before him and expecting 
the solution to emerge from this multiplicative activity.
These base close associations have for the adolescent however#
© propositions! rather than a concrete class-produci significance*
In accordance with the distinctions mads in the prsvioue section# 
the younger subjects discover the associations in application to the 
data# whore&s the older* subjects are able to conceive associations 
©s propositions for empirical teat! prior to experimentation. The 
isolation of variables necessarily leads the subject to combine tho 
base associations among themselves wn by n” in which the multiplicative 
decs system sotveo so a base, “by this moans ho applies the simplest 
of groupings (classification) to tho most general (tho.table of 
logical multiplications) and ends up with a sort of sscomJ-dsgree 
grouping which coordinates all of the groupings in a higher orders 
system* since he cannot integrate them directly*1* This seeond^dsgrsa 
grouping formulated by application of tho gensralirotl classification 
to multiplicative associations is m m  other than an ,?n by n” 
combinatorial system. A sixtoorM-jlemont matrix formed by two 
propositions and their negatives is tho prototypo of tho combinatorial 
system due to its position as the smallest matrix to bo constructed# 
having only two variables (propositions)# each variable -having only two 
values (true or fairs)# Because so much of formal~stago reasoning is 
concerned with trying to relate
just tiao variables, all other things being held constant, the 
16-elcmianC matrix ie the combinatorial system recurring mast 
frequently in pisgefc5a logical "analysis of tho interview data*
In accordance uiih Piagafe^ s symbolic progression at the 
formal stage* F\ K B A X B* A* K 8 and A* K B* can noy be 
symbolised*
4c1 _*a — _
p\ q , p. q , p . q and p. q . From the four b&Bs associations
d@ri.vsd from p end q by ihsnumbers 1 to 4s 1 ^  p . q t 2 ~ p . q ;
3 « p. q and 4 « p . q * sixteen classes result from ths
various possible inclusions*
( 1) 0 i.a*, (p . r x *? ) v (p . q ) \!(p • q )
( 3) ai p . q
( 3) 2 i.CJ** p • P
{ 4} a i»0# 9p •q
< G) 4 i*c*, p .
< 6) 14*2 i«c«p(p ♦p;) v (p . q )
( 7) 14*+■*o i#e* {p • •"i 5 v {p . q )
( «) 1T?»4 1*0* (p. q ) v (p • q )
( 9) 2Hr r*iS X « 0 » (p- q, ) v (p-q X;
(10) 2•r 4 X * s *» (p. q ) V (p • q )
(11) + 4 1*0* (p • n ) v (P • q )
(12) 1 *r 2 4- rfO l*e* Cp . q ) V (p • q ) v Cp • q )
(13) 14*2 4*4 X o Ob {p •p 5 v (p • q ) V. Cp • 5 )
(14) 1 *+'*-* . •J #4*4 i*o* (p. q ) v CP • q ) v Cp • q )
(15) 2 3 + i*o« Cp .n*•*') tf (p . q ) V Cp • q )
(16) 1 .X.2 > ~ 4 X feO* (p •q ) V (p . q ) \? Cp * « )
Figure 1
• = Conjunction (botlgp . q « both p artti o’)
- = Bogation 
*s v » Disjunction {either - or- or both* p v q
ss " either p or q or both*}
Boyle (1969) sets out the following tabulation modified 
from Baldwin (1967) as indication of the relations between the 
sixteen binary operations, which are illustrated by means of 
truth tables.
Figure.2.
Key
P P
2 4
IQQ
1 3
2 4
representing 2 + 4  which in turn represents 
(p.q ) \I (p.q )
representing 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 which in turn represents 
(p.q ) V (p.q ) V (p.q ) V (p.q )
Interpr etotion cr.fi be clarified m  fallowst 
Truth table 12 is made up of tables 6* 7 and 9*
figure 1 indicated that:
operation 12 la cotnpomehd of operations 1, 2 and 3*
Figure 1 indicates that:
operation 6 is made up of operations 1 and 2
operation 7. i© made up of operations 1 and 3 and
operation 9 is fnndo tip of operations 2 and 3*
In Figure 2$ table 6 is composed-of table 2 (representing operation 1)
and table 3 (representing operation 2)
Tables 6 and 7 are connected to table 2 *
Truth table 2 & m m  what, tables 6 and 7 have' in common*
If reference is made to figure 1, it is found 
That operation 6 equals operations 1 and 2 
whilst operation 7 equals operations 1 and'3 
Tables 6 and 7? therefore have operation 1 in common (i*o* p.q)
In simplification of tho' expressions of the binary operations8 
Operation 12 » (p. q ) I? (p • q ) • (p * q )
yhen p is true* q nay bo either true at false* but 'that when p is
—  JH*
false then q is trues or alternatively p»q .
The conditions with which p =>q Is compatible or incompatible ■—
p = q e  {p.q } V (p.q ) V (p . q ) but p=>q /* p . q
Truth table 12 shows that the cells corresponding to p . q $ p . q.
end p.q arc acoup&cd but that the cell corresponding to p . 5 is
empty*
Therefore far operation 12* p=» q can be written.
Similarly operation 13 is equivalent to psq 
operation 14 ia equivalent to p^q
operation 15 is equivalent to p^>q
# =» « implication (if - ther^p® q a if p then q”)
=£ / a incompatibility (pop / p.q « tho relationship tfif
p then q 55 in incanpatibia with the simultaneous truth of
p and the falsify, of q).
Operation 5 e&uorts (p. q)'V ( p . q ) *
that p ie true whether or not cj io trusj p in true
Operation 7 assorts {p. q ) V (p, q ) »
that q is truo utefcher or not p ie true • .\ q is truo .
Operation. 6 asserts (p . q ) \f (p . q ) »
when p Ie true? q is true* when p is. feJ.ni? ;q it faloof/.p - q- 
Operation 0 assorts (p. q ) V (p . q } ~~
whpii p is true q is false and when p is fries q .is true,or p / q •*
Operation 10 assorts (p. q ) V (p . q ) *» q .
Operation 11 assorts (p • q ) V (p . q } »■ p .
it is already known that operations 2 **• S era p. 'q 5 p . q,* pfej and
p . a , respoctlvoly$ so tho table of relationships nay he written as
in figure 39 where the 16 binary operations are expressed-ns 
•proposition®! ralaticnshipo* '
16
p end q are independent
It can ho 8con from Figuro 3 how more complex relationships 
might bo expressed! p* (p => q) moaning, p is false and the falsity 
of p implies the truth of- q*
By combining together the 16 binary operations, 2H6 f.tertiary1
operations would bo obtained, (i-#c« 16 x 16).
65* 336 fquorternary* operations would to obtained, by combining 
256 ?tertiary* operations# • •
2* Ir>torpropasiiignsl flosrefcipns m  Group - The V&XB grmm
Synonymous with the lottips properties'are tho proportion of 
ths group. Piaget assorts, that tho formal operational pubjsot in 
certain problem situations attests.to a cognitive structure with 
tho properties of a four-group* a mathematical group, tiboso elements 
consist of four transformatiemor Identity (X)* ftegaiion (N)f 
Reciprocal (R) and Correlative (0)»
. Firstly* the four-group, directly concerns ths prepositional 
operations* riave.ll (1963) gives, the following illustration* based 
on Piaget* e explanations* of the -bransformafcion of p. v q into a 
different operation in a variety of, ways*
(i) This null transformation changes nothing in the proposition 
on which it is performed# If the proposition is p v q then 
I (p, v q, ) a p V£)} I (p«q ) » p#ij 1 (p v 5) B p  v qT; •
(W) This transformation changes ‘everything in the proposition on
which it bears* All assertions became negations and vice -
versa and all conjunctions (•) became disjunctions (V) and
vice versa# H (p v q) « ’ p*q * n (p «•’ tf) -ss (p v g * - . ;
N(p vq) = p-q
(R) This transformation permutes assertions and negations but
leaves conjunctions and disjunctions unchanged# For example 
H ( p V q) « p v tj# R (p.q-,) - p#q * ft (p a q) « p v q*
•(C) Tliis transformation permutes conjunctions and disjunctions
but leaves assertions and negations unchanged, n (.p v q ) «
P«q<» R (p#qc) « p. V q/; .
Those four transforsatiorts and C farm thn .elements of a
groin undar the operation of multiplication or combination# Tho 
mu!iiplica tion' of m y 2 or more of these four transformations is 
equivalent is‘the solitary'application of some one of them*
nrc « i» hr » c, ih * rj, r* inc « mm  ~ m stc#
Tho second application of tho four-group entails transformations 
within physical systems rather than transformations o f propositons 
per ss* The physical eyetom whose transformations have the IHHC 
'group structure contain two distinct and different operations p 
and' q which' have exactly equivalent outcomes .or effects* together 
with two other operations P* and q* which nullify p and p* flavcll* 
illustrates thus:
(I) I (p) * fh t U * ) « n* . - .
(fl) Vi (p) ^ p-3 r) (q) = q V  tt (p»)' - p3and H (tf-) » q .
(R) f? (p) " cji:'9 U (q) « p*$ R (p-;-) w q and n (q*H) « p .
(C) C * HR* C (p}'~ H [ft f p ) J « q* C (n) » p* C (p*) » f?* and
C(q*) *• . .
F'lavell discusses the connection hoiwssn the JHRC transformations 
with rsspsct to propositions (termed.by F lm te ll as the .logical IWRC 
group) end IHRC transformations in relation to physical systems 
(identified by Flov&iX•m  the physical IHRC group). Ho refers to 
Persons (1960) for support for the dieirintion between these two 
forms of tho group. Ho identifies Piagefcfe spperent treatment as- 
being essentially synonymous. However* Finveil*s interpretation 
of Piaget*o reasoning leads to the suggestion that the logical IflRC 
group Is a aubttchievGtnenfc of prepositional thinking and in manipulating 
and interrelating the sixteen binary propositions* the adolescent
realises that one is the reciprocal or negation of another and 
INRC group properties are acquired. Thus Piaget appears to 
consider the "logical INRC group", the bridge between the 
development of prepositional thinking and the "mors specific 
acquisition of a negation-reciprocal strategy in problem­
solving" which is in turn carried over to the solution of 
phyaical-systoms problems* with its entailment of the success­
ful coordination of reciprocal and negation operations. flavell 
concludes that adolescent thought can bs conceived "in terms of 
an integrated and unified group-lattice totality which forms 
the common genotype for a wide variety of differenfc-looking phenotypes. 
In accord with Piaget,s general equilibration model, formal- 
operational thought is a structure in equilibrium which integrates 
the structural elements of the preceding, developmental period"; 
implying the several concrete-operational groupings integrated 
into the lattice structure and the bringing into s single system 
throught the IMRC group, the negation and reciprocal operations 
previously isolated in separate groupings in the concrete stage.
It is of Importance to noto that the combinatorial system end tho 
IHRC group are not expected to be manifest and explicit in the 
interview materiel. They era inferred from the subjects capacity 
to seek for and to operate with those combinations which are 
necessary and sufficient to enable him to test hypotheses and to 
solve problems at the formal level. Thus as Dulit (1972) summarizes 
"they are conceptualized as latent rather than manifest and implicit 
rather than explicit”.
3. formal Oosrational Schemas
.m mb*in^aiimirrw mm
Piaget, (Inhelder and Piaget, op. cit.) examines tho operational 
schemata as opposed to the particular operations that constitute 
these schemata. Piaget defines operational schemata as "the concepts 
which the subject potentially can organize from the beginning of the 
formal level when faced with certain kinds of date; but which arc 
not manifest outside these conditions", flavell considers that the
adolescents cognitive achievements can be categorized on a 
general-specific dimension. Most general ie tho "structure 
dSnoernble," the integrated’group-lattice total structure which 
Piaget bel&sves to bo behind all adolescent thought. More 
specific are poriiclar and task-linked concepts which this 
total structure permits the adolescent to work out in the course 
of experiments with particular Piaget problems* e.g., the laws 
governing balance and imbalance of weight-scalo arms, in terms 
of weight on the pan, distance from the fulcrum etc. The set 
of conceptual instrumentalities which Piaget calls formal- 
operational schemas is at an intermediate level of generality; 
like the task-linked concepts, the schemas owe their existence 
to tho general lattice-group and are also used for the solution 
of concrete problems, but are more gsnoral in that each 
operational schema has application to a whale set of problems 
rather than a single problem.
Piaget describes eight schemas indicating the group-lattice 
connection and the concrete problems in which the schemas can 
be adapted; namely combinatorial operations, proportions, 
coordination of two systems of reference and the relativity of 
motion or acceleration, the concept of mechanical equilibrium, 
probability, correlation, multiplicative compensations and tho 
forms of conservation "which go beyond direct empirical 
verification".
Piagst therefore concludes that the various operational 
possibilities implied by tho Integrated structure, comprising 
the lattice end tho group found in formal thinking, give rise 
to tho organization of operational schemata* These schemata 
often differ greatly from each other ond are not linked together 
by subject, but they appear in more or less integrated form 
and even synchronously during tho formal stage.
Piaget concludes that "the concept of equilibrium proves
indispensable to causal explanation ••.««••••• it makes it 
possible for tie to understand how at a given level of development, 
intelligence takas up simultaneously all of tho directions opened 
up in this field as a function of the potential transformations 
which characterizes it as well as of the portions already structured". 
Piaget predicts that even if neurological considerations clarify 
his explanations at some later date, the structures of groupings, 
lattices and groups will reappear in this nsu perspective, resulting 
in the laws of equilibrium proving to be more general than when 
linked solely to behaviour patterns. Cybernetics currently permits 
the understanding of this linkage, since the problem in a homeostai 
©Iso proceeds by successive equilibration, within a system with a 
combinatorial structure (lattices) and essential lays of reversibility 
(regulations and groups).
4, Adolescent Thinkino
Inheltior and Piaget (1953) in their jointly written chapter 
regret the bias towards pubertal effects in psychological investigations 
of adolescence and contra on the paucity of concern with adolescent 
thinking. In later elaboration (pisget, 196?), Piaget ©ckowledgss 
a •characteristic affective colouration* during this period which 
causes a momentary disequilibrium, but' considers that pubertal changes 
would play only a very secondary role if the thinking and emotions 
characteristic of adolescents were accorded their true significance.
With the realization that there is more to thinking than logic, 
Inhelder and Piaget suggest that the structural, logical fcbsnsformations 
form a centre from which radiate the various more visible modifications 
of thinking which take place in adolescence. Although it can be 
postulated that tho lattice and group otructures are isomorphic with 
neurological structures and formal thought is likely to bo a 
manifestation of the maturation of tho nervous system, directly or 
indirectly related to puberty, fcha environmental milieu is of 
significance. Tho emergence of such structures is s product of 
progressive acceleration of individual development under the influence
of education. It is because formal thinking plays s fundamental 
role from the functional standpoint, that it can attain its general 
and logical structure; logic is not isolated from life, it is no 
more than the expression of operational coordinations essential 
to action. The necessity to occupy an adult role results in 
conflicts which are not satisfactorily resolved in •present-day* 
compensations and the adolescent adds to these limited compensation^ , 
a more general compensation of a motivation for change or oven 
©pacific planning for change. Thar© is participation in tha ideas, 
ideals and idsol6oie© of a wider group "through tha medium of a 
number of verbal symbols to which he was indifferent as a child"; 
and the adolescent is committed to possibilities, building systems 
or theories. A conception of life is formulated which allows 
opportunities for assertion and greater achievements than predecessors* 
However, there is manifestation of egocentrism in tho failure to distinguish 
between the personal planning for a life programme and the perspective 
of the grouppto fas reformed. Piaget (1967) further elaborates that 
-adolescent egocentric!ty is manifested by belief in the omnipotence 
of reflection, os though tha world should submit itself to idealistic 
schemas rather than to" systems of reality* "it is the metaphysical 
age par excellence •••••••• the self, ie strong ©nought to reconstruct
tha universe and big enough to incorporate it”. Dooontration occurs 
when occupational or professional training commences, resulting in 
transformation from idealistic reforming to achieving.
Parallel to intellectual transformations are two affective 
innovations involving Intsrindividusl feelings facing enriched by 
ideals and personality developing in relation to social roles and 
scales of values derived from social interaction, interlocking with 
the transformations of behaviour caused by the development of formal 
structures. Piaget considers affectivity to be the energetic force 
of behaviour, the structure of which defines cognitive functions, 
both being indissolubly united in tha functioning of tha personality.
The nations of humanity, social justice (in contrast to inter­
individual justice which is experienced at the concrete level)
freedom of conscience and civic or intellectual courage are 
ideals which profoundly influence the adolescent*s affective 
life.
D. CRITIQUE OF PIAGETS LOGICAL MODEL
Wallace (1965), Bruner (1959) end Isaacs (1951) are among 
those who circumstantiate Tisher*s (1962) comment that even 
Piaget's-critics admit his genius. Wallace commenting on the 
paucity of work relating to the growth of logical thinking 
prior to the Inhslder and Piaget's work, describes tho 1953 
publication as "nothing short of a revolution" in the develop­
mental study of logical thinking and Bruner considers the work 
"the moot important yet to appear." Parsons and Milgram in 
their translators introduction consider that the work goes far 
beyond most of the earlier works in its attempt to isolate and 
describe the mental structures on Which the reasoning processes 
are based. Au3Ubel and Ausubel (1966) regret that even Xnhblder's 
and Piaget's pioneering Work has not increased interest in 
adolescent intelligence.
Isaacs (1951) in a review of Piaget's "Traito de Logique" 
questions the adequacy of 910901*0 logical models he locates the 
multiple ambiguities and difficulties inherent in such notions 
as "and", "or", "not", "equals", "proposition", "implication", 
"truth", "not truth" and "validity" and considers that it is 
within Piaget*s "ethos" to establish a psychological grasp of 
the complexities involved, although this would not of course fit 
into tho framework of a calculus presented as a self-sufficient 
system. However, it would be within possibility for Piaget to 
provide tho psychology basic to to^bropiete logic .
Inhslder and Piaget#s discussion on adolescent thinking is 
considered by Parsons(196Q) to be inadequate; details are not 
expounded and there is little clarification With respect to areas 
different from the experimental problems cited throughout tha
book* In trenchant, logical criticism, Parsons considers that 
Pi&goi vacillates in Ms interpretation of the standard notation 
of prepositional calculus and his us© obscures certain features 
of Inferences which logicians call logical* This in Parson's 
opinion vitiates the claim that prepositional logic provides tha 
essential structure of tho final stage of logical development*
Ho protests against the amount of ambiguity.end obscurity in 
Piaget*© use of logical symbolism, further, that such notions 
as "reciprocity" and corrolativity are rather sophisticated 
relations of truth-functions and such & cansnand would fas dependent 
upon knowledge of formallogic. Empirical support for this 
criticism.is provided by Bynum, Thomas and Walts, (1972) detail© 
of which are given later in.this chapter*
Brains (1952) concludes that Piaget1© theory ©asms to embody 
an epistsmolagical confusion of .theproduots of reasoning (for 
example, sentences containing signs of operation) with the process 
(unknown) through which the products arc brought about* . Endorsement 
to this view had previously been expressed by Lunrer (I960) when 
considering than logical structure end psychological processes are 
not necessarily identical and te deduce.from the logical Inter- 
dependence of cartain concepts to their psychological relationship 
Is a dangerous process. Tha psychological processes, fundamental 
to the cognitive development of children need separate examination* 
Inholder (1952) has stressed that Piaget'© use of logical models 
in no way implies that he has decided in. advance that the real thought 
of tho'child should conform to the laws which govern logical and 
mathematical structures* The models represent the ideal system of 
all possible operations and research supports tho approximation, 
but not full attainment of mental structures, to ihsre models* 
Inhsldsr'o support is considered by Wallace as insufficient confutation 
-ior Piaget's critics*
Stressing tho logician© end psychologists objections to confusing
logic with thought, Howell end Simon (1972) show how logic 
contribute© to information processing psychology through the 
representation of ideas by symbols and the eonsGquont alteration 
in meaningful ways by precisely.defined.processes* A 
metaphorical use of the similarities botwahn logical manipulation 
of symbols on the one hand and thinking on the ether has a 
profound liberating influence upon modes of conceptualizing 
thought, problem'eSolving end decision-making processes. Symbol 
manipulation can refer to a much wider range of phenomena than 
■ simple deductive logic* Neusll and Simon attempt to show how 
ths problem-solus? can bo described and understood as an 
information processing system* Wallace (1958) favours-the 
information-processing approach toths developmental problems 
posed by Piaget's work for providing the neihodological break- 
through needed.
An indictment concerning Piaget's concept of equilibrium 
is forwarded by Bruner (1959). Considering Piaget's explanation 
to leek clarity,' Bruner promotes a further definition of 
equilibrium based on Piaget's descriptions: "each stags of 
operational thinking develops its m n internal consistency, Its 
own compensatory reversibility and predictability by virtue of 
being‘based on a set of rules of operation and that these rules 
can be described as logical structures"* Piaget's reflections 
on the effects of the immanency of the adult role are maintained 
by Brunsr to im the potential dynamism In Piaget's system In 
contract to the notion of equilibrium* Bruner elaborates that 
"logical structures develop to support ths now forms of commerce 
with tho world" and this accounts for tho lack of developments with 
respect to tha "abstract gift" within intellectually underprivileged 
families* In counter-argument thare would euroly be relevance in 
stressing that Bruner's observation is an inherent factor in 
Piaget's concept of equilibrium* Of some pertinence hero, Is a 
report of data from Coleman (1974) which permitted a tiiotincblon 
between present and future identity? 'it bncanis clear that while
present Identity ("who X am") remains relatively stable during 
adolescence, future indantity ("who I will be") does nut9*
Aueubnl (1964) also the explanation for the shift
from concrete operational to formal operational equilibrium 
to be insufficient* In a later paper (1965) hs postulates
f
the combined influence of three concomitant and mutiwliy
■ ’. ' t
supportive tiovelopniantal trends to account for the transition*
The subject tiovdbpo a working vocabulary of transactional or 
mediating terms, which' can-be developed into meaningful 
propositions mors readily related to cognitive structures 
and henco rshdor them more meaningful in view'of hie growing 
fund of stable, highsr-ordor concepts and principles encompassed 
by and mads available within that structure# Aftermany year© of 
practice in meaningfully understanding and manipulating relation­
ships with the aid of concrete-empirical properties, he gradually 
develops greater facility in performing those'operations so that 
they can 'eventually be affective without relying Csn properties*
flevell (1971) considers Piaget's concept of equilibration 
to he partly right, but considers clarification and specification 
are necessary, taghcther with research, before being adopted m  
sn explanatory construct* This would seem to'bo in concordance 
with Bruner's further elaboration that‘development will not 
emerge from Piaget's theory until hs attempts to.extend hie 
"theory of tactics" into o broader theory of strategy that tokos 
into account tho objectives toward which thought is forced-J to 
mom In order to copo with the goal-striving necessary for o going 
life and further, to isolate tho processes that develop neurotic 
defences and learning blocks* (Broham, .1965, suggests that the 
negative.sanction?? of intellect nnniovemnnt In adolescent poor 
croupe particularly among the lower-class and culturally deprived 
has o dotorrent effect# Ausubol (1965) reports findings In this 
rosp&ct for Moon youth).
EXkind (1561) has dotootedraoro 'than potential dynamism in 
Piegat's formulafcionas hs maintains that Piaget laakea no . 
^operation between drives and cognitive structures. Tho 
eppearsnce of now structures gives rise to m w  drives to ■ 
exereies those structures and exer&ise is aclf-reinforcing 
throught the production bf function pleasure. In the course 
of being exorcised, novel stimulation leads to the 
differentiation of now atrustyres which in•turn give rise to 
now drives in a continuous progression? this process is an 
Integral part of equilibration theory. A similar contention 
Is- expressed by Hunt (1561), considering Piaget's principle 
of new accommodative modifications and new eesimiliiive . 
combinations of schemata to be sources of function pleasure 
which -promote their rehearsal in practice play*
Piaget*© outline of the stages of dovolepmani is tho 
centre of controversy, particularly in regard to a natural 
transition revealed by new modes of'behaviour attributable 
bo tho emergence of a nsu intellectual level of operational 
structures, rattier than as a conventional analytic device* 
FauviXXe (195G) suggests that the stages found in intellectual 
growth era not features of the child's development but are 
inherent in tha logical and essentially hiorarthical organization 
of tha material presented* The view of natiuism viouc young 
children os poessreing all the processes of thought hut regards 
Piaget as wrong in asserting qualitative changes? the 
differences are attributed to the lack of appropriate data to 
manipulate pr knowledge by which to judge* (Isaacs, 1930, gives 
several instance© of logical thinking in very young children). 
Grown (1950) argues that tho cognitive processes of adults are 
more abstract than children, only in the sense that they manifest 
more discriminative generalization# . Hones he claims, that adults 
do not use a wider range of abstract concepts in their thinking 
■but merely employ a more highly differentiated repertoire of
suh-categorics within existing categories* However, If young 
children use generalization not requiring prior discriminative 
grta^pis, this can hardly be considered- s form of abstract 
thinking. It also eserss plausible to believe that 'adults also 
•tiss a characteristic greater number of genericcat©* goriss,(Wallace, 
McLaughlin (1963) -considsre that- if tha sdoloacsnt is able to 
retain up te eight concepts simultaneously he can carry out 
formal operations. Most fallacies In reasoning can bo accounted 
for on the hypothesis that tho problem being considered calls 
for tho construction of isora'concepts than can bs kept distinct 
in  tho Immediate memory# Attempts to'accelerate concept formation 
■have not on tho whole bean successful* illogical behaviour 
continues ©von when young children hove relevant knowledge*
Toulsiin .(1971) considars that bo fora ■dovalGprasnfcal psychologists 
©an establish © general sequence of daveloprssntal stags© thay 
must have formulated tho various physiological changes of limbs, 
organs and bodily nscchanisma and attempted to farm parallels 
with tho behavioural capacities for bodily control, sequential 
behaviour, aygboliration, internalization and problem-solving*
The resulting stages even then will be nothonly arbitrary end 
normative, but there will be on overlap into ethics with respect 
to desirability and obligation, thereby forming an ethical ideal 
of human development. At host, defining stages can only be a 
descriptive convenience* WaXlace (1972) advocates greater 
flexibility In research studies, with accepiancs of the 
inevitability of inconsistencies and Individual variations In 
subjects* responses and a consequent adjustment in the few 
critorlo employed in identifying dovolcpmentel stages« Piaget 
(1969) emphasises the flexibility within his conception of stages 
and clarifies that each stage of development is not so much 
■ characterized by a fixed thought content, than by © certain power, 
a certain potential activity capable of achieving "such and 3uchM 
a result according to the child's environment* Ho continues to 
maintain that common features can fan determined and are "an 
index of the potential activity differentiating each stags from
Ausvbol cemsicfsra fchsi e l t the argurasnfce involving the 
Ciradusl- reihsr than abrupt Lremiitonf' v&fftabliity within' and 
bete^n culturesi fluotdafclcms m m t t fm  uvar &!&&$ transition 
'to the Form! la togs occurring at different &gse for different 
subject fields end rorapsnent within a particular
field,' fail Its n®mn serious doubt for fch& Xagifcisscy of 
Pi&S&t*o stages# PmrMlfig a gtemn rtefp ©ecupios the s«j 
froquontAal position in all individuals and cul tores and reaches 
equilibrium before thsr.occurrence of Urn m:<t ©tape*. there in- 
compatibility tfas ofnrtHatmtlqned condition??? tha. ■ 
influence of genie and arwirennantal influences are being 
reflected* It l.s- interesting te note that Smrnr (op alt) 
postulates the presence of a §iags bnymd formal tfperatlenftt 
from fming "fXatohesdsd" to %&9-homi©dw, that In from being 
intelligent to being Intelligent about Intelligent?©# Riegol 
(1973) fscvass m  the .failure of Piagothj interpretations to. 
represent adequately ihn thought end emotions of isature .and 
creative persons-# If© consider© that for m  interpretation 
of adulthood end aging, a return to the dialectic baste it 
nvcossery* Such u reorganization dan prenooc! from any of tho 
four major 2m&lo of dovolapsftsnt ©nd introduces Intrsu - end 
interindividusl variations lute Magotfe thaory* fntlividuste 
may operate oifMltanoousty. or in short- eucereoicn at different' 
cognitive level©#' "Tho csassleso striving toward;forms! 
operations ttecrniss inappropriate end ineffective for tha level 
of dlalsetie maturity*" Following fticgel'o reflections, it 
would coonj appropriate to recall Piaget's (1972) recent - 
acknowledgement (r&rnady referred to in Charinr One) that from 
tho cognitive point; of view, tho passage from ttdolcecertoe its 
adulthood raises e number of unresolved questions that need to 
be studied in greater dotail# Following empirical ©vicUmus tsf 
differing m r m  bo those indicated from tho Genevan subjnote.
Piaget postulates that the less general distribution of formal 
structures could bo due to tho diversification of aptitudes 
w ith age* ■ '
Co ftCPLicATXo&s nm cnzrnwm of piagst8s E K p m m m m  mmt
The formal stage of cognitive development is a period in 
Piagststheary that has received relatively little empirical, attention* 
tnholrisr and Piaget (1933) stated that- formal thinking develops 
botuoon the ages of 11 to 15 years Kith an equilibrium point being 
attained at age fifteen years* The direct empirical question is 
therefore concorned with tho percentage of adolescents exhibiting 
formal thinking at tho ago of fifteen.years or at other egos during 
adolescent or adult life* 3ackson (198S), Tisher (1962, 1971),
Lunzer and Pumfrey (1985) and Lovell (1981) reported fifty per 
cent or loss of subjects manifesting formal thinking at the ago of 
fifteen years* Lunzsr and Punfray focus.on tho lack of ability 
of the loss than five per cent of fifteen year old children of ' 
average intelligence successful In the', balance 'situation to explain 
the principle of balance# Pupils tiho.solved the problem using 
proportional reasoning did so quite mechanically - they multiplied 
and divided because the procedure gave them tha right answer.
Kona would find any sort of approximation to tho law of. moments#
Lunzer and Pumfrcy gain support for this finding from Lovell (op# 
cite) and 3sc!<oon (op«eit*) who suggest that only bright pupils 
could'interpret tho situation even at fifteen yoaro# tilth raepsct 
to younger children, TomlinsarHvsasey identified ihieiy*«ttto per 
cent of eleven year old females subjects operating at the formal 
level? of fhs fifty, eight to ten year olds, with I#n*#s 140-f, 
in Lovell and Shields (1967) study, only ten per cant mere at 
tho level of formal thought? it uas only rarely that Lovellfo 
%voraoo«*to«-brightu junior school children reached tho stage of 
.formal thinking^ Yudin (1956) and Koten and Yudin (1984) 
identified significant gains in tho utilization of hypothesis
testing from twelve to fourteen years end in the study of 
Dulit (1972), m  subject in the youngest fourfeeon year old 
average group functioned at tho fully formal level on both 
tasks and only two out of the tusnty-ono subjects in one 
task# When^relaxed criteria wore adopted, i.e. reasoning 
corresponding to Piaget*s ffc&go XIXA, tho percentage rcso by 
anlynino-pcr cont# 'Tomlinson^ Kcsasy found aixty*88Vdn "por 
cent'of fcmala college undergraduate© functioning at tho 
formal level (although this dropped markedly to tuenfcy-thrco 
per cont when mor©stringent criteria wore applied) with the 
■fifty*four yoar old female sample revealing a percentage of 
fifty four# Rose (1975) was in agreement with Tomlinson-Koas©y * 8 
findings that a ooiloga~oducated sample has significantly more 
than fifty per cent of tho subjects functioning efc the formal 
level, however percentages m ve less at tho most developed 
etags for formal thinking* Griffiths (1974) reports that 
only thirty-nine per cent of college students scored at tha 
Stage XXXB level# Dulit (1972) found twenty-five percent of 
avcrggs seventeen year old adolescents to function at the fully 
formal Xevai together with thirty-three par cent of tha adult 
group (20*55 years)* Sixty percent of the gifted sixteen to seven- 
toon year old subjects ware fully operational? sovonty-flva per 
cant in the coca of boys# These studies thsroforo suggest that 
formal operations can bo attained efc very different agas but nan© 
of tha studios detract from the essential validity of Piaget1© 
formulations*
' Lavall's (1961) study was ana of tha ©arliosfe oxtonsivs 
follow—Lip studies involving ton of Piagot*© experiments with 
two hundred subjects between eight end eighteen years, together 
with ton training collegs students and three adults# Lovell 
considered that the main stages in tho development of logical 
thinking proposed by Inhslder and Piagett ware confirmed, although 
tha least able secondary pupils remained at e low level of 
logical thought even at fifteen years, a finding not reported
by Inhsldo? and Pisgot. Lovsll reports considerable agreement 
between the levels of thinking that the subjects displayed in 
the four experiments (details era given later in tha section 
dealing with statistical inveatigations}* Tha majority of 
the protocols showed much tho ssms kinds ’ of reasoning as 
evidenced among tho Swiss subjects end supported many of the 
Genova findings. However* Lovell illustrates e comparatively 
lower incidence of opontanaity and sophistication and 
speculates.that Inbolder end Piagat have somewhat foread tho 
dsvolopmont of tho childfa thinking into n thssrectical frame- 
work* but this class not els tract f ran the provision of valuable 
insight* .
Beard (1962) achieved almost diamsiricsXXy apposed results 
to .those of Lovell* Fran the pendulum experiment* Sscrd concluded 
that there.was no evidence of cla&r~out ©iagos corresponding 
either with, age or intelligence and that younger children may 
roach the higher stages: information and ecioncc teaching (or 
. lack of it) snppoaOoff to influence ths responsss. In fchs shadows 
experiment tho results mgrood somewhat mere closely with those 
of Xnholder and Piaget. However* some of the younger subject® 
ware more advanced then their Genevan counterparts ©nd there 
wore a substantial number of older subjects who despite good 
.intelligence end science teaching were nsf^diarsetoristlc with 
x*cspsct to formal thinking*
Ouiii (op.cit,) considers that his study contains results' 
which gondrolly support* but' which Significantly qualify” eotso 
of tho central thoaics of Xnheldor and Piaget1© formulations. In 
tho group of average older adolescents* only twenty to ihirfcy-fiv© 
per cant functioned at a fully formal level with tho seme 'oodeatf 
percentage© applied to ths trspat checkof n email group of average • 
adults. In order to find consistently higher percentages it um ncccooary
to turn to increasingly select groups5 *mvonty~fiva per 
cant of scientifically gifted* Dulit comments that ih© 
formal atego appears to differ ©ppraoisbXy end significantly 
from the earlier .Piogetien ©tagcs in which full developiaent 
appears to ho tho rule* whereas at ths formal 'stage it appears 
oo the exception. Although Inhelder and Piaget give the 
impression that formal thinking is tho rule in adolescence* 
nowhere i n their work is ths explicit claim that all (or 
'wen mast) adolescents- actually function at the fully formal 
level6 . fault in personal communication with inheXtier confirms 
that indeed not all m tm  w&vb reported* - The orientation 
involved the description and,formuletion.'for ths first time* of 
the characteristic© of the formal stages there was n o . 
intention to speak to tho frequency or incidence* Protocols 
wars used simply as illustration* Dulii concludes therefore* 
that there is no real conflict between tho results of his 
study end the essentials reported by Inhsldor and Planet.
Further* that, the formal stage is therefore more of a 
characteristic potentiality only sometimes- becoming, an 
actuality. The introduction into the model.of at lenst some 
other concept such as ndropcufc” rate or wbrenchir»gM into 
parallel tracks* representing tho development of alternative 
patterns of thought involving only partial or minimal develop­
ment of-the' capacity for formal thought appears to be necessary# 
The Piegotiah- formulation gives too little attention to variations 
within the formal stage* to ho a functioning psychological- reality 
(Piaget*a 1972 acknowledgements op* cii# offers some support far 
Ouiit’s reflections)* It. can bo speculated that one explanation 
for tho lou occurrence of fully-developed formal stag© 
functioning in the normal papulation' compered to the incidence 
of earlier stages is duo totho lack of demand for such development 
The lack of concrete level functioning An eo&e primitive societies 
lends further credence to ©peculation.cbncorning ©omo connection 
fooiwson tho ,sdemsnd function” of the society and tho degree to
ecraa pertinence hero to note that Dasen (S?2) emphasised ths
accumulating evidence from orooq-culiural'studies with raspoofc
to tho non-attainment- of .cancroteopsrsfcionaX thought in'
subjects mjsd from -twelve to eighteen yasra snd further,: ths
studios of Goodnou (I9£i2)f Peluffo (1957)* uiero (1963) end
Kelly (1970) lend credibility■to Piagstte prediction- (1966*
p*13| .1903* pp. 97-99) that tho reasoning of primitive peoples
would .not develop beyond the stage of concrete operations$(Berry 
and Dasen, 1.97*0*
Bynum, Thomas and iteite (1972) challenged Inhoidar and 
Piaget’s clelm that all sixteen binary cpsrations of truth- 
functional login are used by a fully developed operational 
thinker. Bynum ©it-* al. note that the evidence that the . 
sixteen are fully employed is based on a single protocol from 
the Invisible. Magnetism ie.sk* Representing logicians and 
developmental psychologists, repeated unsuccessful attempts 
were made to find or devise expressions in everyday language 
that correspond to six of tho specified operations namely* 
nonimplication, inverse of converse implication, inverse of 
independence of p in relation to qj inverse - of'independence 
of q in relation to p, complete affirmation or complete negation. 
During several years of teaching and studying logic, the 
specified operations wars- not observed except in technical logic, - 
where tho expression consisted of logical symbols. College ' 
students ofiogic, even while solving complex problems used only 
a few of the mast common truth functional operations, and never 
tho specified six. After studying Inhoidor and Piaget’s scoring 
procedure, it was concluded that eight of .tho binary operations 
wars not correctly interpreted and tho•evidence fdrihair existence 
was not discernible* They therefore question tho uoe of the 
sixteen binary operations of fully developed formal operational 
thinkers- end the suitability of tho task of Invisible ftagnefcisin 
for the detection of such a use. Woitz at* ai* in a replication 
of Inheidor’o end Piaget’s results with respect to the cixtaan
binary operations with ci random sample of 57 subjects from nim 
to sixteen yeors found none of the subjects used more than 
five of the sixteen operations, and that thsro was'no develop­
mental trend with regard to the number of operations used* A 
trend woo .manifest, however, since the mors developed roaeonor 
used the. earns operations os the lees developed reasansr, but 
in a more complex and sophisticated manner.
Yudin (1962, 1954, 1965) and Kotos and Yudin (1554) intent
to determine tho role of age end intelligonco in concept attain-
isonfc among teolve, fourteen and.sixteen year-old adolescent
males, have indicated'that tes-Ivo year olds of average intelligence
were significantly Xc-ss efficient than either the fourteen or
sixteen .year olds of avsr/ags intelligence and followed a✓
significantly greater number of strategies consistent with the 
concrete operations of the proadoloscent* The older subjects of 
average intelligence did not differ among themeelves but when 
compared with the younger subjects followed a significantly 
greater- number of strategies which rsflattc'd the proper use of 
hypothesis formation and testing characteristic of late • 
adolescent and adult thought* Tho subjectsof XowinteXllgcnsa 
however, showed c different pattern, with the sequence of 
development indicating no significant changes from ego twelve 
to age fourteen, but significant changes from aga fourteen to 
cgs sixteen* For iha high intelligence sub-group,'tb© results 
pointed to almost linear- development with increasing ago being 
positively correlated with increasing.efficiency. Thus, even 
ot ago twelve, the high intelligence sub-group mas functioning 
at or above the level that tho middle intelligence sub-group 
failed to reach until•ego fourteen* The age of commencement 
of formal thought in high intelligence subjects end tho "celling” 
for gains in efficiency wore further challenges to Kates end 
yudin* The 1564 study presented relevant information for tho 
latter with the indication that in the role of.memory in concept 
attainment offto«ng. college students, all college students,
seventeen to nineteen years, performed at c level superior to 
that reached even by the sixteen year old high intelligence 
subjects* Although the concept of mental age breaks down at 
sixteen, it is important to consider the intelligent adolescent 
and adult as a dynamic anddeveloping individual, rather than 
remaining static at sixteen years. At the converse level, it 
ia of relevance to note Dackaon’s study (op. cit.) in which 
the E*S*f»?* children showed very little increase in scores beyond 
the age of nine years and there was suspicion of a deterioration 
between thirteen and fifteen years*
Inhelbsr and Piaget’s work does not differentiate between 
the sexes and in this respect research findings have bean 
ambiguous. Ross reports a significant difference among under­
graduates and considered his findings to support ClXind’s 
(1962) social rols hypothesis, that formal tasks differentiate 
between tho sexes because of the adolescent female’s aversion 
to science, particularly as the females were equal to or 
superior to males in general intelligence measures. Dulii 
(1972) reports that boys functioned at the fully formal level 
significantly more frequently than girls* For the three older 
groups, the percentages for boys were from twieo to four times 
as great as those for girls. Field and Cropley (1959) noted 
the superiority of the boys in tho development of formal 
operations between sixteen c.^eighteen years and Oraybill 
from eleven to fifteen years. However, Tisher (op* cit.) and 
Saarni (1973) report no eex differences.
fteimarkC end Slotnick (1970) commenting on the importance 
of language at the later levels of thinking, centre on the 
lack of evidence with respect to tho development of understanding 
of ouch fundamental language elements as quantifiers (all, soma) 
and connectives (or, and) in the context of logical statements. 
Ths investigators administered an English translation of two of
the tasks of Miits and Magana (1966) involving logical connectives 
and replicated ths major findings* Inclusion end exclusion were 
understock by a majority of ©van the youngest children of nine 
years* intersect (conjunction) was understood by a majority of 
ell but the youngest children end union (disjunction) was not 
understood by the majority of the subjects except at tho Collage 
level* This difficulty in dsaling with disjunction confirms 
the contentions of Piaget ©nd Inheidor and further caused 
fterlm&rk ©t* el to speculate that there may be difficulty in 
tho understanding of the word "or”* Tho moaning of ’and* is 
learnt quickly with no ambiguity, however "or" io often used in 
an exclusive cendo of "one or the other but not bsth"s 
conceivably ths subject may not be conversant with tho Inclusive 
interpretation* Maim.ark (1970) attempted to trace in a group 
of pupils aged fifteen to eighteen years, the development of the 
understanding of logical connectives and to illuminate ths 
reasons for the apparent late appearance of the comprehension 
of "or”* Analysis revealed that this comprehension develops 
during this ©go range and errors suggested that dealing correctly 
with disjunction requires formal operations, errors resulting 
from the application of inadequate concrete operations# The 
description form of ths test indicated that "or” was not used 
spontaneously by the majority of the subjects despite the recent 
completion of a test in which the word appeared eight times* 
"Except" or "all but" wore also infrequent. 3onos (1972) examined 
the performance of two groups discrepant in verbal ability on 
three tasks designed to assess formal operational reasoning# The 
sample consisted of teonty-teopairs of grads 6 bays. Each pair 
jyac matched for intelligence but discrepant with respect to verbal 
ability and the use of tentative statements# Two Piagation tasks 
ware used together with a relatively languagc-frao problem-solving 
task# Boys who worn deficient in verbal ability and who used fsaay 
hypothetical statements in speech showed no lose ability te think
in hypothetical terms than did boys whs had more verbal facility.
Such findings support Piaget*o contention that the level of 
cognitive development is not dependent on concurrent language 
development* Speech variants are not directly related to formal 
operational reasoning - uhilo elaborated opoach variants may 
well bo more affective as a vehicle for communicating propositions! 
reasoning, they are not to bo viewed as being a prerequisite for 
such reasoning. Additions! exemplification le provided by Forth 
commenting in 1969 that propositions! operations are manifestly 
closely tied to ths exorcise of verbal communication and further 
that an advanced stage of development without ths use of language 
cannot he envisaged, advocates the study of intellectual development 
in deaf persons, furth end Younis (1971) using tasks based on tho 
Piagatien modal, assessed the functioning of deaf persons beyond . 
ths stags of concrete operations. Tho study indicated the 
facilitating effect of linguistic use on certain formal operations 
expressed in a symbolic medium. Forth interprets teat it is the 
figurative medium for symbolic statements that causes language to 
be more closely related to formal than to concrete operations*
Saarni (op. cit*) focused on the contentions of Simon and 
Newell (op. cit.) that a theory of.human problem-solving should 
answer questions relating to prediction of performances on specified 
tasksi give explanations of tho problem-solving process| demonstrate 
how changes in the conditions of the problem-solver or the task 
alter problem-solving behaviour, i.e. eaplain how specific end 
general problem-solving skills are learned or acquired davslopmsntaXly 
and predict incidental phenomena that accompany problem-solving. 
Therefore Sasrni’e objective was to compare problem-solving 
performance among formal-operational, trensitWfet and concrete- 
operational subjects with the effect of relative field independence 
(Uitkin’e theory of cognitive style). The results indicated 
Individuals classified as formal operational (or transitional) m m  
generally more competent'problem-solusrs on the productive thinking
problems then tho concrete-operational subjects* Thereby,
SaarnI claims to have provided an overall theoretics! framework 
frost which to understand and interpret differences in complex 
doductivo problem-solving performance* Dulit (op*cit.) emphasizes 
differences in problem-solving style for those.©objects failing to 
function at fully formal lave!# ’Standard mothod types1 lacked 
the power of formats tag© thought for the solution of m u problems 
but adapted tho problem at hand to some standard problem with 
standard solutions* Dulit considers this to b© adequate for "every­
day life", particularly with respect to tho fact that tnapy of the 
students ranked at the top of their class in a difficult and 
soXoctivQ school*. Inspiration.©! subjects, occurring mars comotHy 
among subject® in an average school* would leap to © solution, 
but could giva little by way of explanation* • Tending to be "arts 
and letters" students*.they were probably concerned in cultivating 
other mpmba of themselves# , These dual typos fit with Hudson’s
(1965) convergent and divergent cognitive styles* '-Dulit considers 
that ths epfcifrtisl formal-stage function might be identified with 
spins balance (equilibrium) between divergence and convergence 
especially since Piaget quite explicitly Identifies tho Combinatorial 
Matrix as having ths virtue of bring the framework within which one 
can both focus -down on e particular crucial combination-antl/br 
freely generate all possible relevant ©ostbimtiomi* Ths subjects 
functioning at the' fully formal level# manifested however# a ©ore 
convergent style, suggesting either that they were influenced in 
that direction by the nature.of the problems that call for © right 
©newer or that thsooncept of the formal stags is mors appropriate 
end useful m  a model far convergent styles of thought m  compered 
with divergent stylos* Formal operations may in theory relate to 
divergent thinking but may not capture tho naturally crucial 
features of that style*
( Familiarity with the content of the task appears to facilitate 
the use of formal thought* Further, credibility appear© te 
Influence the situation* Lunzer (1965) points out that in ths
experiment involving ”failing bodies on an inclined piano”, 
logical necessity and initial belief arc concomitant,'unlike 
the experiment involving tho "oscillation of a pendulum” whore 
initial belief suggests that weight must bo a relevant factor*
Lovell (1971) ciiso a study (not identified) at Leeds involving 
female College students eighteen to nineteen years, many of 
whom maintained that weight must be a relevant factor in spits 
of their own evidence to ths contrary* This initial belief 
appeared to arise from the fact that there in always a weight 
on a grandfather clock to give energy to the system. Other 
work at Leads suggests that there is a positive relationship 
between attitude to subject matter and performance* Both concrete 
and formal thought appear later in history than in many other 
school subjects* Sticht (1971) comments that the factors of 
familiarity, credibility end student attitudes are all interrelated 
and they act in soms unified way to permit the eturiant to deal at 
a formal operational thought level with given subject matter* He 
postulates the hypothesis that whsnevera parson capable of formal 
thought encounters an unfamiliar task, the probability of instances 
of formal thought operations decreases* Sticht suggests there may 
be ontogenetic development of thought structure which follows 
Picsgot*e stages and subject-matter development of thought structures 
following the ssmo stages*
Cross-cultural studies such as Peluffo,e (op. cit.) work in 
Southern Europe suggest that combinatorial reasoning and 
anticipatory thinking wore strongly interfared with by an undar- 
dm&lopod mTliau and by lock of schooling. Goodnou and Bethon
(1966) showed the poor performance of unschooled eleven year old 
Chinese boys on a task involving combinatorial reasoning, although 
they m re able to conserve weight. Similar findings wore noted by 
"Kimball (1968) in flslawlfe end Lovell (1969) has reload the question 
as to whether ths traditional African cosmology retains the onset of 
formal operational thinking*
Research has therefore shown that subjects from varying 
environments give results differing from tho norms indicated 
by Inholder end Piaget*a pioneering sample. Piaget (1972 
op* cit.) acknowledges these differences by suggesting that 
research has shown that generalizaLiens cannot be mads,on the 
conclusions of the Geneva resaax'ch which was pf?rhpps based on 
a somewhat privileged population. However, he emphasises that 
the orginal observations have bean confirmed in many cases and 
m m  to be true for certain populations* Tho difficulty lies 
in understanding why there arc exceptions and whether those 
are real or apparent* It can bo speculated that differences 
in the speed of development would be duo to the quality and 
frequency of intellectual stimulation and that therefore- 
development would occur between fifteen to twenty years rather 
than eleven to fifteen years or that It will never emerge? 
secondly, that aptitudes of individuals differentiate 
progressively with age, in which case, formal operations can • 
no longer be characterized ac n proper stage but would already 
seem to be a structural advancement in ths direction of 
specialization* Ths most probable Interpretation allows n 
reconciliation with the concept of stages and the idea of 
progressively differentiating aptitudes? that all normal subjects 
attain the stage of format operations or structuring if not 
between eleven to fifteen years, in any case between fifteen to 
twenty years* However, they reach this stage in different areas 
according to their aptitudes and their professions! specializations 
(advanced studies of different types of apprenticeships for tho 
various trades)$ tho way in which those formal structures are used 
however, in not necessarily the came in all cases* One of tho 
essential characteristics of formal thought appears to be the 
independence of its form from its reality content. At the concrete 
level a structure cannot bo generalized to different heterogeneous 
contents but remains attached to a system of objects or tp the 
properties of these objects? a formal structure seems gsnoralizablo
as it deals with hypotheses® However, it is one thing to 
dissociate the form from ths content in a field which is of 
interest to the subject and within which he can apply his 
curious!ty and initiative and it Is another to be able to 
generalize the earns spontaneity o f research and comprehension 
to ci field foreign to the subjects career and interests. 
Therefore ths passage from adolescence to adulthood raises 
a number of unsolved questions, particularly with respect-.to 
the possibility of demonstrating at fiftoon to twenty years, 
as at'previous levels, cognitive structures common to all 
individuals which will bo applied or used differently by each 
person according to his particular actlvltes. The analysis of 
.probable, processes of differentiation.is required, involving 
ascertaining whether the seme' structures arc sufficient for 
ths organization of many varying fields of activity allowing 
differences in the way they arc applied or whether there arc 
new structures still remaining to be discovered.
With respect to attempts to train formal operations,
Lovell (1971) summarizes that tho scattered and fragmentary 
evidence available ie consonant with ths view that training 
on tacks involving thought has little transfer value before 
the age of thirteen years. Lovell specifically refers to e 
study (not identified) at Leeds in which training was given 
heurictic&lly* It was only among the thirteen year olds in 
a modified and more complicated form of fch® balance 'task in 
which more variables were isolated. Lunzer and Ccombss (1969) 
used guided instruction designed to assist subjects at the 
ages of seven, nine, eleven and thirteen years in realizing 
the importance ofhoiding constant all variables not under test 
and.to arrive at an adequate realization of the scope of a 
combinatorial system through the presentation of three Piagetien 
situations at paints previously revealing inadequate reasoning, 
Uhon confronted throe months later with variants of th© testing 
situation, together with a new problem - tho results showed
quite marked advantages to the taught subjects, changes being 
most apparent in tho oldest cge group, Lunzsr and Coombs© suggest 
tentatively that formal reasoning may be defined in  • terms of 
ability to profit from instruction* Slegler ot*el (1973) 
attempted to teach ton and eloven year old subjects tooolve 
Inhelder end Piaget's pendulum.problem* Tho results replicated 
Inheldsr and Piegat's observation that ten and sloven year olds 
do not often solve the pendulum problem unaided, but their 
inference that tho student*s cognitive developmental level would 
not allow benefit from instruction, was not supported* Tomlinson* 
Koesey (op, cit*) incorporated training with female 'subjects, 
eleven, nineteen.and fifty-four years according to tho individuals 
current level of cognitive development involving conflict between 
existing structures and reality together with active participation* 
The training led to a significant increase in tho performance of 
all age groups on the immediate post-test, but there was a lock 
of gsnerality to the delayed post-tests* An interesting feature 
ms that the fifty-four .year old woman progressed less after 
training then the older groups and wore less likely to maintain 
a training effect* TomlinsorHCeasoy speculates about ths areas 
in which formal operations are being assessed end concludes that 
it is certainly possible that applying the operations characteristic 
of formal thought to'different arses is e life-long endeavor.
Sticht (1971) suggests that it is not to fee concluded that ths 
development of stages cannot bs accelerated, but rattier that 
diacovory methods nay hot tm appropriate* He alternatively 
suggests didactic approaches, systems principles, task analysis 
and synthesis and ths importance of stating clearly and distinctly 
tho Instructional goal to bo attained.
f* . STATISTICAL INVESTIGATIONS OF F03Kfit OPERATIONS
i-i tm ■ M * >* n  ■ m m  MifaaNui'
Although studies reported previously have as a matter of course 
involved statistical analysis, it is of rolsvcnce to focus on a 
selection of studies primarily concerned with applying statistical
techniques to analyse various Plagetian claims.
Of pertinence Hero is a study by Dochorfcy (1374) who was 
intent to examine the developmental qualitative difference© 
noting that, previous efforts have tended to focus on the tasks 
themselves, Docheriy's perspective m o to discever whether 
individual children can.fes identified as primarily cohereto or 
formal operational on ths basis of their performance on Piagsiian 
tasks. It was realized by Ooehsrty that ttieoroQtlcally "parfeet” 
patterns (i.e. pass ell concrete tasks, fail all formal ttesks) 
are seldom' ©eon and that variability in meaningful within the 
Plagetien model in terms of horizontal dscalage (that is that 
a child might pass only s few of several concrete operational' 
tasks, bacons® of differences in the content of the tasks,•. 
Inhslder end Piaget (1954) or that with formal tasks a child 
may bemore adept in some areas' than in others (Piaget, 1975, 
op, cit) tilth tho no tiers that tho model is only of educational 
usefulness if relatively homogciasous groups of' children,. . 
identifiable. as "concrefcc^perationa” or. t?formal-opsrationalM 
can b& obtained, Dochsrty attempted to determlins if groups of 
concrete and formal operational-children..could .-be. identified 
through the technique of cluster analysis using a battery of 
fivs concrete and five formal.tasks, Ths study provided "general, 
indirect support far the Piogstisn modol of qualitative differences 
in development" and suggested that it is passible to form groups 
of children which nm reiativoly homogeneous. from a Piagatian view 
and further illustrated tho use of cluster analysis os a means of 
identifying such groups, a task.which has in tho past•bean largely 
arbitrary in- terms of the items and criteria used far tho .grouping 
process,
Gyr at, ,cl. (196?) formulated throe quosi-formal medals of 
inductive -behaviour, baaed on an inductive problem, representing 
the features of pro-operational, concrefco-aporaLionel and formal- 
operational thinking, together with exploration of their vcl-imis
properties* Each of the modsle m s written go a computer 
programme, allowing the computer to simulate each model in 
turn and to have it respond in terms of the event probabilities 
generated by that model* Ths possibility of inducing the 
models of cognitive behaviour in adult populations by experimental 
conditions designed to evoke one or the other of them was also 
explored* behaviour sequences generated by a live subject being 
fed into the programme for each model* Tps data suggested that 
a) the models generated behaviour sequences which were relatively 
unique to each model and b) that they have a certain degree of 
face validity in that they are sensitive to given experimental 
conditions In adult populations and else relate to ontogenetic 
development* Ths findings also suggested that the models for 
inductive behaviour may, as was hypothesized, bo quasi-formal 
expressions of tho cognitive stage descriptions proposed by 
Piaget* Sort and Airasian (1974) following a mothari of generating 
task hierarchies (ordering theory) to seven Plagetian tasks 
confirmed that success on concrete operational tasks is a 
necessary pro-requisite to success on formal operational tasks*
"Given the theoreetical stance that formal operations are 
highly interrelated| for they have a unified structural basis",
Bart (1971) inferred a "psychometric counterpart" of this hypothesis 
namely, that formal operational skills are unifactor* Ha cites 
ths longitudinal study of Hughes (1965 op* cit*) and focuses on 
the principal componsnts e&alysis with the four Plagetion tasks 
and the discernment of a general component for formal operational 
skills* Ho further acknowledges the substantiation of a large 
general factor inharsnt in formal operational skills by tovoll 
and Butterworth (1966, op* cit*) and by Lovell and Shields (1967, 
op. cit.) Lovell and Buttorworth using a principal component 
analysis found "a central intellective ability” to underlie tests 
involving proportion. Lovell and Shields demonstrated first 
principal component correlations with respect to the three Piagetian 
tasks. Bart administered four Piagetian formal thought tasks
{Oscillation of a Pendulum, Conservation of Motion on a Horizontal 
Plana and Equilibrium in ths Balance), three formal operational 
reasoning tests and a test of verbal intelligence to ninety 
scholastically above-average adolescents at three ago levelc 
(13, 16 and 19 years}® The formal reasoning teste involved the 
areas of biology, history end literature. Following principal 
component analysis and a 'maximum Xi&Lihocd factor analysis8 
results indicated that "though the array of formal operations is 
conceptualized ae a structure ri9ensemble, formal operational 
skills have a bifactor structure”. In this hi factor structure, 
the first faster was very substantial and was considered to be 
the formal operational factor, with ths second relating to tho 
content faster due to its separating the tasks from the teste.
Though two of tho tasks tested combinatorial reasoning, two tho 
schema of proportion, end the formal reasoning tests, hypothetico- 
deductive* reasoning, the second faster did not show differences 
among these reasoning modes but revealed differences emong ths 
contents for tho measure. Thus it may be contended that formal 
operational skills set in © given content are unifanter. Bart 
continues "given that formal operational activities can bo 
meaningfully classified according to their contents, it may he 
that this factor structure «••••. reveals information as to the 
nature of horizontal riccalage at tho stage of formal thought. An 
individual who is capable of applying formal operational skills to 
tasks within & given content (e.g. semantic content) would bo more 
apt to ©pply formal operational skills to other tasks within ths 
same content than to tasks in a content in which tho individual 
has not applied formal operational skills." However, it is 
possible that there may be other relevant dimensions along which 
to separate formal operational skille. A further findings involved 
the component indicating formal thought to correlate modestly with 
measures of verbal intelligence. Uarri (1972) concludes that "Butch 
and Slim" (details of which are given later in this Chapter) together 
with e number of parallel forms oioht wall ©How s tost of ths
unidimensionality of formal operations.
Lovell (1951) using Kendall1© Coefficient of Concordance 
(y) as the index of stability of the level of pupils thinking 
with ton of the experiments of Xnheldor end Piaget found 
considerable agreemant? the value of U varied from *89 to *52 
depending upon the &qq and ability range of ths132 subjects 
aged eight to eighteen years* In addition, to dstermine if the 
experiments ware drawn from the same population of experiments, 
ths Kruskal felallis one-way analysis of variance by ranks was 
uscdf providing some evidence for resuming that eight of the ton 
experiments are drawn from the earns population of experiments* 
3ackson (1985) found ton subjects to be at ths same substags 
within his battery of experiments and a further twenty-nine had 
answers included within two sub-stagess thus just over ©svanty 
per cent gave responses within two or 1mo sabotages*
Meiimerk (1970) states that there is no direct evidence for 
the existence of "structures” as Piaget describes them, as being 
consolidated at progressively higher levels of abstraction*
Although Inhelrisr and Piaget report the results of a number of 
studios of tasks assorted to be diagnostic of formal operations 
thinking 'which may or may not have been run on the some subjects — 
there is no evidence of the intercorrelations among these tasks 
which would support the assumption that they do in fact# reflect 
a coherent structure8* Koimsrk therefore attempted to provide 
evidence for ths intercorrGlotaon among tasks of correlation# 
combination of chemicals and a problem-solving task* BoTnrmrk 
concluded that formal operations tasks used in tho study uses 
correlated but questioned tho appropriateness of the combination 
of chemicals tasks*
Hathaway with respect to concrete operations confirmed that 
performance on Piagofcian measures bear a modest# poative degree of 
relationship to performance on traditional measures considering 
the evidence to clarify the two types of measures to be neither 
totally distinct nor totally identical* Both measures contribute
to a general intelligence) factor* However, the uniqueness of 
the Fiagotlen tasks end ths aspects of the mental development 
they reflect and richness was revealed, together with ths 
overwhelming and dominant concurrent association of Piagstian 
factors with moasuras of school achievement points ths way to 
now and possibly mara valid and'reliable predictors -and develop­
mental aids to children's achievement* further, relationships, 
remained stable over time*
Studies-reaffirming that Piaget toots measure corns aspects 
of intelligence (probably-a general intellectual factor) also 
measured by psychometric toeto but which etress that they also 
measure something unique, include among' others Dutiok ot* al 
(1369) and Kohlbagg (1963) who reports intertask consistency 
of Piaget levels representing a general Piagetian vfjaoter 
independant of any general intelligence factor entering into 
the f8inatf• 'Kohlbsrg also draws upon this finding in concluding 
that Plagetian measures reflect general increments in cognitive 
development duo to natural (indexed by chronological ago) or 
educational experience bettor than psychometric findings* .Kohlberg 
and De Vries (19G9) tentatively conclude that there is a 
consistency in Piagofcian tasks that is relatively didtfcvet from 
the consistencies found in psychometric teste and further that 
there is an additional component of consistency in Piogetian tasks 
that is related to psychometric performances and which helps to 
extend the concept of general intelligence. Stephens (1969) study 
of retardates and normals report significant correlations of 
ill SC verbal I Performance IQ and a Full Scale IQ. with Piagetian 
teaks of reasoning (including one formal; ’->operational task) given 
to subjects from six to eighteen years - thus suggesting a general 
intelligence factor* However, tho fact that few correlations ware 
*60 or higher although reliabilities uaro high, strongly suggested 
that Piegdtian reasoning tasks generally assess intellectual 
processes different from those assessed by Uechst lie* Scales* Ths 
fact that Piagetian measures defined three factors, not one factor 
supports tlie notion of a multidimensional a true tore of intelligence
in .Plagetian assessed areas as in the more traditional areas*
G* OTHER APPROACHES TO THE STUDY Of FORMAL OPERATIONS
Tho various references throughout this chapter to the 
importance of investigating formal operations In areas other than 
those investigated by Inhelder and Piaget have received support 
from the work of'Peel and his students (1359,1960, 1971, 1973)
Peel emphasizing the importance of the ability to make effective 
judgements for appropriate action, andorceos the views of Snheldor 
'and Piaget with reppact to adolescent thinking that the adolescent 
conceives of possibilities beyond the limits of the environment 
and that they are impelled to the opinion and action which 
characterizes their lives by a drive to' rooonoil© ths actuality 
of their existence with ths possibilities they themselves envisage* 
Concentrating upon verbal situations to assess the maturity of 
thinking, Peal reports that this interplay does not appear to bo 
predominant until after thirteen and a half years for answers 
involving thinking beyond tho evidence given in the presented 
passage arc not prevalent before this age. Other research at 
Birmingham has given support to those findings? Rhys (1364) 
investigating adolescent thinking in terms of geographical 
materials Davies (1964), healings (1963), the difficulties in 
choice' end rejection of hypothesis in practical $c£"£nes problems? 
Thomas (1986) in archeological material? Richmond (1973) among 
others emphasizes the importance of formal operations for religious 
education and Lodurick (1358) inferences drawn from historical 
passages*
tilth respect to the promotion of mature judgements, Peel 
cites tho work of Suchman (1961,1934) who initiated 'learning to 
think* sessions in which pupils were encouraged to inquire and 
discover concepts autonomously. Biran (1968) constructed a 
successful learning programme which demonstrated the designing 
of experiments, tho testing of hypotheses and tho drawing of
conclusions* Gray (1970) found thst adolescents subjected to 
programmed texts for training judgement, obtained higher 
scores on thinking problems. Anderson (1967) administered 
instruction in thinking to pupils and the results showed a 
considerable influence on the maturity of judgement. Stones 
(1365) gave programmed instruction in relevant historical 
concepts and increased tho maturity of historical judgement 
in a group of secondary puilc. Peel (1967) discusses the 
possibility of using the actual..responses obtained'in ths 
investigations of person's judgements so a means of teaching 
individuals how tojudge.
Case end Collinson (1962) attempted to establish whether 
the inferences that secondary modern school children and 
pupils in further education draw in history, geography and 
literature texts correspond to the formal operational stags 
of reasoning. They concluded from the evidence that it can 
be reasonably stated that children of fifteen, with average 
intelligence, will have reached equilibrium of formal thought. 
They focused on the finding that children of matching CA and 
MA had differing scores of formal thought and emphasize that 
another factor or factors contribute to formal thought.
Cultural background, width of experience and verbal repertoire 
may contribute to the development of formal thought operations. 
The incidence of regression to tee intuitive level was high 
and thay conclude that the occurrence is duo to lack of verbal 
repertoire. Case and Collinscm consider that Piaget's theory 
of structures of thought was substantiated but the appearance 
of formal thought in tee Junior group leads to the questioning 
of age divisions, field and Cropley (1969) were intent to 
clarify the relationship between science achievement and four 
cognitive style variables? mantel operations, originality, 
flexibility and category width. A significant relationship 
was found to exist between formal operations and science
achiavamont*
Dart (1972) reports tho construction end validation of 
formal reasoning tests which ware used as jparfc of tho 
testing •battery described in Sart, 1971, op. cit* Tho multiple- 
choice reasoning items involved ths specification that ths 
task for each item required a simple deduction, through use of 
logical rules of inference in order for the validly 'doduciblo 
response to be recognized, therefore fulfilling tho Genevan 
specification for formal,reasoning items. Bart concluded that 
the attempt to construct and validate paper and pencil formal 
reasoning tests was "somewhat successful”* Burgess (1963) 
investigated the subject's ability to solve formal problems, 
his appreciation of the structure of the problem and his power 
to perceive what information was relevant end what irrelevant 
to the solution o f tho problem and attempted to externalize 
thinking through written group teats in throe different ways? 
problem-solvingt te make up another problem of ths osmo kind . 
and the. writing of problems in a simpler, form when problems 
were given containing irrolsvancios* Burgess concluded that 
formal thinking cannot he regarded as an inevitable result of 
physical maturation and tho following of traditional academic 
curricula*
Hsimark and Lewis (1967) considering that most of tho 
available research in forme! operations has boon concernedudth 
the development of specific concepts, therefore designed en 
experiment to examine the development of logical thinking 
from n problem-solving task designed to ho relatively content 
free and to provide objective quantitative msasures of the 
quality of tho subjects performance. The subject wan confronted 
with en initial state of a problem having a finite number of 
aolutionc and was required to determine a correct solution'by 
gathering information with which to eliminate inappropriate
alternative solutions* Tho findings confirmed previous studios 
of conceptual development, with'younger subjects performing at 
sseoniislly e random or nsnla&llel level, with en increasing 
improvomont with age* Syr and Fleisher (1967) in connection 
with on inductive problem-solving apparatus, found only four­
teen per cant of University students to moinfest behaviour 
compatible with tbs formal operations modal* When induced to 
solve ths problems in as fm  trials m  possible which forced 
them to use logical infsrsneing, fifty par cent showed behaviour 
favouring the- formal operations modal, with only five per cont 
when a time factor was introduced. Hear significant differences 
were found between the students end fourth graders and significant 
differences between fourth and ninth graders.
Ward (1972) describes tho later stages in the- development 
of a sorts® of reasoning items for tho Operational Thinking Sub- 
Scale of the now British Intelligence Scale.'Butch and Slim*# a 
logical gams, is based upon the combinatorial of the sixteen 
binary propositions and represents an attempt to integrate 
developmental material into s factorial framework. "Butch and 
Slim" class net require the subject to produce hypotheses about 
a phenomenon, hut to test the truth values of prepositions 
already supplied against a rule or logical condition* The results 
broadly justified .the rationale adopted far the items, an out­
standing feature being clear developmental trends in the ability 
to carry out operations involving negation. Premising evidence 
as to reliability and validity emerged, although a number of 
substantial modifications to the items have been suggested* Ward 
end Pearson (1973) attempted to study tho effects of variation of 
content on sets of items similar in administrative procedure end 
logical form, employing "Butch and Glim” and a parallel "chap© 
game". The relative ease with which many of tho earlier "Shape 
Game” items were accomplished gave clsar evidence ofthe effects 
of a variation of content. Reported speech (in "Butch end Slim”), 
involving additional linguistic transformations ,, may have 
provoked more errors in the required prepositional thinking, 
together with emotional and attitudinal factors involved in the
usa of 8human* characters# ,Usrd and Pearson conclude that 
logical games merit tho attention they are receiving in . 
science and mathematics teaching and in research In child 
development# hut share considerable misgivings over the. 
operations of formal logic m  a behavioural universe and 
a© a source of stable discriminative items. Content appears 
to be crucial# suggesting that any general theory of human 
reasoning must Include an important semantic content.
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THE COGNITIVE -  DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH TO MORALITY
A. INTRODUCTION
As has been evidenced in the previous chapter, Kohlberg cen be considered 
a leading exponent with respect to the development of moral judgement and it is 
therefore predetermined that this chapter will deal with an elaborated account 
of Kohlberg*e developmental theory of moral judgement* However, in order to 
give full explanation to Kohlberg*s theory it is necessary to place his argument 
within the context of the various psychological approaches to the broader category 
of moral development*
The study of moral development has long been recognised as a key problem area in 
the social sciences, as indicated by HcDougall’s (1908) statement that f,the 
fundamental problem of social psychology is the moralization of the individual 
by the society” or by Freud’s (1930) conjecture that ”tho sense of guilt is the 
most important problem in the evolution of culture*” However, it appears difficult 
to make clear distinctions between moral development and the broader area of social 
development and socialization* Hoffman’s (1970) comprehensive review of the 
research literature relating to morality indicates that moral development viewed 
as the particular aspects of socialization involved In Internalization (i*e* 
learning to conform to rules in situations that arouse impulses to transgress and 
that leek surveillance end sanctions), have been approached from the behavioural, 
emotional and judgemental perspectives*
A behavioural criterion of internalization is that of intrinsically motivated 
conformity, or resistance to temptation. Such a concoption is implicit in 
"moral character” which formed the basis of earlier research on morality% Hartohorne 
and Hay (1928-30) defined moral character as a set of culturally defined virtues, 
such as honesty, which could be measured by observing the child’s ability to resist 
the temptation to break a rule (for example, against cheating) when it seemed 
unlikely that he would be detected or punished*
A second criterion of the existence of internalized standards is the emotion of 
guilt, that ie, of self-punitive, eelf-critical reactions of remorse and anxiety 
after transgression of cultural standards* Both psychoanalytic and learning 
theories of conscience have focused upon guilt os the basic motive of morality*
In addition to conduct that conforms with a standard and to emotional reactions 
of remorse after transgression, the internalization of s standard implies s capacity 
to make judgements in terms of that stenfiard and to justify maintaining the 
standard to oneself and to others. This judgemental form of moral development 
has constituted the focus of the work and theory of Piaget (1932), leter 
elaborated by Kohlberg (passim)* A major section of research therefor© seeks to 
answer tho problems of moral development by examining how socialization factors,
such es amount, type end conditions of punishment and reward, or opportunities 
for identification with parents, are related to individual differences in 
resistance to temptation, guilt or moral judgement.
Kohlberg (1964, 1968a, 1969) centres on the limitations of the study of 
internalized socialization in deciphering the classical problems of moral develop­
ment. Internalization does not represent e clear dimension of temporal 
development; experimental measures of resistance to temptation (honesty) do not 
indicate any clear age trends toward greater occurrence of honesty from the pre­
school years to adolescence; projective measures of the intensity of guilt or 
moral anxiety also do not indicate clear age trends, except in terms of rather 
rapid and cognitively based ago changes in the year© 8 to 12, end these changes 
ore in the direction of defining morel anxiety as a reaction to moral self-judgement 
rather then to more diffuse external events. While clear trends of development 
have been found in moral judgement, these trends cannot in the same sense be 
considered as internalized socialization. Further, a distinctive set of socia­
lization factors hes not been found that can be considered as an antecedent of 
moral internalizations research results suggest that the conditions which facilitate 
moral internalization (e.g. parental warmth) are the seme conditions which, in 
general, facilitate ths learning of nonmoral cultural rules and expectations.
The findings of Hartshorne’s and flay’© (op. cit.) studies of moral character 
suggested that honest behaviour is determined by situational factor© of punishment, 
reward, group pressures, and group values, rather than by an internal disposition 
of conscience or character. Kohlberg concludes: that to the extent that human
resistance to temptation is not general across situations to which a moral rule 
pertains end must therefore be predicted by purely situational factors, it would 
not seem toube expedient to describe human behaviour as the result of conscience.
Consequent studies of morality have generally attempted to cope with Hsrtshorne’s 
and Hay’s findings by defining moral internalization in terms of superego, rather 
than "moral character." Researchers have recognised that moral action uao not 
the direct result of en internal disposition toward honesty or moral character 
and instead have aesumod it to be tho result of a complex balance of internal and 
external forces, including strength of drives aroused by temptation, defenses 
against these drives, situational foare, group pressure© etc. However, one 
distinctively moral force, guilt, wae assumed to be a major determinant of action 
in situations of moral conflict or temptation. The^disposition to feel guilt wa© 
assumed to be the recult of early childhood indentifications end experiences of 
punishment, rather then situational forces. Accordingly, while morel behaviour 
might be situation-specific, it might otill be possible to ieolete a general 
process of moral internalization or guilt formation having the same childhood
antecedents regardless of the particular moral situation involved. However, 
subsequent research on parental antecedents of guilt and of resistance to 
temptation has usually indicated that the child-rearing correlates of children’s 
resistance to temptation in one situation are not correlates of resistance in 
another, and further the child-rearing correlates of projective test measures 
of guilt have not proved to be correlates of actual moral behaviour. Finally, 
projective measures of guilt have failed to consistently predict actual resietance 
to temptation behaviour. (reviewed in Kohlberg 1963a, 1964). Kohlberg (1964, 
1968a) argues that this more recent research evidence is consistent with tho 
Hartshorns’s end Way’s findings by suggesting that the variables leading to 
resistance to temptation arise primarily from the situation rather than from fixed 
habits, character traits like honesty, or permanent superego dispositions to feel 
guilt. Following Burton’s (1963) analysis of honesty, however, it can be agrpe^ 
that there is some personal consistency in honest behaviour or some determination 
of honest behaviour by general personality traits. These traits, however, do 
not seem to be traits of moral conscience but raltHer a sot of ego abilities 
corresponding to common-oenss notions of prudence and will. In a tretfcion of 
moral psychology arising from tho ossociationists and utilitarians, morel 
character is believed to rosult from practical judgement or reason. In this 
view, morel action (action based on rational consideration of how one’s action 
affects others) requires much the some capacities as does prudent action (action 
based on rational consideration of how it affects the self’s long range interests). 
Kohlberg (1968a) elaborates that "both require empathy (the ability to predict 
the reactions of others to action), foresight (the ability to predict long range 
consequences of action), judgement (the ability to weigh alternatives and prob­
abilities), end capacity to delay (delay of response and preference for the 
distant, greater gratification over the immediate, lesser gratification)*1 ♦ In 
psychoanalytic theory, these factors are included with other aspects of decision­
making and emotional control in the concept of ego strength. Some of the ego 
abilities which have been found to correlate consistently with experimental and 
rating measures of children’s honesty include intelligence (IQ), delay of 
gratification, and stability and persistence of attention in simple experimental 
tasks. However, those findings suggest that honesty can be predicted as success­
fully from an individual’s behaviour in cognitivo-issk or othor nonmoral situations 
as from situations involving honesty, leading to the implication that the study 
of moral behaviour in'.terms of early experiences centering on specifically moral
training of honesty, guilt, etc., is less likely to be profitable than is a
study of moral behaviour in terms of more general experiences relevant to ego
development and ego control in nonmoral contexts.
However, Kohlberg (op. cite) stresses that while there is tho suggestion that 
moral action con Be determined by nonmorel situational and personality forces, 
there are also findings suggesting tho determination of action by specifically 
moral values. He however, emphasises that this should not be token to mean 
that there is ony direct correspondence between conformity of vorbal moral 
beliefs or attitudes and conformity of moral ection. He refers to his own 
researches for evidence that there is a considerable correspondence between 
maturity of moral values (the possession of rational and internal reasons for moral 
action) and maturity of action in moral-conflict situations. "Clear relations 
between maturity of morel judgement end mature morsl action are found in situations 
in which social norms are ambiguous or conflicting an din which developmental!#.,^ 
advanced values clearly predispose toward one course of action rather than another." 
Kohlberg considers that Hartshorns’© and Hay’s limited correspondence between 
age-linked measures of moral knowledge and experimental measures oi'f honesty, 
occurred because they defined moral knowledge largely in terms of verbal conformity 
of attitudes, rather than maturity of moral reasoning and because resistance to g 
cheating is not clearly e developmentally more mature choice or a choice based 
on moral reasons in the young age group studied. The evidence of Kohlberg’s ? . 
collebrretors suggests however, that resistance to cheating does become a more 
mature alternative at older ages or higher levels of development, than those 
involved in the Hartshorns and Hay study. This occurs however at tho levol in 
which not-cheating may be dofined os relevant to principles of contract, trust 
and Gquity. (Kohlberg refers to studies by Krebs, 1967 and Brown et. at*, 1969, 
described later in this chapter within Section Et "From Thought to Action”).
Kohlborg (1968a) concludes that evidence suggests that the basic social science , 
problem of moral development is not that of accounting for individual differences 
in moral character as revealed in behaviour. Moral behaviour that involves 
conformity to social rules is, on the whole, to be? explained as the result of the 
same situational forces, ego variables and socialization factors that determine 
behaviours which have no direct moral relevance. A more distinctive focus of 
analysis centres instead upon the direct study of the development of moral values, 
judgements end emotions. The study of actual conduct becomes relevant to problems 
of moral development insofar as research is able to find links between the child's 
conduct and tho development of his moral values and emotions. The pursuits of 
the origin of distinctively moral concepts and emotions in the child; the extent 
to which the child's development indicates typical or regular trends of change 
in these concepts and sentiments; the causes of stimulation of these developmental 
changes end the extent to which these developmental changes in moral concepts end
attitudes are refloated in developmental changes in the child’s moral action 
under conditions of conflict or temptation, appear to bo relevant in 
connection with moral development.
Prior to embarking on an exposition ef the ■cognitivo-dovclopmantal approach to 
the aforementioned pursuits, it is appropriate to refer more specifically to the 
related issue of the development of morality in cultures. Hast recent 
psychological no wall as sociological thought has assumed that the problem of the 
origin of moral values Is o cultural problem: morality being viewed as a system
of rules and values defined by. tho culture and acquired by the child through 
general cultural - transmission mechanisms such as reinforcement learning or 
identification. This culturological approach to moral development was first 
clearly outlined by Ourkheim (1890-1911; 1925} who based it on assumptions about 
the cultural relativism of moral values which era still widely held, Ourkheim 
developed hie position out of a critique of the utilitarians (o«g, Hume, 1751 
and Mill, 1861) whs assumed that morel values were the product of individual 
adults, pO*33Gw£?S ti of language and intelligence?, whs judged tho actions of other 
individual rasn, The utilitarians suggested that actions by the- self or by 'others 
whoso consequences to the self arc harmful (painful) arc naturally doomed bad 
and arouse anger or punitive tendencies, and actions whose consequences are 
beneficia 1 {please snt) are naturally doomed good and arouse affection or approving 
tendencies. Logical tondsncics lead these judgements of consequences to take the 
forms of judging that act right which does tho greatest good for the greatest 
number.
In his critique of the utilitarians, Durkhcim pointed to the following four 
phenomena: (a) Morality is basically a matter of respect for fixed rules (and
the authority behind those rules); not of rational.calculation of benefit and 
harm in concrete cases, (b) Morality seems universally to be associated with- 
punitive sentiments, continents incompatible? with tho notion that the right is 
a matter of human-ualfere consequence; (c) from group to group there is wide 
variation no to tho nature of ruins arousing moral respect, punitiveness and 
the eeriho of duty? (d) while- ms darn Hastorn societies divorce morality from 
religion, tho basic morel rules end attitudes in many groups arc those concerning 
relations to Gods, not non and hones do not centre on human-wslfate consequences. 
The psychological origin of moral attitudes according to Durkhslm, is In the 
individual's respect for the group, the attitudes shared by the group, and the 
authority figures whs represent the groups. Tho values mast sacred to the 
individual are those which ora most widely shared by, and most closely bind 
together the group. Although Durkheim’e uiews have been widely questioned, .the 
essential implications have been widely accepted and assumptions common to Durkhsim 
and Freud underlie the research studies of moral internaliEsticn previously
discussed. Unlike Ourkheim, Freud derived morel eentimento end beliefs from 
respect for, end identification with, Individual parents, rather then from respect 
for the group. Furthermore, Froud derived this respect and identification from 
instinctual attachments (end defences against these attachments) and viewed the 
central rules of morality as deriving their strength and rigidity from the need 
to counter these instinctual forces. In spite of these differences, Freud 
©gmead in viewing morality (superego) as fundamentally a matter of respect for 
concrete rules which are culturally oariabla or arbitrary, since these rules are 
a manifestation of social authority, and hs egresd in viewing punitive (or self- 
punitive) sentiments towards deviation as the clearest and most characteristic 
expression of moral internalization or respect.
As will be expounded later, Kohlberg's research shows that individual moral 
judgement es&ms incompatible with either of the extreme views contrasted. Moral 
judgements and decisions in all cultures appear from Kohlberg*s work to be a 
mixture of Judgements in terms of individual human utility consequences and 
judgements in terms of concrete categorical social rules. Kohlberg emphasises 
that the implications of his research oriented to a "developmentalist” concept of 
morality are that individual moral beliefs and sentiments involving universal 
principles not directly embodied In concrete social rules often develop and function 
at a level of conscious opposition and transcendence of group authority, as the 
utilitarians implied, but this development itself presupposes the development of 
respect for group authority discussed by Ourkheim.
0. PIAGET'S DEVELOPMENTAL CONCEPTION OF MORALITY
In general, the developmental approach to moral psychology (Baldwin 1897j 
Mead 1934; McDougall 1908; Hobhousa 1906; Piaget 1932; Kohlberg passim) has 
attempted to mediate between the extreme positions represented by the utilitarians 
and by Ourkheim. Moral judgement and emotion based on respect for custom, 
authority and the group ©re eeen as one phase or stage in the moral development 
of the individual rather than as the total definition of the essential charater- 
ietics of morality as for Ourkheim. Oudgcment of right and wrong in terms of 
the individual's consideration of social-welfare consequences, universal 
principles and juetice ia eeen os o loter phase of development. This phase 
depends upon and integrates many of the emotional features of the earlier 
customary phase and does not opring directly from the minds of unsocialiseed 
rational adults os for the utilitarians. Both o morality of respect for social 
authority and on autonomous rational morolity are to be understood as ©rising from 
tho development of e oolf through the process of taking the roles or attitudes 
of other selves in interactiono occurring in institutionalized patterns.
As elaborated in Piaget's developmental theory (1932), the child first moves from 
an amoral stage to Ourkheim*s stage of respect for eacred rules. This is not 
so much respect for the group as it is respect for the authority of individual 
elders such as the parents. Piaget considers that the cognitive limitations 
of the child of three to eight lead him to confuse moral rules with physical laws 
and to view rules as fixed external things, rather than as the instruments of 
human purposes and values. Piaget believes that the child sees rules as 
absolutes and confuses rules with things because of his "realism” (his Inability 
to distinguish between subjective and objective aspects of his experience) and 
because of his "egocentrism” (his inability to distinguish hie own perspective 
on events from that of others). In addition to seeing rules as external 
absolutes, the young child feala that hie parents and other adults are all-knowing, 
perfject and sacred. This attitude of unilateral respect toward adults, joined 
with the child's realism, ia believed to lead him to view rules as sacred and 
unchangeable. Piaget explains that intellectual growth and experiences of role 
taking in the peer group naturally transform perceptions of rules from external 
authoritarian commands to internal principles. In essence, he views Internal 
moral norms as logical principles of justice. By "thesense of justice", Piaget 
means a concern for reciprocity and equality between individuals. However, norms 
of justice are not simply matters of abstract logic; rather they are sentiments 
of sympathy, gratitude and vengeance which have taken on a logical form. In 
accordance with Piaget, an autonomous morality of justice develops in children 
of about age eight to ten years and eventually replaces an earlier, heteronomous 
morality based on unquestioning respBct for adult authority. He expects the 
autonomous morality of justice to develop in ell children, unless development is 
fixated by unusual coerciveness of parents or cultures or by deprivation of 
experiences of peer cooperation.
Certain aspects of Piaget's theory have been supported by subsequent research 
findings, while others have not, (a comprehensive review is to be found in Modgil, 
1974). Piaget's stage theory suggests a number of cross-culturally universal 
age trends in the development of moral judgement. Among these are (a) intention- 
ality in Judgement, young children tending to judge an act as bad mainly In terms 
of its actual physical consequences, with older children Judging an act as bad in 
terms of the intent to do harm; (b) relativism in judgement, the young childL,^*» 
views an act as either totally right or totally wrong and thinks everyone views 
it in the same way, the older child being aware of possible diversity in views of 
uright and wrong; and (c) Independence of sanctions, the young child saying an 
act ia bad because it will elicit punishment and the older child stating an act
as bad because it violates a rule or does harm to others. The young child's 
absolutism, nonlntentionalism and orientation to punishment do not appear to 
depend upon extensive parental use of punishment. Even the permissively reared 
child appears to have a natural tendency to define good and bad in terms of 
absolutism and punishment, e tendency which his awareness of punishment by 
teachers, police and other parents seems sufficient to stimulate. While specific 
punishment practices or cultural ideologies do not appear necessary for the 
formation of the young child’s moral Ideology of punishment, they may lead to 
the peroiatence of this ideology into adolescence or adulthood. Specific 
cultutal factors therefore appear to stimulate or retard age trends of development 
on the Piaget dimensions, but they do not appear to actually cause the age shifts 
or trends observed. Piaget appears to be correct in assuming certain character­
istics of the young child's moral judgement in any society, characteristics which 
arise from the child's cognitively immature interpretation of acts labelled good^, 
and bad by adults, according to the derivation of their goodness from their 
association with good and bad consequence© of physical harm, punishment and reward. 
However, his interpretation of these aspect© of the young child's morality, as 
deriving from the child’s sense of the secredness of the rules and of adult 
authority has not been supported. Piaget (1932) attempts to demonstrate that 
the young child's attitude toward rules is one of unilateral sacredness by 
observation of children's behaviour and beliefs about the rules of the game of 
marbles. Swiss children are quiqted ss saying that the rules of the game can 
never be changed, that the rules have existed from the beginning of time and have 
been invented end handed down by God, the head of the state, or the father.
Kohlberg (1968a) emphasises that his research suggests that attitudes of rigidity 
toward game rules seem to decline with age in American children of five years to 
twelve years, but that attitudes expressing the rigidity or sacredness of moral 
rules or of laws, increase in this period, rather than decline* From cross-cultural 
research by Kohlberg and his colleagues, Kohlberg concludes that Piaget is correct 
in assuming a culturally universal age development of a sense of justice, involving 
progressive concern for the needs and feelings of others and elaborated conceptions 
of reciprocity and equality. As this sense of justice develops, however, it 
reinforces respect for authority end for the rules of adult society; it also 
reinforces more informal peer norms, since adult institutions have underpinnings 
of reciprocity, equality of treatment, service to human needs etc.
C. KOHLBERG'S COGNITIVE— DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY OF MORALI2ATIOM
For more than sixteen years, Kohlberg has studied the development of moral 
judgement and character, primarily by following the same group of 75 boys at 
three year intervals from early adolescence (10 years) through manhood (up to 
28 years) supplemented by a aeries of studies of development in other cultures
and varying environmental conditions. These studies have led to the definition
of moral stages as follows (as given in Kohlberg, poeeim) derived from responses 
to hypothetical moral dilfeasmas, "deliberately philosophical", some found in 
medieval works of casuistry."
DEFINITION OF MORAL STAGES
I. Preconventional level
At this level tho child ie responsive to cultural rules and 
labels of good end bad, right or wrong, but interprets these
labels In terms of cither tho physical or the hedonistic
consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of 
favours), or in terms of the physical power of those who
enunciate the rules end labels• The level is divided into
the following two stages:
Stage 1: The punishment end obedience orientation. Tho
physical consequences of ection determine it© goodness or badness 
regardless of the human meaning or value of these consequences. 
Avoidance of punishment end unquestioning deference to power 
are valued in their own right, not in terms of respect for an 
underlying moral order supported by punishment and authority 
(the letter being siege 4).
Stage 2s The instrumental relativist orientation. Right
action consists of that which instrumentslly satisfies one's 
own needs and occasiiJonally the needs of others. Human 
relations ere viewed in terms like those of the market piece. 
Elements of feirnoso, of reciprocity, and of equal sharing are 
present, but they ere always interpreted in a physical pragmatic 
way. Reciprocity is a matter of "you scratch my back end I'll _ 
scratch yours," not of loyalty, gratitude, or justice.
II. Conventional level
At this level, maintaining the expectations of the 
individual's family,group or nation is perceived es valuable in 
its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences*
Tho attitude is not only one of conformity to personal 
expectations and social order, but of loyalty to it, of actively 
maintaining, supporting and justifying the order, and of 
identifying with the persons or group involved in it. At 
this level, there are the following two stages:
Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or "good boy-nice girl"
orientation. Good behaviour is that which pleases or helps 
others and is approved by them. There is much conformity 
to stereotypical images of what Is majority or "natural" 
behaviour. Behaviour is frequently judged by intention - "he 
means well" becomes important for the first time. One earns 
approval by being "nice."
Stage 4: The "law and order" orientation. There is orientation
toward authority, fixed rules, and the mainteaance of the social 
order. Right behaviour consists of doing one's duty, showing 
respect for authority, and maintaining the given social order 
for its own sake.
Postconventional, autonomous, or principled level 
iAt this level, there is a clear effort to define moral values 
and principles which have validity and application apart from 
the authority of the groups or persons holding these principles, 
and apart from the individual's own identification with these 
groups. This level again has two stages:
Stage 5s The social-contract legalistic orientation, generally 
with utilitarian overtones. Right action tends to be defined 
In terms of general individual rights, and standards which have 
been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society. 
There is a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values 
and opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules 
for reaching consensus. Aside from what is constitutionally 
and democratically agreed upon, the right is a matter of 
personal "values" and "opinion." The result Is an emphasis 
upon the "legal point of view," but with an emphasis upon the 
possibility of changing law in terms of rational considerations 
of social utility (rather than freezing it in terms of stage 4 
"law and order"). Outside the legal realm, free agreement and 
contract is the binding element of obligation. This is the 
"official" morality of the American government end constitution.
Stage 6s The universal ethical principle orientation. Right 
ie defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self- 
choeen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, 
universality, end consistency. These principles are abstract 
and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); 
they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments.
At heart, these are universal principles of Justice, of the 
reciprocity and equality of human righto, and of respect for 
the dignity of human beings as individual persons.
Porter (1932) refers to recent speculation by Kohlberg on the possibility of a 
Stage Seven, based on "rational mysticism" traditionally examined by religion 
or metaphysics rather than the combined efforts of psychology and philosophy.
Kohlberg cites examples of responses from a variety of cultures, e.g. Malaysian 
aboriginal, Taiwanese, to show how it is the distinctive form (as opposed to 
tho content) of the child's moral thought which allows him to refer to the 
developmental sequence as being universal. Kohlberg (passim) claims to have 
found the earns aspects or categories of moral judgement and valuing in all 
cultures. (Kohlberg (1971) elaborates that his notions of moral categories 
are derived from both the Piagetian psychological tradition and from traditional 
ethical analysis. Piaget's structural analysis of cognitive development is based 
on dividing cognition into basic categories such as logic, space, time, causality, 
and number, which define basic kinds of judgements, or relationships, in terms 
of which any physical experience must be construed: that is, it must be located
in spatial and temporal coordinates, considered os the effect of a cause etc. 
Piaget's cognitive categories derive from Kant's analysis of the categories of 
pure reason, who also considered an analogous set of categories of pure practical 
reason, or of action under the mode of freedom.
Further, Kohlberg has received inspiration from Dewey's treatment of moral categor­
ies, which echoes Kant's distinctions. Kohlberg (1971) includes the following 
extract from Dewey (1905) to further clarify the origin of his aspects of Moral _ 
Oudgement.
"The distinctively Intellectual Judgement construes one object 
in terms of other similar objects and has necessarily its own ; 
inherent structure which supplies the ultimate categories of all 
physical science. Units of space, time, mass, energy, define 
to us the limiting conditions under which judgements of this type 
do their work. The limiting terms of moral judgement (of the 
judgement construing an activity content in terms of each other)
constitute the characteristic features, or categories, of 
the object of ethical science, just as the limiting terms 
of the judgement which construes one object in terms of 
another object constitute the categories of physical science.
A discussion of moral judgement from this point of view may
be termed the "Logic of Conduct." Ethical discussion is
full of such terms; . the sensuous and the ideal, the standard • —
and the right, obligation and duty, freedom and responsibility
are samples." (p.22)
Kohlberg elaborates that the particular terms listed by Dewey have been termed 
"Modes", that is, terms defining functional kinds of moral judggment. Equally 
basic ere "Elements" or Principles of Judgement", such as "Welfare", "Respect" 
and "Justice." Further, there are universal moral issues, or values (the 
application of the categories to content area or Institutions) ranging from 
law to authority to life. Any given moral judgement may be simultaneously 
assigned to a mode, to an element and to an issue in Kohlberg*e scheme, with 
each mode, element, and issue being defined at each of the stages of development. 
Kohlberg*a table of the "Aspects of Moral Judgement" is reproduced as follows:
ASPECTS OF MORAL JUDGEMENT
I• The modes of Judgement of obligation and value
A. Judgement of right
B. Judgement of having a right
C. Judgement of duty and obligation
D. Judgements of responsibility-conceptions of consequence of 
action or of the demands or opinions of others one should 
consider over and above strict duties or strict regard for 
the rights of others
E. Judgement of praise or blame
F. Judgements of punishability and reward
G. Justification and explanation
H. Judgements of nonmoral value or goodness
II. The elements of obligation and value
A. Prudence-consequences desirable or undesirable to the self
B. Social welfare-consequences desirable to others
C. Love
D. Respect
E. Justice as liberty
F. Justice os equality
G. Justice as reciprocity and contract
III. The Issues or institutions
A. Social norms
B. Personal conscience
C. Roles end issues of affection
D. Roles end issues of authority end democracy, of division of
labour between roles relative to social control
E. Civil libsrties-righto to liberty end equality to persons as
human beings, es citizens, or aa members of groups
contract, trust, and equity in the actions or reactions 
of one person
G. Punitive justice
H. Life
I. Property
3. Truth
K. Sex
(Further discussion with respect to issues appears throughout this 
thesis and condensed versions of the details of respective issues at each of 
the six stages appear in the Appendices).
It is emphasised that the concept of stages implies something more than age trends 
First, stages imply invariant sequence? each person moving step by step through 
each of the kinds of moral judgement outlined, with the possibility of moving 
at varying speeds and becoming fixated at any level of development. Kohlberg*e 
longitudinal studies allowed the citing of the example of "Tommy", responding 
et St«se-1 at ege 10, Stage-2 at age 13, and Stage-3 at 16 years. "Jim" was 
found to be responding at Stage-4 at age 16. Stage-5 at age 20 and Stage-6 
at 24 years. Secondly, stages define "structured wholes", total ways of thinking 
not attitudes toward particular situations. A stage is a way of thinking which 
may be used to support either side of an action choice, that ia, it illustrates 
the distinction between moral form end moral content (action choice). Kohlberg 
emphasises that correlational studies indicate a general factor of moral level 
which cross-cuts aspect, but it should however be noted that any individual Is 
usually not entirely at one stage. Typically, as children develop, they are 
portly in their major stage (about fifty percent of their ideas), partly in the 
stage into which they are moving, and partly bin the stage they have just left 
behind. Seldom, however, using stages at developmental removes from one another. 
Thirdly, a stage concept implies universality of sequence under varying cultural 
conditions? suggesting that moral development is not merely a matter of learning 
the verbal values or rules of the child's culture, but that it reflects something 
more universal in development, something which would occur in any other culture*
Research considered by Kohlberg to indicate the cultural universality of the 
sequence of stages, demonstrated that for middle-class urban boys aged ten in 
the United States, Taiwan and Mexico, the greater number of moral statements are,, 
scorable at the lower stages. In the United Stetes, by age 16, the order is 
reversed, so that the greater proportion use higher stages, with the exception of 
Stage-6, which is rarely used. The results in Mexico and Taiwan ere the same, 
except that development is a little slower, showing however, that Stage-5 thinking 
is not purely an American democratic construct. From two isolated villages, 
one in Yucatan, one in Turkey, the similarity of the pattern is considered by 
Kohlberg to be "striking." While conventional moral thought (Steges-3 and 4)
Increases steadily from age 10 to 16, at 16, it still has not achieved a clear 
ascendancy over premorel thought (Stages-1 and 2); Stages-5 and 6 being totally 
absent. Trends for lower-class urban groups are intermediate in rate of 
development between those for the middle-class and the village boys. Kohlberg 
concludes that these studies suggest that the seme basic ways of moral valuing 
are found in every culture and develop in the same order.
Kohlberg further reports that no important differences have been identified in 
tho development of moral thinking between Catholics, Protestants, Jews,
Buddhists, Moslems and Atheists. Children’s moral values in the religious area 
seem to go through the same stages as their general moral values, and although 
both cultural values and religion are important factors in selectively 
elaborating certain themes in the moral life, they are not unique causes of the 
development of basic moral values.
The order of psychological adequacy of the stagesis claimed by Kohlberg to have 
been empirically tested? the studies of Rest (Rest, Turiel and Kohlberg, 1969) 
form,the core data which link the psychological explanations to issues of phil­
osophic adequacy. In these studies, adolescents were first pretested with 
standard moral dilemmas, then asked to put in their own words, prepared arguments 
at each stage, "pro" and "con" a choice for each of two newly presented dilemmas. 
Typically, adolescents distorted arguments higher then their own moral etage 
into Ideas at their own stage or one below. In contrast to such distortion 
downward of stages above their own, adolescents had no difficulty comprehending 
arguments below their own modal stage? all subjects understood all arguments 
at or below their own level. Some subjects understood thinking one end 
ocusionally, two stages above their dominant or modal stage; they revealed 
however, some (twenty percent) use of the higher stages which they comprehended, 
indicating that they wore already in transition to the higher stags. The major 
implication of these findings are that Kohlberg's stages constitute a hierarchy 
of cognitive difficulty with lower stages available to, but not used by those at 
higher stages. This order of cognitive difficulty does not however indicate an 
order of moral adequacy butt Rest further found that his adolescent subjects 
perceived the statements for each stage as representing a hiererchicel order of 
perceived moral adequacy: this was most clearly the case for the stages which
they comprehended. The order of perceived "goodness of thinking" correspond^ 
to the order of stages comprehended by the subjects. There was also a tendency 
to rank Stage-5 end 6 statements high, even when they were not comprehended, but 
it was much less clear cut. (kohlberg, Qtohlberg 1970b; 1971; and Rest,
Turiel and Kohlberg 1969]) speculates that this preference for stages not
comprehended, could be a Platonic intuition of a higher form of the good).
From this it was predicted that, "eliminating tho stage at which he ia, the 
subject should most assimilate moral Judgements one stage above his own, and 
assimilate much less those which are two or more stages above, or one or more 
stages below, his own. These predictions hcve been clearly and consistently 
verified in different experimental studies (Turiel 1966; Rest. Turiel and 
Kohlberg 1969 end Blstt end Kohlberg 1959) A recent study by Ifest et el*
(1974) lends further credence to the stage hierarchy; using Kohlberg*s moral 
stages, statements were written to exemplify stage characteristics. Subjects ^  
were asked to select the statement defining the most important issue in a 
morel dilemma. The importance attributed to principled (Stages-5 and 6) moral 
statements evidenced developmental trends, differentiating student groups of 
varied advancement and correlating in the 60s with age, comprehension of social- 
moral concepts and Kohlberg*s scale, together with attitude measures. The 
more advanced subjects attributed more importance to higher stage statements 
and further, the correlations suggested that as subjects develop cognitively 
they come to define moral dilemmas more complexly and come to place greater 
importance on principled moral thinking than do the less cognitively advanced 
subjects.
Kohlberg emphasises that e cognitive-developmental theory of moraliaation holds 
that there is e sequence of morel stages for the sams basic reasons that there 
are cognitive or logico-mathomatical stages, that Is, because cognitive-structural 
reorganizations toward the more equilibrated occur in the couree of interaction 
between the organism and the environment. By"cognitive-developmental" Kohlberg 
elaborates that he refers to a set of assumptions common to the moral theories 
of Dewsy end Tufts (1932), Mead (1934), Baldwin (1906, Piaget (1932) and his 
own (Kohlberg, passim). All these theorists have postulated:
" (a) Stages of moral development representing (b) cognitive-
structural transformations in conception of self end society; all
have assumed (c) that these stages represent successive modee
of "taking the role of others" in social situations, and henco
that (d) the social environmental determinants of development
are its opportunities for role-taking. More generally, all
have assumed (e) an active child who structures his perceived
environment, end hence, have assumed (f) that moral stages and
the structural features of the environment, leading to (g) **
successive form of equilibrium in interaction. This equilibrium
is conceived as <h) a level of justice, with (i) change being
caused by disequilibrium, where (j) some optional level of match
or discrepancy is necessary for change between the child and the
environment."
The psychological assumption that moral Judgement development centrally involves 
cognitive development ie not the assumption that this io an increased "knowledge" 
of rules found outside the child, in his culture and Its socialization agents. 
Studies of moral knowledge such as the Hartshorns end May study (op. cit.) 
indicate that most children know the basic moral rules and conventions of our 
society by the age of eix-toseven years. By insisting on the cognitive core of 
moral development,is meant rather that the distinctive characteristic of tho 
moral is that it involves active judgement. "Judgement is neither the 
expression of, nor tho description of, emotional or volitional states, it is e 
different kind of function with a definite cognitive structure." Kohlberg 
elaborates that this structure of Judgement os the child*s use end Interpretation 
of rules in conflict situations, and his reasons for moral action, rather than 
as correct knowledge of rules or conventional belief in them. fKohlberg (1971) 
describes his cognitive hypothesis to be basicelly, that moral judgement has a 
characteristic form at a given stage, and that this form is parallel to the form 
of intellectual judgement at a corresponding stage. This implies a parallellsmu 
or isomorphism between the development of the forms of logical and ethical 
judgement. By this it ie meant that each new stage of moral judgement entails 
a new set of logical operations not present at this prior stage; the sequence 
of logical operations involved being defined by Piaget*s stages of logico- 
mathematical thinking. (This aspect of Kohlberg*s theory has received 
treatment In "The Statement of the Problem", Chapter Ono).
With respect to cognition and affoct, Kohlberg considers that such discussions 
ueually founder under tho assumption that cognitions and affects ere different 
mental states. However, the cognitive-developmental view holds that "cognition" 
and "affect" arc different aspects, or perspectives, on the same mental events, 
that all mental events have both cognitive and affective aspects, end that the 
development of mental dispositions reflects structural changes recognizable in 
both cognitive and affective perspectives. Kohlberg affirms that it is evident 
that moral judgements often involve strong emotional components, but this in no 
way reduces the cognitive component of moral judgement, though it may imply a 
somewhat different functioning of tho cognitive component than io implied in more 
neutral areas. Kohlberg cites as en example
"fin ootronomers calculation that a comet will hit the 
earth will be accompanied by strong emotion, but this does 
not make his calculation less cognitive then the calculation 
of a comet*e orbtit which had no earthly consequences. Just 
as the quantitative strength of the emotional component ie 
irrelevant to the theoretical importance of cognitive structure 
for understanding the development of scientific judgement, so 
the quantitative role of affect is relatively irrelevant for 
understanding the structure and development of morel judgement."
Kohlberg acknowledges that this example however is misleading in that effective 
aspects of mental functioning enter into moral judgement in e different way than 
in scientific judgement. Morel judgements ere largely about sentiments end 
Intuitions of persons end to a larger extent they express and are justified by 
reference to the Judosrs sentiments. The development of sentiment, as It enters 
into moral judgement is, however, a development of structures with e heavy cognitive 
component. Kohlberg has identified empirical correlations between a child's 
stage on, for example, the life concept and on the guilt concepts thus a child*© 
stage on the aspect "concepts of moral sentiments" correlates well with his stage 
on nonaffective concepts, end correlates about as well with IQ as do the 
nonaffective concepts. Kohlberg concludes that "the quality (os opposed to the 
quantity) of affects involved in moral judgement Is determined by ito cognitive- 
structural development", end is an inseperable component of the general development 
of the child's conceptions of © moral order. In elaboration:
"Two adolescents, thinking of stealing, may have the same 
feeling of anxiety in the pit of their stomachs. One 
adolescent (Stege-2) interprets the fooling es *being 
Chicken* and ignores it. Tho other (Stege-4) interprets 
the feeling as "the warning of my conscience* and decides 
accordingly. The difference in reaction is one in 
cognitive-structural aspects of morel judgement, not in *
emotional 'dynamics* as such."
The centrality of role-taking for moral judgement is recognised in the notion that 
moral judgement is based on sympathy for others, as well as in the notion that the 
moral judge must adopt tho perspective of the "impartial spectator" or the 
"generalized other." Kohlberg*s empirical claims include the underlining: of 
opportunities for role-taking, operating by stimulating moral development rathor 
than producing a particular value system. In four different cultures, middle-class 
children were found to be more advanced in moral judgement thsn matched lower-class 
children: moving through ths same sequences but moving at different speeds.
Similar, but even more striking differences were found between "peer-group 
participators" (popular children) and "non-participators" (unchosen children).
Kohlberg refers to studies in progress which suggest that these peor-group 
differences partly ©rise from, and partly ©dd on to, prior differences in opportunities 
for role-teking in tho child’s family (family participation, communication, emotional 
warmth, sharing in decisions, awarding responses to the child, pointing out 
consequences of action to others etc.). Holstein (1971) found that the amount of 
parental encouragement of tho child's participation in discussion (in e taped 
"revealed-differences" mother-father-child discussion of moral conflict situations) 
was a powerful correlate of moral advance in the child. "An explanation of 
differential morel advance in terms of role-taking is an explanation in terms of
differential moral advance" is the clarification given by Kohlberg. The 
environment which provides role-taking opportunities is not necessarily a warm, 
loving* identification-inducing environment, and an environment deprived in role- 
taking opportunities is not necessarily cold or rejecting. A certain minimum 
amount of warmth in face-to-face groups or institutions is required if a child 
or adolescent is to feel a sense of participation and membership in the group. 
However, the conditions for a child’s maximal participation and role-taking in 
e group is not that he receives maximal affection from the group, or that the 
group bs organised on communal affiliation lines. At the extreme negative end, 
impersonal, cold environments are also deficient in role-taking opportunities.
In traditional orphanages, a large majority of children ere still at the pre- 
conventional level at age 16. (Thrower 1971). At the more positive end
(as environment promoting moral development) are both certain types of middle-class 
families and the kibbutz, not an especially warm or emotionally responsive or 
personal environment (Bor-Yam and Kohlberg 1971). Kohlberg (1964) discusses 
that affactional relationships (or identification) with parents are important 
in moral devolopcent, more because positive and ©ffectional relations to others 
are generally condHucive to ego development and to rple-taking and acceptance 
o f social standards than because they provide a unique and direct basis for 
conscience.formation•
Role-taking tendencies and tho sense of justice are interlocked. While role- 
teking in the form of sympathy ofton extends more broadly than the sense of justice, 
organised or "principled" forms of role-taking ore defined by justice structures.
In order for roles and rules to represent a socio-moral order, they must be exper­
ienced as representing shored expectations or shared values and tho general ^  
shoreobility of rules and role expectations in an institution rests centrally 
upon a justice structure underlying specific rule and role definitions. Because 
the central mechanisms of role-taking are justice structures of reciprocity and 
equality it can bo suggested therefore, that institutions better organised in terms 
of Justice provide greater opportunities for role-taking and a sense of sharednesc 
than do unjust situations. Tho concepts of role-tsking and Justice, provide 
concrete meaning to the cognitive-developmental assumption that moral principles 
are neither external rules taken inward, nor natural ego tendencies of a biological 
organism,but rather the interactional emergente of social interaction. Piaget 
argues (ae elaborated in "The Statement of tho Problem", Chapter One) that just as 
logic represents an ideal equilibrium of thoughtoperations, justice represents on 
ideal equilibrium of social interaction, with reciprocity or reversibility being 
core conditions for both logical and moral equilibrium. While the sense of
justice would not develop without the experience of social interaction, it is 
not simply on inward mirror of sociologically prescribed forms of these 
relations, any more than logic is on internalisation of the linguistic forms 
of the culture#
In Piaget*g theory, closely followed by Kohlberg, the notion that logical and 
moral stages are interactional is united to the notion that they are forms of 
equilibrium, forms of integrating discrepancies or conflicts between the child’s 
schemata of action and the ectiono of others# Opportunities to role-take ere 
opportunities to experience conflict or discrepancy between one’s own actions 
and evaluations and the action of evaluations of others# To role-take in a 
moral situation is to experience moral conflicts the conflicts of the wishes 
and claims of the self, the other and a third party or more. However exposure 
to higher stages of thinking presented by significant figures in the environment 
is probably neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for upward movement: 
the studies of Turiol, and Rest, Turiel and Kohlberg (op. cit.) have led 
Kohlberg to presume that movement to the next stage involves internal cognitive 
reorganization rather than the mere addition of more difficult content from the 
outside# Turiel (1969) postulates that cognitive conflict is the central 
"motor" for ths internal cognitive re-organization that upward movement to the 
next stage involves# Turiel is conducting a series of experiments presenting 
children with varying combinations of contradictory arguments flowing from the 
same stage structure. Turiel hopes to show that exposure to the next stage up, 
effects change not through the assimilation of epocific messages, but by providing 
ewareness thet there are other, better, or more consistent solutionsj'than the 
child’s own, forcing him to rethink hie own solution, thereby proving to be one 
of tho environmental events promoting cognitive conflict# Exposure to real or 
verbal moral conflict situations not readily resolvable et tho child's own stage, 
and disagreement with, and among significant others about such situations ore 
other environmental effects being empirically tested in the moral discussion classes 
conducted by Blatt (Blett 1969? Blatt and Kohlberg 1969). Blatt’s findings
suggest that the affects of naturally occurring moral discussions upon moral 
judgement be understood in the theoreticcl terms outlined, those of inducing 
cognitive conflict in the child, and subsequent reorganization at the next level 
of thinking*
Kohlberg*s cognitive-developmental theory can be cummarized go deiming that 
" (a) moral judgement io a role-teking process, which (b) hes a new logical 
structure at each stage, paralleling Piaget’s logical stages? this structure io 
best formulated as (c) a justice structure, which (d) ie progressively more
comprehensive, difforontieted and equilibrated than the prior structure."
Kohlberg claims that "evidence has been presented of a culturally universal, 
invariant moral sequence, as well as evidence that this sequence represents a 
cumulative hierarchy of cognitive complexity perceived as successively more 
adequate by non-philosopher subjects."
D. THE IMPLICATIONS OF KOHLBERG*5 GENETIC STUDIES FOR PHILOSOPHIC ETHICS
Kohlberg (1971) focuses on the "epistemological blinders" worn by 
psychologists, which have hidden from them the fact that the concept of morality 
is itself a philosophical (ethical) rather then e behavioural concept. He 
considers that it was due to hie awareness of the necessity for orienting to 
philosophic concepts of morality when starting his psychological research that 
he has uncovered facts not previously noted. There was a failure to anticipate 
houever, that an empirical developmental study could contribute to the solution of 
distinctively philosophic problems in both normative ethics and metaethice. It 
was because of a practical concern to develop his research implications into an 
active programme of moral education (Kohlberg 1970a, 1970b? Blatt and Kohlberg 
1969) that he worried about the implications of his moral research for a definite 
ethical position. Kohlberg's 1971 Paper is therefore addressed to "From is 
(the facts of moral development) to Ought (the ideal content and epistemological 
status of moral ideas)." Kohlberg claims that his earlier, philosophic claim 
that the stimulation of development is the only ethically acceptable form of 
morel education, can be upheld regardless of his more controversial claim, namely: 
that tho common assumptions of the cultural relativity of ethics is in error, 
promoting instead, that "ethical principles" are the end point of sequential 
"natural" development in social functioning and thinking, the stimulation of 
their development being a different matter from the inculcation of arbitrary 
cultural beliefs. As indicated in an earlier section of this chapter, this 
cultural relativity, on which almost ell contemporary social scientific theorizing 
about morality is based, has influenced the eociological-role theorists, 
psychoanalytic theorists and learning theorists to view moral development end other 
forms of socialization as the direct internalization of external norms of a given 
culture. A second assumption, closely linked to tho assumption of ethical 
relativity, being that morality and moral learning ere fundamentally emotional 
end irrational processes based on mechanisms of habit, reward and punishment, 
identification and defense. (Kohlberg^-© fwll consideration of the empirical 
propositions derivable from the relativity postulation as being factually correct 
statements about variations in human moral behaviour and judgement, appears in 
Kohlberg 1971 pp. 155-63 end passim). In contrast to "extreme" and "sociological 
relativism", Kohlberg has empirically demonstrated that there are universal moral
concepts, values, or principles, and there ie less variation between individuals 
and cultures than has usually been maintained, in the sense that: almost ell
individuals in all cultures use the same thirty basic moral categories, concepts 
or principles? oil individuals in all cultures §o through the seme order or 
sequence of gross stages of development, though varying in rate and terminal point 
of development. The marked differences between individuals end cultures which 
exist ere differences in stage or developmental status.
Kohlberg affirms that his psychological theory as to why moral development is 
upward and sequential is broadly the same as his philosophical Justification for 
claiming that a higher stage is more adequate or more moral than a lower stage.
Both psychological and philosophical analyses suggast that the more mature stage 
of moral thought ia the more structurally adequate. This greater adequacy of 
more mature moral judgement rests on structural criteria more general than those 
of truth value or efficiency. These general criteria are the formal criteria 
which developmental theory holds as defining all mature structures, the criteria 
of increased differentiation and integration: formal criteria synonymous with the
formal criteria which philosophers of the formalist school have held to characterise 
genuine or adequate moral judgements. From Kant to Hare, formalists have stressed 
tho distinctively universal and prescriptive nature of adequate moral Judgement.
The increasingly prescriptive nature of more mature moral judgements is, Kohlberg 
stresses, reflected in the scries of differentiations described throughout the 
theory, "which is a series of increased differentiations of ’is* and ’ought* (or 
of morality as internal principles from external events and expectations)".
The claim of principled morality is that it defines the right for anyone in any 
situation: in contrast, "conventional morality defines good behaviour for a
Democrat but not for a Republican, for an American but not for a Vietnamese". 
Conventions! morality is not fully universal and prescriptive, and leads to 
continual self-contradiction; in contrast, principled morality is directed to 
resolving these conflicts in a stable, self-consistent fashion.
Kohlborg claims that the higher moral stage is the philosophically better although 
he accentuates that "claims of superiority" for higher stages are not claims for 
a system of grading the moral worth of individual persons. In Kohlberg*s view, 
the basic referent of the term "moral" is a "type of judgement or a typo of 
decision-making process, not a type of behaviour, emotion, or social institution". 
Kohlberg (1970a) elaborates: "for one man, a prohibition of parking is a moral
norm, for another a mere administrative regulation. Uhet makes it moral ie not 
the legislation of the rule but the individual’s attitude towards it". Kohlberg
emphasises that Stagc-6 io o deontological theory of morality. He elaborates 
that "the three primary modes of moral Judgement and the corresponding types of 
ethical theory, deal with (a) duties and rights (deontologies!), (b) ultimate 
alms or ends (ideological) and (c) personal worth or virtue (theory of approbation)" 
Kohlberg emphasises that "claims of superiority, then, ore claims for the superiority 
of St$ge~6 judgements of duties and rights (or of justice) over other systems of 
judgements of duties and rights. We mskG no direct claims ©bout the ultimate 
aims of men, about the good life, or about other problems which a ideological 
theory must handle. These are problems beyond the scope of tho sphere of morality 
or moral principles, which us define as principles of choice for resolving 
conflicts of obligation."
Kohlberg continues: "the general criterion we have used in saying that a
higher oteges mode of judgement is more adequate than a lower stage is that of 
morality itself, not of conceptions of rationality or sophistication imported from 
other domains". Kohlberg acknowledges that a philosopher may not judge Stage-6 
as more adequate than lower stages because it Is not more scientifically true,
Is not more instrumsntslly efficient, does not reflect more metaeihical or epistem­
ological sophistication, or is not bored on a "more parsimonious set or normative 
ethical postulates. Only e philosophical formalist who views morality es an 
autonomous domain, with its own criteria of adequacy or rationality, is likely to 
evaluate moral arguments by moral criteria rather than by philosophical criteria of 
rationality imported from nonmoral domains"• In further explanation, Kohlberg 
states: "us arc arguing that a criterion of adequacy must take account of the
fact that morality ic a unique eui generic realm. If it ic unique, its uniqueness 
must be defined by general formal criteria, bo our moteethicol conception is 
formalietic. tike most deontologies! moral philosophers sinco Kant, us define 
morality in terms of tho formal character of e moral judgement, method, or point 
of view, rather than in terms of its content. Impersonality, ideality, universal- 
izability, preamptlvencos, etc* are the formal characteristics of o moral 
Judgement. These are best seen in the reasons given for a moral judgement, © 
moral reason being one which has these properties. But ue claim that tho formal 
definition of morality only works uhon us recognize that there are developmental 
levolo of moral judgement which increasingly approximates the philosopher’s moral 
form. This recognition ehou's us (a) that there are formal criteria which make 
Judgements moral, (b) that these are only fully met by the most mature stage of 
morel judgement, so thot (c) our mature stages of judgement ere more moral (in the 
formalist ©ense, more morally adequate) than lees mature etoges" (Kohlberg 1971, 
p. 215). i
i\uiixut!i.-y mtji'uiort) cxQxnis xnav oevexopmenvex tneory assumes rormaiistic criteria 
of adequacy and the criteria of levels of differentiation end integration. In 
the moral domain, these criteria are parallel to formalistic moral philosophy's 
criterie of prescriptivity and universality. "These two criteria combined 
represent a formalistic definition of the moral, with each stage representing full 
realization of the moral form". In conclusion, Kohlberg states: "To my knowledge,
thoso who object to e formalist definition of morality have no positive alternative 
to offer except (a) morality is what is in accord with my own system, or ’(b) 
morality ie relative. Regardless of psychology then, our conception of morality 
has a strong philosophical base. ; ^ Anyone who tries to criticise it must provide 
a stronger positive alternative"•
Uith respect to principled of justice Kohlberg expounds that the whole notion 
that there is a distinctively moral form of judgment demands that moral judgement 
be principled, that is, "that it rely on moral principle, on a mode of choosing 
which is universal, which we want all people to adopt in all situations". Mature 
principles are neither rules (means) nor values (ends) but are guides to 
perceiving and integrating all the morally relevant elements in concrete situations? 
guiding the resolving of claims which compete in a situation. All principles 
can be reduced to the single principle. (Kohlberg promotes eight "steps of argument 
for justice as the basic moral principle in Kohlberg 1970a p. 65 end"six arguments"
In Kohlberg 1971, p.229).
In final summery, Kohlberg delineates that what is being claimed uith respect to 
the relation of "is to ought" in moral development is that scientific facts reveal 
a universal moral form successively emerging in development end centering on 
principles of justice. Science can test whether a philosopher’s conception of 
morality phenomenologically fits the psychological fact but cannot justify that 
conception of morality os what morality ought to be because the rules of scientific 
discourse ere not the rules of moral discourse* However, science can contribute 
to a moral discourse as to why one morel theory is better than another. The
scientific theory as to why people factually do move upward from stage to stage and 
why they factually do prefer a higher stage to a lower, is broadly the same as a 
morel theory es to why people should prefer a higher to a lower. "UJe have argued 
for s parallelism between o theory of psychological development and a formalistict 
moral theory on the ground thot the formal psychological developmental criteria 
of differentiation and integration, of structural equilibrium, map into the formal 
moral criteria of prescriptiveness and universality........ In essence there is
a ’deep logical structure’ of movement from one stage to the next, a structure 
tapped by both a psychological theory of movement end by families of philosophical 
argument. If these contentions are correct they provide a new definition of the 
morel philosopher’s task, s definition more exciting thsn that implied by much 
recent philosophic work".
E. FROM THOUGHT TO ACTION
Kohlberg postulates that maturity of moral thought schould predict maturity 
of moral action: that specific forms of moral action require specific forms of
moral thought as prerequisites* The judgement-action relationship can be 
described as "the correspondence between the general maturity of an individual’s 
moral judgement end the maturity of his moral action." Kohlberg’e initial 
study (Kohlberg 1958) produced a product moment correlation of .46 between moral 
judgement scores and ratings of conscience. Experimental studies by Krebs (1967) 
and by Broun et al. (1969) bear these correlation trends out by revealing that 
principled subjects appear much less likely to cheat then conventional subjects. 
Conventional subjects referred to cheating in terms of maintaining social 
expectations and order, which carried no force when no longer supported by the 
group? the principled person defines the issue of cheating as one of inequality, 
of taking advantage of others, of deceptively obtaining unequal opportunity, 
that is, in terms of justice. Kohlberg claims that this interpretation implies 
that moral judgement determines action by way of concrete definitions of rights 
and duties in a situation. Kohlberg interprets this to imply that moral judgement 
determines action by way of concuete definitions of rights end duties in a 
situation*
Kohlberg argues that moral judgement dispositions influence action though being 
©table cognitive dispositions, not through the affective changes with which they 
are associated. He is claiming that the moral force in personality Is cognitive. 
Affective forces are involved in morel decisions, but affect is neither moral nor 
immoral: when the affective arousal is channelled into moral directions, it is
moral; when it is not so channelled it is not. The moral channelling mechanisms 
are cognitive principles defining situations, sorting out conflicting claims without 
distorting or cancelling them, leaving personal inclination as the arbiter of action.
"The study of the relation of social cognitive structures to social action seems 
in principle much like the study of the: relation of physical cognitive structure 
to actions upon physical objects, including the fact that both take place In 
social fields". However, Kohlberg acknowledges that tho issue of sacrifice 
raises a fundamental difference in the moral area: "Because much morality invplyjs
basic sacrifice, it has been consigned to the realm of the irrational by Niotszche, 
Freud and Kierkegaard and their followers. If however, a mature belief in moral 
principle in itself engenders e sacrifice of the rational ego, apart from other ! 
personality end emotional considerations, we are faced with a conception of the 
rational end of cognitive structure which has no parallel in the realm of scientific 
and logical thought".
Further studies providing validation for Kohlberg’s"judgement-action relationship" 
include those of Hnan, Smith and Block (1968)? Rubin and Schneider (1973)? Fodor
(1972)? and Mann (1973). Berkeley students faced with a decision to "sit-in"
in the name of political freedom of communication were administered moral judgement 
interviews by Haan et el.. Fifty percent of Stage-5 subjects ond eighty percent 
of Stage-5 subjects were among those "sitting-in", while only ten percent of 
conventional level students were included. (An interesting phenomena in this 
study is that about sixty percent of students, termed by Kohlberg as "Staga-2 
instrumental relativists" also sat-in. Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) report that 
in about twenty percent of college youths, the transition from conventional to 
principled thought is marked by extreme relativism accompanied by en apparent 
retrogression to Stage-2 instrumental hedonism. However tho longitudinal study 
shows that ell extreme relativists eventually move on to principled stages).
Rubin end Schneider, using Lee’s (op. cit.) adaptations of Kohlberg’s moral 
approach reported a positive relationship between decentration skills as indicated 
by scores on measures of communicative egocentrism, morel judgement and altruism 
in seven year old subjects, thereby relating moral cognition to altruistic 
behaviour. Fc4or (1972), following the administration of the Kohlberg interview 
to 40 delinquent and 40 non-delinquent adolescent boys, found delinquents received 
substantially lower moral judgement scores (significant at the .001 level) than 
did non-delinquents.
Kohlberg (1971a) cites that with respect to the My Lai shootings in Vietnam, the 
one man who refused to shoot any civilians during thG massacre showed principled 
thinking in his reasoning about both My Lai and other moral conflicts. The 
public statements of other soldiers involved, indicated that they were at
conventional levels, reasoning that It was necessary to shoot to obey orders. Mann
(1973) reports an Australian survey of public attitudes relating to the My Lai
massacre and the trial of Lieutenant Galley. Fifty-nine percent believed that 
the My Lai soldiers should be "pardoned" and thirty percent reported they also 
would have obeyed orders to shoot civilians. Subjects endorsing the "follow- 
orders" ideology were more likely to be older, less well-educated, at the lower 
end of tho economic scale, politically conservative and authoritarian. Following 
further analysis, Mann had reasons to believe that the true level of obedience 
ideology in the population could be substantially higher than revealed by the 
data? thereby lending further credGnce to Kohlberg*s indications that tho 
majority of the population operate at conventional levels.
F. CRITIQUE OF KOHLBERG*S THEORY
Alston (1971) commenting on en earlier version of Kohlberg*s 1971 paper 
considers that scrutiny of Kohlberg*e descriptions of stages and assignation of 
subjects to stages reveals that what is being classified is what might be called 
a person*© habitual style of moral reasoning. Alston points to a fundamental 
conceptual point about having a concept, on the one hand, and of using a concept 
(or habitually or typically using a concept) on the other. Therefore the 
hypotheses confirmed by empirical studies using these stage assignments, hypotheses 
concerning the cause end consequences of stage membership and stage transition, 
cannot themselves be construed as hypotheses about the causes end consequences 
of stages of conceptual development. A more direct demonstration would require 
the development of a test for possession of moral concepts, analogous to the 
test of typical mode of reasoning, leading to a further question of a parallel 
sequence between the acquisition of moral concepts and the adoption of a mode of 
reasoning.
Alston with respect to Kohlberg*s claim that each stage involves a differentiation 
of its characteristic content from that of the preceding stage would suggest that 
this is * contemporaneous with one’s adopting ("or felling into") that mode of moral 
reasoning as dominant. He feels that Kohlberg hes not presented adequate evidence 
for that claim. Many philosophers who are as conceptually sophisticated as 
Kohlberg*s Stage-6 subjects taka positions In moral philosophy that reflect Stage-# 
or 5.
With respect to the concept of justice as a supreme moral principles "a judgement 
baced on a principle of racial destiny, or on no principle at all, can be just 
as proscriptive as a judgement based on an application of Kohlberg*s principle 
of justice. Alston considers that Kohlberg mot uith only pertial success in 
showing what he set out to illustrate, namely, that the facts of the order of 
morel development end its explanation reveal hie Stage-6 of moral reasoning to 
be e morally superior way of resoVing moral problems. The mere fact that one 
concept logically depends on another has no tendency to show that moral thinking 
involving the former is superior to moral thinking involving the latter. However..
 .... . "the evidence Kohlberg adduces goes far toward breaking down the popular
contrast between factual end scientific judgement as objective, and moral judgement 
as subjective. It does at loaet strongly suggest that one*s modes of moral 
judgement universally tend to develop in certain directions under the impact of 
objective dimensions of its subject matter". Alston considers that Kohlberg 
has enriched moral psychology and hes opened a number of new perspectives which 
"should force psychologists to take the cognitive aspects of morality seriously 
es en important influence on behaviour". However, Kohlberg "has not been able to 
resist the temptation to overstate his case"? he tends to imply an insignificant
role for affect In moral life and rurtner, ne gives ins iir.pressxuii Wltlb bl,CiXka 
baaed on cultural norms and the concept of habit have no place in moral 
psychology. Alston argues that habit concepts ere indispensable in psychology, 
moral or otherwise and Kohlberg*s evidence does not prove to the contrary.
Uith respect to affect one can "universally embrace the thesis that any distinctive 
emotional state will have a cognitive side* by virtue of which it is the kind of 
emotional state it is, and still insist that emotional states, to which en effective 
side is olso essential, play crucial roles in moral development and moral 
motivation •••••••••" Alston suggests that Kohlberg*c concentration on moral
dilemmas in his research leads to his emphasis on reasoning as against affect and 
habitual response, "both in terms of relative contributions to tho determination 
of behaviour and in terms of phenomenological prominence.••••••••• Thus one may
see the neglect of the affective and tho habitual as, in part, a sort of 
’methodological artifact*
In similar vein to Alston, Paters (1971), in addition to considering that 
Kohlberg*e argument that moral development occurs as a result of interaction 
between the child and his physical end social environment is inadequate, refers to 
Kohlberg*a contention that specific character traits, such as honosty, which 
function as habits ere of little significance in the moral life. Paters considers 
that it parallels Kohlberg*s claim that learning theorists hove produced no 
evidenced of the influence of early forms of habit training on adult behaviour 
(Kohlberg 1966). This lack of importance assigned to habit goes against a whole 
tradition of thought about moral development stemming from Aristotle. Peters 
expands that it is not the case that habits have to be formed by e process like that 
of a drill: learning habits in an intelligent way, can be regarded as providing
an appropriate basld, in the moral case, for tho later stage when rules are followed 
or rejected because of the justification that they are seen to have or lack. In 
addition to intelligent rule following, Peters feels that young children can 
become sensitive to considerations which will later servethftm os principles.
Dustice is a difficult abstract consideration for young children end if instead 
of justice, concern for others was encouraged, "it con como to function later Uj! 
on as one of the fundamental principles of morality. Further, Peters considers 
Kohlberg nowhere deals uith the development of the decs of virtues involving 
self-control: namely to be tempted, or to be made fearful. Familiarity uith
such situations carry over into situations in later life when the proper reasons 
for being courageous cen be appreciated. Habituation is important both in 
familiarizing children uith the features of such situations end developing the 
relevant ection patterns that will enable them to deal practically with the 
emotions that may be aroused instead of being overcome: "habituation may thus help
to ley down a pattern of response that may be used in the service of more 
appropriate motives at a latter stage1’. Peters asks whether Kohlberg thinks that 
an individual cen edhere to ’’his favoured principle of justice ••••••• without
come training”. Peters also refers to the ’’disposition to act”? on a broader 
view of ’’reason”* it becomes readily apparent that there are a cluster of ’’passions” 
closely connected with it* without which its operation would be unintelligible. , ^  
Passions such as ’’abhorrence of the arbitrary, the hatred of inconsistency and 
irrelevance, the love of clarity end order and the determination to look at the 
facto”. Kohlberg’s reli&nce, like Piaget’s, on the intrinsic motivation to 
assimilate and accommodate to what is novel reveals a great difference between 
sporadic curiouaity and the passions which cluster round the concern for truth.
The question of how children come to care finds no clear answer in Kohlberg*e 
writings.
Peters concludes that Kohlberg*s account of morel development might be considered 
to be one-sided, in that it has boon erected on the features of a limited 
interpretation of morality: any moral system in which justice is regarded as the
fundamental principle cannot be applied without a view, deriving from considerations 
other than those of justice, about what is important. To propose any criteria 
about what is just implies evaluation and this ’’opens up obvious possibilities 
for alternative emphases in morality in addition to those already mentioned”.
Peters considers that Kohlberg*s findings are of unquestionable importance but 
’’there ie a grave danger that they may become exalted into a general theory of 
moral development.....” Peters considers that Freudian theory far from providing 
o competing theory of moral development is providing e much needed supplement to
the work of the Pieget-Kohlberg school.
Simpson (1974) in considering the methodology and interpretation of findings which 
are specific to Kohlberg’e cognitive-developmental research believes that it will 
serve as a focus for examining more broadly some of the problems of cross-cultural 
studios in any field ’’not just tho emotion-laden one of morality”. She considers 
that one of the difficulties of Kohlberg’s work is that although developing 
parallel and in some senses, isomorphic philosophical and psychological statements 
of cognition and morality, he doos not make , clear the empirical sources of his
claims to universality in the empirical realm. The distinction between normative
philosophy and empirical psychology remains blurred, end normative thinking especial! 
governs the description of what he calle empirically derived categories of ’’post- 
conventional” or ’’principled” reasoning. The related reseerch only tentatively 
supports the claim of an invariant developmental sequence and Simpson does not accept 
the related studies of Turiel (1966 op. cit.) and Rest (1969 op. cit.) ae being 
conclusive. She emphasises that Kohlberg’e ’’cosmopolitanism io hemispheric” for
view, Western end Eastern philosophies differ fer more between themselves than 
within, both in eubetencs end methodology, Western philosophy does not 
represent systems of thought common to the entire world.
Simpson considers that like eech of us, Kohlberg*s interest in cognitive 
development and moral reasoning, his choice of a Kantian or Oeweyien infrastructure 
for his theory and his predilection for abstractions of such principles of justice, 
equality or reciprocity are ell in a sense accidents of time and place and the 
interaction of his personality with e specifiable social environment and the norms 
of the subgroups within that environment. His rebuttal to those who emphasise 
cultural differences is ’’more a statement of faith than an evidence-based 
conclusion”. Universality is far from confirmed from the limited cross-cultural 
studies reported and further, if principled reasoning as defined by Kohlberg does 
not occur in some cultures, then one third of the paradigm is missing and the 
assumption that, under different conditions, these stages would appear in these 
groups is not necessarily warranted. Simpson further refers to the fact that 
post-conventional reasoning, presupposes the capacity to perform formal operations 
of abstract thought. She refers to the empirical parameters of formal thinking 
being defined by cultural manifestations and what Piegot (1972) terms ’’extremely 
disadvantageous conditions” which may delay its appearance to 20 years of age end 
Indeed even prevent its appearance, (piaget 1972 has been discussed in "The 
Statement of the Problem?’- Chapter One). If formal operational thinking - a 
precondition for principled reasoning does not occur in every culture, it seems 
illogical to expect principled moral reasoning to appear universally. Simpson 
further focuses on findings such es those of Ross (1973, discussed in 
Chapter - One ) which point out that fewer than fifty percent in adolescent
samples are able to achieve this level of reasoning. Simpson statest "the 
ascendancy of the normative philosopher over the empirical scientist becomes very 
clear in Kohlberg*s acknowledgement that his Stage-6 describes a utopian ideal 
rather than a reality". This is in response to Kohlberg*s statements
"There is a universal set of moral principles held by men in 
various cultures, our Stage-6. (These principles, us shall 
agree, could logically and consistently bo hold by all men in 
all societies; they would in fact bo universal to all mankind 
if tho conditions for socio-moral development were optional for 
all individuals in all cultures). In responding to written 
and oral interviews based on situations and issues, a very small 
percentage of subjects studied in a number of cultures utilize 
the reasoning processes and the principled content which I 
prefer to think is tho highest developmental stgge of which 
human beings ere capable, and which I believe ell should 
utilize end would under specifieble conditions”.
acknowledges that cultures and individuals may be systematically described 
as to their stage or developmental status, however, "Kohlberg leans a little 
farther into philosophy and assumes a judgmental, normative stance which is 
in danger of toppling him out of scientific psychology entirely".
With respect to principled thinking Simpson considers that the principles 
displayed may simply be the learned values of a different and smaller reference 
group so well internalized that its members believe themselves to be functioning 
autonomouslys "r;in some groups, internality - in the sense of autonomy in 
respect to the dominant culture - is learned as a norm, and admission end 
continued membership are contingent upon that knowledge. Further, Simpson . 
considers that the language used in the protocols of Stage-5 and Stnge-6 subjects 
raises other questions about the structural aspects of the moral development 
interviews. There is a dependence on tho capacity to refer to hierarchies and 
principles, to universal ideas, and especially to concepts such as justice, 
equality end reciprocity at g high level of abstraction. Simpson finds it 
difficult to believe that Stage-6 subjects are not functioning independently 
of their socielization, that they must have been very thoroughly socialized into 
the company of intellectual elites who velue and practice analytic abstract and 
logical reasoning. Highly abstract concepts such as justice have so little 
commonality in moaning from one group to another as to be practically useless as 
cross-cultural generalizationss concept development simply does not mean the 
same thing from one class or culture to another; for example, the concept of 
equality has a wide range of specific meanings which is affected by class member­
ship.
Further, the series of issues, selected because they are deemed to have universal 
applicability ere questionable: the issue of property rights is prone to
cultural differences oc is the value of life prone to the same ambiguities; "in 
every group it is not that life is valued overall or not valued, but that it is 
valued situationally in highly culturally-cpecific ways" and is not a matter of 
natural and universal knowledge. Simpson believes that Kohlberg*o (1969) 
suggestion that St^ges-4, 5 end 6 could bo viewed as alternative typess of mature^ 
moral responses, rether than as a sequence "would relieve some of the tension 
caused by the attempt to define the higher three stages eo culture-free and 
universally attained through normal development. It would also render the 
hierarchy a typology end represent the stages (at least above the first three) as 
lateral, rather than vortical growth so that tho present pious loading should be 
shovelled off//principled reasoning".
reporting of the methodology and focuses on the delayed publication of 
Kohlberg*s frequently cited major works (Kohlberg 1969 and Kohlberg and Turiel 
1971). In conclusion: "lile would do better to explore and analyse differences
whenever found, to borrow end adapt, and to nurture invention and cultural 
mutation as it occurs than to perpetuate the ideology of a suicidal world trying 
to reconcile its differences through the use of a theostical framework ill-suited 
for containing end ordering real human diversity".
Ueinrich (1974) states that Kohlberg*s research has mapped out a broad description 
of moral growth, has illuminated the correlates of moral judgement development, 
with some awareness of the causative preconditions of moral progression.
However, an understanding of the processes of moral thought remains lacking: 
the examination of the anomalies and lacunae in the evidence may be more fruitful 
of explanation than the evidence which confirms the system. There are many 
implications arising from the failure of most people to arrive at Stage-6: the
degree to which a stage of thought is functional to society may indeed affect 
the personal viability of that mode of thought for the individual; there may 
not exist the external stimulation to progress beyond a certain stage; motivation 
to progress is not necessarily intrinsic end while exposure to material and 
arguments of a subsequent stage may lead to the transition to that stage in some 
cases, understanding of the transition demands an understanding of the nature of 
the current stage and the reason why the subsequent stage is more satisfactory 
to the individual.
RcGeorge (1974) concluded from his research with forty 12 year old subjects end 
twenty-three college students, that a description of a subject*e development in 
moral judgement, in terms only of his percentage of use of the various stages is 
too simple. He considers that there is a need to specify the issues involved 
and record profiles of stage usage on those. Further, that the most immediate 
need is for scoring systems which would make such precision possible and enable 
further research on specific mechanisms of development in moral judgement and on 
the relationship of this dimension to moral action.
G. FURTHER EMPIRICAL VALIDATION OF KOHLBERG*S WORK
Grimley (1974) in a cross-cultural study of moral development involving 
subjects from Zambia, United States, Hong Kong, 3apan and England reported results 
confirming that sequential stages of moral development are to be found in different 
cultures. While the parameters in moral development (rate of development, 
dispersion of moral maturity scores etc.) were found to vary somewhat from one 
culture to another, no significant differences between nationalities were found in
account for any significant differences in the development of morel reasoning 
among Catholics, Protestants, Dews, Buddhists, and Atheists. Academic 
performance and socio-economic status were found to be highly significant factors 
affecting development, although the same sequences persisted. Keasey (1973) 
modified by exposure to various conflict situations, the moral opinions end stage 
of reasoning of preadolescents at Kohlberg*s first three stages of moral develop­
ment. Opinion and reasoning change were found to be independent processes. The 
small amount of upward reasoning change induced was consistent with the cognitive- 
developmental view that radical changes in an individual*s stage of cognitive 
functioning ere rare and reaching a more equilibrated state depends on readiness 
to move upward. Graham (unpub.) in a replication of Kohlberg*e measures with 
British children confirms the importance of chronological age and intelligence 
in moral development; when intelligence was controlled, social class differences 
were "rather small" although Classes 1 end 2 "come out on the more *moral* side". 
Graham concludes however, that the relations between "moral" variables, intelligence 
and social class are complex. A curvilinear relationship between moral judgement 
level and overall frequency of conformity is reported by Saltstein et al. (1972). 
Stage-3 children (so-called "good boy, good girl, approval-seeking" morality) 
were more likely to conform than children at either higher or lower moral judgement 
levels. In particular, very few of the higher level subjects (those at Stages-4 
or 5) made any conforming response. Fodor (1969) compared negro and white male 
adolescents in moral judgement in accordance with the Kohlberg interview. The 
subjects consisted of twenty-five socially disadvanated * negro boys together with 
twenty-five white boys aged 14 - 17 years selected at random. The difference 
between moral judgement scores for white and negro boys was non-significant.
There was a statistically significant difference on moral judgement scores between 
boys whose mothers had graduated from High School and boys whose mothers lacked 
this experience.
Selman (1971, op. cit. Chapter One) confirmed that the development of reciprocal 
role-taking skills related to the development of conventional moral judgement 
among sixty middle-class children at ages 8, 9 and 10. Results of a re-examination 
one year later of ten subjects whose role-taking and moral judgement levels were 
low in the original study, supported the hypothesis that the development of the 
ability to understand the reciprocal nature of interpersonal relations is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for the development of conventional moral 
thought. Moir (1974) concludes that moral development may be characterized in 
part, as a gradual evolution of role-taking abilities. From correlations between 
scores of 11 year old girls on Kohlberg*s Moral 3udgement Interview end a nonmoral-
role-taking test, the results showed that a significant proportion of the variance 
in moral maturity scores could be accounted for by measures of nonmoral-role- 
taking. Keaoey (1971) examined the hypothesis that higher stages of moral 
development would be positively associated with social participation. Extent 
of social participation was assessed by having subjects indicate the number of 
social organisations of which they were members or leaders, together with ratings 
by teachers end peers. The stage of moral development was found to be positively 
related to the extent of social participation whether judged by self, peers or 
teachers. Further support was therefore given to Kohlberg’s report (Kohlberg 
passim) that the quality of social participation is associated with accelerated 
moral development and further, to his proposal that social interaction is an 
important source of disequilibration which facilitates progression through the 
stages of moral development together with role-taking opportunities as the 
fuddamental social inputs stimulating moral development.
Keasey and Keasey (1974 op. cit.) from high correlations and systematic relation­
ships between the stages of cognitive development (concrete and formal operations) 
and moral development suggest that sophisticated cognitive operations are a pre­
requisite to advanced moral judgements and further that there is a lag or de-calage 
between the acquisition of logical operations and their application to the area of 
morality, thereby providing further confirmation for Kohlberg*s postulations in 
this connection. (These postulations have been elaborated in "The Statement of 
the Problem, Chapter One). Lee (1971) using material based on Kohlberg*© work, with 
children 5 - 1 7  years, identified, from factor analysis that a concrete operations 
component best related to a decrease of authority type responses and concomitant 
increases in moral modes of conceptualization. The formal operations mode of 
thought best predicted the increase of societal, idealist moral modes of concept­
ualization. Further support that cognitive and moral modes of thought covary 
according to their respective modes of conceptualization was found in the transition 
function as age progressed. Lee concluded that the findings clearly supported 
concomitant "growth" of the two modes of thought.
Ego-identity status and "love! of moral judgement" were independently assessed 
and examined in relation to each otheryby Podd(197£). Subjects who achieved an 
ego identity were generally characterized by the most mature level of moral 
judgement, while those with a relative lack of ego identity were generally character­
ized by either the least mature level of moral judgement or a transitional period 
between moderate and highly mature moral judgement. People undergoing an identity 
crisis were found to be unstable and inconsistent in their moral reasoning*
provided support for Kohlberg*s characterizations of these levels as externally 
versus internally oriented. tileisbroth (1970) reports that identification with 
both parents is significantly related to high moral judgement in males, while 
identification with the father is significantly related to high moral judgement 
in females.
Tapp and Kohlberg (1971) derived a theory of legal development from cognitive- 
developmental theory using kindergarten to college and cross-national preadolescent 
data* Paralleling evidence on universal moral levels, the development of 
individual orientations vis-avis legal or rule systems revealed consistent movement 
from a preconventional law-obeying, to a conventional law-maintaining, to a post- 
conventional law-making perspective* In both the United States and cross-national 
samples, "law and order" conventional reasoning is modal, reflecting that socia­
lization experiences can accelerate, retard or crystallise the growth of legal 
values and roles. Tapp (1970) in an earlier report of part of this work, comments 
that such striking convergences across such divergent nations are "a good sign"*
The common trends of child development and the socialization goals that transcend 
nationality suggest that the shared values throughout our world are more compelling 
than diverse ideologies would imply* (A view counteracting those of Simpson 
op. cit. whD focused on perspectives more aligned with the 'cultural relativists’) 
"If these children’s wisdom could be maintained into adulthood, there might be e 
better chance for freedom and justice within a world society, which after all is 
the message of law". Fontana and Noel (1973) investigated moral reasoning 
among three role groups:- students, "faculty" and "administrators"• "Administrat­
ors" employed law and order reasoning more than "faculty" and students. "Rightists 
used law and order reasoning more than "Leftists" and "Leftisits" reasoned ego- 
istically more than "Rightists". Natural scientists employed more lew and order 
and less social contract reasoning than those in the social sciences and humanities. 
These findings supported the hypothesis1 that stages of morel reasoning provide a 
fruitful model for conceptualizing and assessing differences in values and 
premises among groups and subgroups. A study related to Kohlberg*s work and also 
to Tapp and Kohlberg (1971) by Adelson et el. (1969) traced the growth of the idea 
of law during adolescenee. Oepth interviews were conducted with 120 subjects*^' 
among whom significant changes in the view of law were found to take place between 
13 and 15 years. The level of discourse shifted from concrete to abstract? a 
restrictive emphasis is replaced by a stress on the positive aims of law and a 
conception of amendment is increasingly present in the later years, os is an 
emphasis on ths intrapsychic effects of leu. In general, law lost its absolutistic 
meanings and was seen as functional, as a tool for achieving community ends.
Hogan and Di-ckstein (197 f; supported the hypothesis that ths ethics of personal 
conscience (as reflected by the Survey of Ethical Attitudes) is related to a 
tendency to blame and distrust institutions, while the ethics of social responsib­
ility is associated with a suspicious attitude toward other people. Hogan and 
Dickstein formulate an "orderly pattern of relationships surrounding these 
viewpoints": the ethics of conscience, moral institutionism, principled dis­
obedience, doubt concerning the efficacy of the law as a means for promoting human 
welfare, end a tendency to regard institutions es the source of social injustice 
seem to be reliably interrelated. Theethics of responsibility, moral rationalism, 
principled rule compliance, belief in the instrumental value of the leu, and a 
disposition to locate the roots of injustice in the actions of individuals also 
appear regularly to covsry. Hogan and Dickstein comment that it might be argued 
that the ethics of conscience and responsibility msrely reproduce Piaget’s stages 
of autonomous and heteronomous moral judgement or perhaps Kohlberg*s later stages. 
This observation would assume that the ethics of conscience is developmentelly 
more advanced then the ethics of responsibility. However, the authors would 
disagree on the grounds that the viewpoints in question here are "ideal types" 
derived from two fundamental traditions in social philosophy. In their pure forms 
the ethics of conscience and responsibility should be morally and developmentally 
equivalent, paralleling for example, the Integratist and Normative conscience 
orientation. Secondly, the authors have found it useful to conceptualize moral 
development in terms of four dimensions considered in conjunction with conscience 
and responsibility (moral knowledge, socialization, empathy and autonomy).
According to this view, a proper evaluation of a person*s moral posture requires 
considerable information beyond the manner in which he reasons about morel dilemmas 
The moral and developmental implications of a person’s position with regard to 
the ethics of conscience-ethics of responsibility continuum can bs properly under­
stood only within the context of total character structure.
H. KOHLBERG*S APPLICATION OF HIS THEORY TO SHE SPHERE OF MORAL EDUCATION
Kohlberg (1970c) considers that the issue of "real life" brings us to what 
should be a central concern of moral education, the moral atmosphere of the 
school. He further elaborates (1971a) thet to extend clessroom discussions o£,.^ 
justice to real life is to deal with issues of justice in the schools. Education 
for justice, requires making schools more Just and encouraging students to take 
an active role in making the school more Just. Kohlberg employs his evidence 
that children with extensive pser-group participation advance considerably more 
quickly through the Kohlberg stegBs of morel Judgement than children isolated from 
such participation, for the application of environmental stimulation in the form 
of the enhancement of participation end role-taking opportunities. Ultimate
participation is participation in the structure and decisions of the school 
itself: "Here the principle of participation must be integrated with our
principle of stimulation by a justice-structure a stage above the child’s own".
Kohlberg (1971a) claims that the existence of moral stages offers the educator 
an alternative to the arbitrary indoctrination of children with the values he 
happens to favour. The cognitive-developmental approach to moral development 
involves the stimulation of natural moral development through the universal 
stages. The basis of the cognitive-developmental approach is that children 
hove their own way of thinking and consequently, moral education must be based 
on a knowledge of their stages of development. The following propositions, 
basic to the cognitive-developmental approach and contrary to the propositions 
of ethical relativity, Kohlberg claims to be supported by clear research evidence 
(Kohlberg 1971a op. cit.; Kohlberg and Turiel 1971a):
"(i) We often make different decisions end yet have 
the seme basic moral values. (ii) Our values tend 
to originate inside ourselves as we process our social 
experience. (iii) In every culture and subculture of 
the world, the same basic moral values and the same 
steps toward moral maturity are found. While social 
environments directly produce different specific beliefs,
(e.g. smoking is wrong; eating pork is wrong;) they 
do not engender different basic moral principles (e.g. 
consider the welfare of others; treat other people 
equally etc.). (iv) Insofar as basic values differ, it 
is lergely because we are at different levels of 
maturity in thinking ebout basic moral and social issues 
and concepts. Exposure to others more mature than 
ourselves, helps to stimulate maturity in our own 
value processes. We are, however, selective in our 
responses to others and do not automatically incorporate 
the values of elders or authorities important to us”.
Kohlberg (1971a end passim) reports that et certain age periods transitions to 
higher stages are made most easily. The first is the pre-adolescent period 
(10 - 13 years) when the transition from pre-conventional to conventj.onal thought
,%\>r •• -
most commonly occurs. The level of morality at age 10 years doss not indicate 
the level that will be attained in adulthood, but children who do not reach a 
solid Stage-3 or 4 level by age 13 years are unlikely to attain principled thinking 
in adulthood. The second transitional period appears to be in late adolescence, 
ages 15 - 19 years. Results suggest that those who do not use some (at least 
20% principled thinking by the end of "High School" are unlikely to develop 
principled thinking in adulthood.
The school’s potential for positive influence on moral development is indicated 
by a variety of evidence. Bar Yam end Kohlberg (1971 op. cit.) showed the effect 
of a non-familial environment when disadvantaged adolescents in a Kibbutz High 
School were compared with a control group of disadvantaged edolescents in the
w*«; f <bii inu.ia. juuyciuciiu* m o  b A b y  blIJUXUI'UII X X V U U  UJX 1*11 bHtJJ.1T I BIIIXJ.J.6S j lillti
Kibbutz adolescents had little direct contact with their parents, yet seemed to 
show moral maturation. Blatfc and Kohlberg (I96£ op. cit.) indicated that more 
restricted educational efforts, such ao Sunday School claeaes, to stimulate moral 
development con also have a significant effect on children. These studies 
suggest that by the uae of procedures that are littib different from those 
available to any teacher, it is possible to raise children’s moral level 
significantly and in a way that ie sustained over time.
The first principle to be embodied by teachers is for the spontaneous moral 
situations arising in the classroom to be embodied in e programme of moral 
education, for development is not achieved through direct teaching and instruction. 
Kohlberg’s research evidence indicates that the child generates hie own level of 
thinking and changes gradually. The task of the teacher is to facilitate the . 
process of change. Studies (Rest, Turiel and Kohlberg 1969 op. cit.) suggest 
that it ie not possible to encourage children to comprehend stages much higher 
than their own, much lees to use them spontaneously. Success in stiaulating 
change to a higher stage requires (a) helping children to understand the next 
highest stage of reasoning and (b) facilitating their acceptance of that reasoning 
as their own, with tho spontaneous use of it in new situations. In another 
series of studies (Turiel 1966 op. cit.) it was found to be possible to induce 
chango in a child’s thinking to the stage directly above his own. Moral reasons 
below the child’s level is not very likely to be education. The teacher’s 
primary task is to help the child to focus on genuine moral conflicts; think 
about the reasoning he uses In solving such conflicts; see inconsistencies and 
inadequacies in his way of thinking and find means of resolving such Inconsistencies 
and inadequacies (evidenced by Turiel 1969). Kohlberg and Turiel (1971a) state 
that these approaches meet thB criteria of being constitutional (i.e. they do not 
qualify as indoctrination, violate no civil rights and are Independent of religious 
doctrines); are philosophically justified (morel philosophers thooughout history 
have in various ways expressed principled moral judgement, moral leaders like 
Lincoln, Martin Luther King had an ethic based upon an advanced stage of moral 
development and the stages do not represent middle-class bias - they are universal) 
end further the approaches are socially useful (persons at a higher level of moral 
development, not only reason better, but act in accordance with their judgements).
Therefore the aim of morel education ie tho "stepwise stimulation of development 
toward a more mature moral judgement and reasoning, which culminate in a clear 
understanding of universal principles of justice, end not to develop intellectually 
or morally precocious children by mere acceleration. The aim is to ensure the
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outii&g Qf imtBtmmmi
the overall design fm irtvecfcigaiton involved the administration 
of Kchlborg*© m m l  Budgsmsni Interview to populations contrasted 
in respect of Pieptlsn Concrete11 and HrnmV* epac&tivity end 
precision matched in terms of extraneous variables* namelyi IB*;.. 
age* soK end eaoio*ecenemie status*
the final cample consisted of ZZl subjects (attrition of tho 
number of subjects by 19, was due to school transfer, inconsistent 
attendance and incomplete responses), aged 13 para 10 months to 
10 pans 11 months* ranging in intelligence from below*av0»age* 
minus to intellectually superior (Reveres categories 1930* X9S£5)| 
representing ©ocie«*eoonemie elasee© I to W$ in accordance with " 
the Registrar Generalfc Classification (Registrar General 100i)# 
all attending Secondary Schiele In ft Worth tendon Borough*
§* SStSCflll Of S^SSIS
In selecting the spools it was important that they should bo • 
within the earns administrative unit* not only f m  control of 
environmental factors, but further* because of"tho current 
transitional nature and diversification of SecondaFy Schools : 
organization emanating from the Circular- 10/65, iosuod from the 
Department of Education and Science and emphasised to varying 
degrees by successive Gavernmsnts* A further factor affecting 
Secondary Schools at the time of the investigation, were 
preparations for end implementation- of the Raising of the School 
leaving*!§©* which although common to Oil oroao, was being dealt ; 
with variably by administrative unite in accordance with their 
Individual resources*
1* Selection of the Administrative ..Unit
Several tendon Boroughs were approached through the Education 
Officials, some refusal© being received on the grounds #■ current'’ 
pressures on Secondary Schools* two offering co-operation. The ' 
co-cperatien offered by the Worth tendon Borough was accepted for 
the following reasons%
(©) Tho Borough is  well-designed and incorporates
comprehensive environmental, features from semi-rural 
to urban, h istorical to modern* with a variety of 
housing accommodation ranging from the privately ounad 
to council provision*
(b) The population is  settled and heterogeneous incorporating 
various, uell-integratad, sub-cultural groups*
(c) Ths educational administration appeared to bo w ell* 
organised and consistent throughout the Borough with 
various forward-looking plans for the future, supported 
by teams of Educational Advisors and Welfare Officers.
(d) The plans for the Secondary Schools Reorganization on 
Comprehensive lines appeared to be well-designed in  
order to cause the least disruption to the schools, 
least change to the pattern, and to be suited to the 
resources available -  gradually working towards a l l -  
through Comprehensive Schools within the next th irty  
years*
Selection of the Schools
The fin a l cample of six schools was selected following personal v is its  
and discussion with the Haadteachers* I t  collectively represented 
pupils from*
(a) both sexes, both single-sex and mixed schools$
(b) various social classesf
(c) various sub-cultural groups and religionsg
(d) various a b ility  groups
Schools included (with sample sires) were*
local Authority -  g irls  -  one -  49 girl©
local Authority -  boys -  one -  77 boys
local Authority -  mixed -  two -  19 boys 11 g irls
12 boys 16 g irls  
Private -  boys -  one -  24 boys
Private -  girl© -  one -  17 g irls
The ochoolo a ll  followed re la tive ly  sim ilar patterns, both 
in  terms of general school organization and in terms of 
curriculum* A ll pupils appeared to follow a wide range of 
eubject courses in the early years of secondary school end 
were only ju s t, a t the time of testing, beginning to lim it 
subjects for study in  the fourth year* General fa c ilit ie s , 
sport© opportunities, extra-curricular a c tiv itie s  and social 
and community a c tiv itie s  appeared sim ilar throughout a l l  
schools*
MEASURES USED XH THE INVESTIGATION
Measures used to equate (match) the various groups)
(e ) Raven*© Standard Progressiva Matrices* Sets A* B* C* D end £*
S S E m u a E i U 2§§)»
The Standard Progressive Matrices is  a test of a person*© capacity 
at the time of the test to apprehend meaningless figure©$ see tho 
relation© between them* conceive tho nature of tho figure completing 
each system of relations presented end thereby develop © systematic 
method of reasoning* Raven describes the scale a© ,fa test of 
observation and clear thinking” and stresses that by its e lf  i t  is  
not e test of general intelligence, although when used in  con­
junction with tho M ill H ill Vocabulary Scales can bo considered 
synonymous with © single test of ,fgeneral intelligence11* The 
Standard Progressive Matrices Scale is  intended to cover the whole 
range of in te llec tu a l development and to bo suitable from ©gs 
eight years to adult level*
Instructions and detail© of interpretation, including ©coring, are 
to be found in Raven (I960)* Further discussion with respect to 
this measure i© included in Chapter Five*
(b) The M ill H ill Vocabulary Scale Form One Senior (Raven 1943)
tike  the Matrices Test, the M ill H ill Vocabulary Scale is  designed 
to cover os nearly as possible, tho whole range of in te llec tu a l 
development from infancy to maturity* bhile the Matrices Tost 
provides a re liab le  index to a person1© present capacity for 
in te llectu a l activity^ irrespective of education and language,
the M ill H ill Vocabulary Scale provide© a re liab le  index of 
the beet In te llectu a l level the subject has attained, whatever 
hie present capacity for in te llec tu a l a c tiv ity  may happen to be*
As eteted above, the two teats are designed for use together, in  
placo of a single verbal test of general intelligence, so that i t  
ie  possible to assess separately end nin a clearly defined form”*
( i )  a parsonfs present capacity for in te llec tu a l work?
( i i )  the fund of verbal information he has acquired so 
fa r, and thance hie cultural level re la tive  to other 
peopleg
( i i i )  the psychological significance of discrepancies 
between tho best cultural level a person has attained, 
and his present capacity for in te llectu a l ac tiv ity *
Instructions end details of interpretation, including scoring, 
or© to b© found in  Haven (1958, 1965)* further discussion with 
respect to this measure is  included in Chapter five*
<c) Soclo-Cconomic Statue
A rating for each subject was obtained based upon parental 
occupation* Tho Registrar General*© Classification of Occupations 
(Registrar General 1960) was used as followst
I  Professional and managerial occupations
I I  Other professional and technical
I I I  (non-manual) Other non-manual occupation©
I I I  (manual) Skilled manual
IV Semi-Skilled manual
Scoial class I I I  in  this scale ie  by fa r the largest section of 
the general population end needs distinction between non-manual 
and manual*
Measures used to contrast the various Groups
(a ) Measure©, of Plagetien Operativlty -  The Piaoetian Questionnaire 
( Tlshsr* 1962* 1971)
Tishor (1962, 1971) has devised a poncil-and-poper test which 
can be usod to determine e subject*© stage of mental development*
C rite ria  eat cut' in  Inheider and- Piaget (1958) mm  -used fo r ; 
the construction of the test which contains 24 multiple-choico 
items based on four sc ien tific  phenomena or tasks* niho bouncing 
b a ll,” "equilibrium in  a balance,” % ater levels in  connected 
containers” and s^hadows o f rings#” four teen of the tost items 
can be classified as ^concrete”# (th a t is , they would fee most 
lik e ly  solved by pupil© in  the ^concrete” stage o f development) . 
end ten m» ”formal”* to  correct for guessing only those ©object© 
who correctly answer five or more tf formal” items and mmn or 
more ’’concrete” items are classified m  belonging to the formal' 
© tap o f development* The rationale for the procedure appears. 
in Chapter fiv e  and details of the items and seeping of the 
items are included in- the Appendices*
the administration of the Questionnaire occurs in fat# phases, : 
corresponding to ih@ four aeto of questions* Each phase is 
initiated with a demonstration of the relevant phenomenon* 
fisher has compared the results obtained using the questionnioro 
with these obtained using the conversaticn-intervisw -technique* 
further discussion of the validation and use of this instrument. 
is included in Chapter Five* Additions were made to fisher1© 
original Questionnaire in the form of %hy do you think so”, to 
bring it further into line with Piaget*© approach# two counter- 
suggestion situations were also included*
References to the relevant Piegstiaii work upon which the fisher 
Questionnaire is based are as foilowsi
Designation Area o f Cognitive Strategy. ; , Source
f??he Equality o f Angle© At ihs concrete stage, subjects
o f Incidence end -establish a correspondence between
RefMcUon ond the dope of Incidence a t path and
Operations o f Reciprocal. ., elope, o f reflected path# Do not •
Implication11 • construct ley*
At"the formal slago* subjects 
discover leu o f equality o f angle 
of incidence end angle of 
■reflection* ■’
^Equilibrium in the ‘ At the concrete ©taga, subjects
Delanos s . realise:that equal weights at .
equal distance from the fulcrum 
■•balance each'other and that a ■ ■ 
smaller weight a great distance 
- fmm the fulcrum balances with 
a larger: weight closer to the , 
fulcrum on the other aide*
■ At the formal stage*' mbJaets- 
; : discover, the. proportional: . .
relationship between weights and
■ distances fro® the;fMlcrum* ■■
^Communicating Vessolo, t ■ At the concrete stage* subjects
discover that, water: level© , 
return to s common level*
At the formal atago* the subjects 
;!. can predict what could happen in
art© container whan the other is  
raised or lowered*
,fTho Projection o f Shadow#. At the concrete s te p * subjects
discover that the si?;© of 
shadow depends on s ite  end 
diaiftnos from the screen*
"The Drouth
Of
thinking 
frOm;Chii«fc'';;-- 
hood to 
Adolsscsnco** 
Inboldor and 
Piipet; flOSS) 
pp.3-19
Inholdor and 
Piaget (1988) 
pp* 164*81
Inhcldor and. 
Piaget (1988) 
pp* 133-4?
Inholdor end 
Piaget (1950) 
pp. 190-209
(b) Measures .of;Boral,'.judgement (Kobltern 113S8* 19?lb)
Kohlberg ha© em pirically devised m  instrument with which to 
measure moral judgement* hypothetical moral dilemma© are 
presented, followed by a eerie© of queeiieno which m k  the 
subject to resolve the dilemma and then probe Into the reasons 
leading the subject to make-hie decision* I t  Ie  the reasoning 
process which Is  o f in terest and Kohlberg has delineated 
c rite ria  by which responses can be scored cm a variety Of 
dimensions according'to' a developmental scale o f maturity o f 
moral judgement* the moral Judgement test has boon designed ' ■ 
m  that i t  can fee used either in  written form or a© a 
structural in ter view* the. floral judgement Scoring Guide i© o 
lengthy document and condensed extracts are therefore included 
in  the Appendices* Further discussion o f the scoring is  
included in  Chapter Five*
The selection of situations foom Kohlberg*0 (1971b) t e a l  
judgement Interview was os follows 1 •■■■■■■
Story ■ Conflict
i l l  Heinz steals the drug taw m *  floral
iv  The wife wants euthanasia taw Vs* floral
floral Form 6
v the captain orders a man to Authority and justice
hie death
v i Choose the sick matter the . ; justlco, ■
troublemaker
v ii One brother steals, the other taw vs* justice
,Jcons**
v i i i  The reformed criminal hacrnH taw vs* justice
carved his ja i l  term
PROCEDURE
Subject© wore tested from thro© school© during 1973 end from 
the remaining throe during 1974* Testing took place between the month© 
of te c h  .and Sun© in  IDTS-end A pril end fey in  1974* footing xm, 
completed within each ached during a period not longer than four 
uaeke* in  a l l  school©'tec ting :wa© arrangtd in  aooordaiicd with tho •'•• 
ochool timetable, two unit©.of time-table.being a llo tted  fop each . 
testing seseioni. th is  ameuntatii© .four sisoions of one hour and 
twenty minuiss each* in  ic ta l*  tharaby allowing for tho aeisblieh* 
meat o f tappert* w p lm s tlim n m d  femonstratien*
the order of administration of teats was kept throughout* • 
as foliewai * ; ' ' '*'"
Session 1 (the Standard feogrsseiv© matrices* Sets Afi*CfD .: ■
(Th© Mill Hill VoDObuXaxry EcDl©
Session 2 (feral Sudgsmant Dilemmas 111 and IV 
' Rfferai Sudgewit ^11 ■
Session s {Th© PicQotien DuQeiionnaire 
Session 4 (feral Judgement Dilemmas If tntHft 
(feral Judgement Dilemma, Vlit
Situations VII and Vlti m m  considered tho most aulfeebla 
dilemma© to divide between two eeeeiono* Unlike the other 
tum~oituaUcn unite*they coneiat of two separate stories* not . ... 
econtinuaUon, and ©re relatively short#
feoknrepnd Information
Additional information ebtainod included*
Date of birth;
Position tm the family - ages of brothers and alatarei 
Out-of-school-activities and interest©;
Ambitions for career
CHAPTER FIVE 
MEASUREMENT Of THE VARIABLES
A* Measures used to Equate (match) the Various Groups 
1* Age 
2. Sex
3* Socio-Economic Status
4. (a) Intelligence
(b) Vocabulary
Bm Measures used to Contrast the Various Groups
1. Measures of Piogotian Cperotivity
2* Measures of Moral 3udgement
CHAPTER FIVEiu w * — p«
m£ASUREF£MT Of THE VARIABLES
1* Aqq
Subjects were engaged in the fourth year of the Secondary 
School Curriculum, therefore within the approximate CA range,
14 years to IS years*
2* Sex
Subjects representing both ©exes were included#
3# Socio-economic status
Subjects representing socio-economic classes I to IV in 
accordance with the Registrar General*o Classification (Registrar 
General 1960) were Included* (Further details have been given in 
the previous Chapter - 11 Outline of the Investigation” - Chapter Four)*
4* (e) .Xntollloonce8 Standard Progressive. flatrlcee
Sate A* Bft C« 0 and £# (Raven 1938* Revised 19S6)*■ f T O i r f a o  m m i  » • » > » • •  ■  «ii>»<n«»iii ■iiumn m tan0um *m *m m nm m
The Standard Progroscivo Matrices, Sets A, B, C, 0 and E in 
accordance with Raven (1960) together idfcfo ”a test of a person*© 
capacity at the time of the teat to apprehend meaningless figures 
presented for hie observation, see the relations between them, 
conceive the nature of the figure completing each system of relations 
presented, and, by so doing, develop a systematic method of 
reasoning”*
i
The scale comprises 60 untimed, multiple-choice problems, each 
consisting of a design or “matrix” from which a part has been removed, 
divided into five sots of 12* In each set the first problem is as 
nearly aa possible self-evident, with tho problems following, becoming 
progressively moro difficult* Tho order of tho tests provides the 
standard training in tho method of working and fiva progressive 
assessments of a parson*© capacity for intellectual activity* The 
themes employed ore (a) continuous patterns, (b) analogies between 
ppiirs of figures, (c) progressive alterations of patterns, (d) permut­
ations of figures and (o) resolution of figuroo into constituent 
part©* The Scale is intended to cover tho whole range of intellectual
development end can bo given either m  m  individual, e eolf- 
©dminlstercd or as e group teat to provide an index of intellectual 
capacity, irrespective of nationality or education** Tho contribution 
which each of the five ceic makes to the total provides a means of 
assessing tho consistency of the estimate and the psychological 
significance of discrepancies in the test results*
Raven (op*cit*} claims that the test measures what he variously 
calls “innate eductlve ability”, “eductive 101011108000” or simply 
“eduction” and stresses that by itself, the scale i© not a test of 
“general intelligence” end that the cmphesis needs to bo on e test of 
observation and clear-thinking* £ech problem in the scale is a 
“©cures” of e system of thought - hence the name Progressive Matrices* 
However, the Progressive Matrices ere recommended by Raven to be used 
together with the Mill Hill Vocabulary Scales in place of a single 
test of general intelligence* The Progressive Matrices Scale has 
a re-tost roliebllity varying with age, from 0*83 to 0*93f correlates 
0*86 with the Terman-Merrill scale, being found to have a ”g” 
saturation of 0*82* Raven on the basis of tho evidence for the 
changing ratio between ago end test scores on Progressive Matrices 
especially before ego 14, has bean opposed to converting Progressive 
Matrices ©cores into IQ*s. He has preferred the use of percentile 
ranks thereby evaluating ability In terms of the percentage frequency 
with which a similar degree of ability is found to occur amongst 
people of the earns age*
(i) Scoring
The standard record form is arranged so that it can be marked 
by superimposing a stencil marking key* A personfe score on 
the scale is the total number of problems he solves correctly 
when he io allowed to work through the series from beginning to 
end, and ie classified as follows*
* Raven adds th© proviso that the scale appears, from published 
correlations, to justify thie claim, although conclusions can 
never be accepted uncritically*
* ccoro obovo 95th percentile 
for ego
* ©core' at or cbove the 75th 
percentile
- score at or above the 90th 
percentile
- ccore lios between 25th and 75th 
percentile
- score greater then median or SOth 
percentile
* score lees than median
«* score lies at or below 25th 
percentile
* ©core lies at or below 10th 
percentile
* ©core lie© at or below 5th 
percentile
Shipley (1919), Orrne (1966), Cronbocb (1961) end Irvine (1969) 
support the Progressive Matrices test with rospoct to its highly 
abstract content end its more direct relation to ’’native” intelligence* 
with less to academic achievement* educational opportunity or cultural 
backgrounds Orm© focuses on the frequency* from statistical analyses* 
with which the Progressive Matrices has proved to be a most reliable 
non-verbal measure of the general factor involved in intelligence* 
Irvins draws attention to its culture-free potential end its 
prominence as an experimental cross-cultural test.
Burks (1958) in e critical review of tho literature relating to 
the Progressive Matrices* with respect to content validity states 
that no studies report correlotiona of Progressive Matrices with 
other tests of mental ability eo high a© that given by ftovons 
*86 with the Terman-Merrill* Tho combination of verbal end performance 
scores on tho decheler teste gave tho next highest correlations with
Grads I Intellectually Superior
IX Above Average
XI*
III Average 
XXX*
XXX-
IV Below Average 
XV-
V Intellectually
defective
(11) Validity and Reliability
Progressiva Matrices e.g. *78 (Barrett 1950) and .74 (KlcrtDff 1951). 
Burke focuses on the confirmatory evidence for the validity of tho 
Progressiva Matrices in tho sense of capacity to differentiate among 
age groups below 15* which has been furnished in graphs and tables 
provided in Raven’e (1941* 1956) standardisation data and citing a 
number of studies concludes that **there ie abundant evidence of 
concurrent validity for Progressive Matrices in the sense of its 
capacity to discriminate over a wide range among groups known by other 
criteria to differ in intellectual capacity”. He considers that it 
is not e substitute in any cense for the Binet or tioch&l&r teste* 
nor for any berbai or non-verbal group tost of mental ability* but 
is psrhopo an almost equally useful supplement and chows inter- 
correlations with such teste perhaps ee high as they chow with one 
another. (However* Burke* 1972)* later reports that data on 
reliability for ages above 25 yeare compare favourably with similar 
data for the reliability of bAlS verbal and performance scores.)
Burke (1958) cites Spearmen as having ”est Englleh opinion in 
regarding progressive Matrices as e nonverbal test of ’’g”* •the beet 
of ell* to quote Vernon end Parry (1949) ••«••••«* on almost pure 
®g* test® ”• Burke summarises from the researches cited* that the 
evidence is not convincing that Progressive Matrices has validity 
as a pure measure of tho Spearman construct of ftg"f end doubt may 
be raised whether such a construct can be measured independently of 
tho modality through which it is expressed* the selectivity of tho 
subjects end thsir sex, and possibly tho presuppositions of the 
factor analyst* Ho cites Adkins end tyerly (1952) who reported from 
their coroprohensivo factor analysis no evidence for a “general 
reasoning” factor* nor “any factor fully corroborating Spearman*© 
ng” among their first order factors.11 However, they identified 
factors relating to hypothesis verification (sometimes referred to 
as inductive ability)* perceptual speed and concept formation#
Burko end Bingham (1969) reporting that Progressive Matrices loaded 
on a verbal factor speculate that the test could depend on verbal 
ability in the sense that the subjects 11 talk their way through* i.e. 
they explain to themselves verbally what the relationships are.
Dencen (1970) comments that tho intcrcorrelation© among toots 
ere roughly related to their degree of proximity on the complexity 
cantintmum and toss to which are intended to identify “g”, such as 
Raven*© Progreceivc Matrices, show increasing correlations with other 
task© as one moves along the continuum from simple to complex*
3ensen (1973) cite© the study of MacArthur and Elley (1963) involving 
sotting up certain desirable criteria for culture-reduced teste and 
studying a large number of such tests along with conventional IQ 
tests* Raven*© Progressive Matrices and Cattail*© Culture-Fair Tests 
of ”g” proved to be superior, showing negligible loadings on verbal 
and numerical factorsj lesc significant relationships with socio­
economic status than conventional tests* fclestby (1953), with some 
reservations, gives further support to Progressiva Matrices as a 
test avoiding affects of previous learning*
RecFarlene Smith (1964) with respect to spatial factor© within 
the Progressive Matrices states that it is not a true K-test, because 
it does not involve the perception of organised configurations in a 
way which is critical for successful performance# It involves 
explicit trial end error and tho checking and cross-checking of 
relationship© between the different parte of the figures* From a 
fector-analysie, Progressive Matrices was found to have spatial 
loadings on Sets A, C and E of *17 and Sets B and 0, a aero loading*
Keir (1949) and Vernon (1950) alco found small spatial loadings on 
Sets A, Cf and E and Kolr suggested that this was due to these sets 
comprising the section of the Matrices tost most readily worked by 
attention to the figure as a whole*
Approach©© to Tostino in the Present Invostloation
The Standard Progressive Retries, Set© A, B, C, 0 end E wore 
administered as a group toot following the instructions end procedure 
cot out in Raven 1960 (pp*8 - 9)* Marking, ©coring and grading ©Iso 
followed tho recommended cyotem (pp*10 - 15)* Extract© from the Standard 1 
Progressive Matrices arc included in the Appendices#
4* (b) Vocabulary; The Rill Hill Vocabulary Scale with the 
Progrossivc Rotricos Scale (Raven 1943)
Like the Matrices Test, the Rill Hill Vocabulary Scale is 
designed to cover as nearly as possible the whole range of intellectual
development from infancy to maturity and to bo equally useful with 
subjects of every intellectual level* While the Ratricee Teat 
provides a reliable index to e parsonfe present capacity for 
intellectual activity whatever language he spooks or education he 
has acquired* the m i l  Hill Vocabulary Scale provides an index of 
a subjects present recall of acquired information and ability for 
verbal communication* Revon (1956) claims* that demands on a 
person*s present capacity for intellectual activity and rational 
Judgement arc reducedjfco a minimum# The fact that the Scale provides 
a consistent and reliable estimate of a percent recall of verbal 
information at the time of the test explains both its uses and 
limitations} to this extent It shoes © personfs present cultural 
level relative to other people* which lo not necessarily the best 
level he has ever reached* or may in future achieve* It Indicates 
with some accuracy a person1© present ability to express his idea© 
orally or in writing end oven hie ability to read and spell* thereby 
Indicating © personfe educational attainments* The Information it 
provides 1@ explicit end valuable* but before any inferences can bo 
drawn concerning progress in the future or causes of failure in the 
past* it is necessary to know in addition* the present capacity for 
intellectual activity and rational Judgement# Raven suggests that 
when the Vocabulary Test io used ©long with the Matrices Test* 
inferences concerning past limitations or deterioration must 
inevitably remain et the level of speculation but inforcncoc 
concerning future progress can however be verifiori by subsequent 
observation end Raven claims that over a period of time* predictions 
cade on the basis of these two tests have proved more correct then 
cross-sectional studies alone might suggest# By using two separate 
teste in place of a simple test of general intelligence a clear 
distinction can be made between a persons capacity for rational 
judgement end hie, present ability to recall verbal information* Hie 
Standard Scale consists of 08 suitably selected words* arranged in 
order according to the frequency with which they cro usually known#
It is divided into two exactly parallel series of 44 words* known ac
UwvU-
Set fi end Set B. Children and adults able to read and write-down 
the meaning of each word in Set A end for each word in Sot B to 
select © synonym from a group of six words provided# This is known
as Form Ono# Form two* for the purpose of ro-tosting consictc of
dofining each word in Sot B and selecting e synonym for each word
in Set A* For those over the age of 14 years* Form One Senior and 
Form Two Senior* the ton easiest words in each sot are omitted end 
the eleventh is printed as a worked example*
Scoring
For most purposes it is only necessary to ascertain the total 
number of words in the scale e person can explain* elthou^i the test 
also allows for qualitative analyses*
Scores ere classified ass
Grade 1 Verbally superior - score lies at or above the 95th
percentile for ogo
XI Above average - score lies at or above the 75th
percentile
II* - score lies at or above the 90th
percentile
III Average - score lies between 25th and 75th
percentile
1114* - score is greater than the median or
50th percentile
III- - score is lose than median
IV Bolou average - score lies at or below the 25th
percentile
IV- - ecoro lies ©t or below the 10th
percentile
V Verbally - score lies at or below the 5th
defective percentile
The percentile grades for children end adults up to the ego of 
85 years oro given in Raven (1958* 1965)*
J5.ta.nd.agjdizotion
Standardisation procedures ore givon in Raven (195Q)» The
over-ell correlation between Set A end Sot B words was found to bo
*’in the neighbourhood of 0*90n* Raven reports that the Vocabulary
Toot may be expected to give the highest re-test reliability end 
to correlate moot closely with tha Matrices Toot for those between 
12 « 50 years*
yocholor (19if-9) states that in spite of the excellent criteria 
and stotisticel procedures used, the net result, as in tho case of 
other vocabulary tests is to furnish median scores which discriminate 
only modestly between successive ago levels* thus the differences 
between successive median ago scores (4j-14) is on tho average only 
about two words* On the other hand, the author’s norms show a vary 
marked jump from the median 14 year score to that of the average 
adult* Tho difference between these two age levels is much greater 
then those found by American Authors (Toman and fclechslor)* On the 
Mill Hill blot (88 words), the Jump is from 38 to 55f on the Tarmcn 
Uefc (45 words) from 16 to 20$ on the t’echsler list (42 words) from 
20 to 25* Utecheler considers that the claim that the Rill Hill 
Vocabulary Test was dscignod to complement the Progressive Matrices, 
both scales constructed to cover ee nearly as possible the whole range 
of intellectual development from infancy to maturity ic an 
unsupported claim and "would ba difficult to prove". However, bachelor 
considers that the Rill Hill is nevertheless an excellent toot 
measuring in "a rather good way tho cams factors which may bo said 
to bo measured by other vocabulary tests".
Bortnor (1965) focuses on the difficulty of interpreting the 
portion of tho test requiring the testes to writs hie answers,ft® 
poor spelling ability may lead him to use inappropriate substitute 
words or hie general expressive ability may lead him to use 
inappropriate substitute words or his general expressive ability 
may lead him to use inappropriate substitute tuorde or hie general 
expressive ability may be systematically inferior to hie actual 
comprehension as indicated by on oral toot* These considerations 
Bortner feels suggest thbt the test is measuring more than merely 
the "acquired information" the author eeoka in order to eupplemsnt 
hie Progressive Retrices* Further, tho suggestion that the test 
be used together with the Standard Progressive Matrices helps to 
counterbalance the latter*e excessively perceptual approach to
tho measurement of intelligence but, it does not go far enough, 
elnco it still 1eaves unmeasured, the variety of measurable 
abilities commonly subsumed under the matrix of intelligence*
the Present Investigation
Form One Senior of the Mill Hill Vocabulary Scale was 
administered as a written group test following the instructions 
cot out in Raven (1956, p.SOf 1965, pp.3-4). Marking, scoring 
and grading also followed the recommended system (Raven 1950, 
pp.31*33, 52*62| 1965, pp. 4*18).
B. MEASURES USED TO CONTRAST THE VARIOUS CROUPS
1* Measures of Fieaotian Qperatlvitv * The Piaostlan Questionnaire
Piaget, cot© up a theoretical framework to account for the 
development of Intelligence from childhood to adolescence (Inheldor 
and Piaget, 1958) and outlines in detail the mental operations of 
which children at various age levels are capable.
Piaget has shown that the preoperationai child makes judgements 
that ora fragmentary, inconsistent and in terms of a single relation* 
chip at a time| not being capable of reversible operations. As 
tho child enters the concrete etage of mental development, his judge* 
monte (i.e. operations) gradually become reversible and co-ordinated, 
but are limited to tangible and visible material© and objects. He 
is able to classify materiali break down groups into constituent 
parte$ place a series in order| pair corresponding elements and 
substitute equivalent elements$ but whan solving problems a trial and 
error approach le adopted, no hypotheses are proposed and tested, 
nor are all available possibilities tested. Uhen the formal ©tags of 
development has been achieved, the adolescent is capable of setting-up 
and testing theories against available data. Propositions ©re dealt with 
as opposed to concrete cbjocte end relations between the symbol© which
are being dealt with can be held in the mind and the relations can be 
transformed in various ways. Problem-solving involves a systematic approach; 
constructions and tccting for implication, non-implication end incompatibility 
are involved.
By devising various ingenious experiments, Piaget was able to determine tho 
operations of which a child at a given age was capable and to confirm tho 
existence of periods of equilibrium and acceleration in mental development. 
However, Tisher (1962) emphasises that Piaget’s "clinical" or "conversation- 
interview" method has been criticised, in particular, for his failure to use 
statistical techniques and to standardize the msthod of testing (Hazliti 1930; 
Suchman and Aschner 1961; Brains 1962; Flavell 1963; Wallace 1972). Tisher
(op. cit.) proposes therefore that the clinical method, as used by Piagst, thus 
becomes suspect and perhaps should be jettisoned in favour of another technique 
for collecting data. However, when the clinical method is jettisoned, the study 
becomes vulnerable to the type of criticism levelled by Moore (1950), who ^  
commented that in much of the research purporting to test Piaget’s theories, 
ths investigators failed to use Piaget’s methods and as a consequence, these 
studies cannot be considered to be replications of Piaget’s work not to 
adequately test his theories. Despite criticisms of the type.levelled by Moore, 
several researchers (Keots 1955; King 1961; Tanaka, Cempbell and Helmick 1970? 
Peel 1971; Bart 1972? Dulit 1972; Shayer and Whorry 1974; Winkelmann 1974, 
1975) have used tho questionnaire technique to collect data in studies purporting 
to test Piaget’s theories. The questionnaire method has several advantages: 
it readily allows quantification of responses end large numbers of pupils may be 
examined in a relatively shorter timo than when the same number are to be 
interviewed. Towards resolving doubt os to whether studies using techniques 
other than the techniques used by Piagot can be considered adequately to test 
hie theories, Tisher prepared a questionnaire and compared tho ©suits obtained 
with those obtained from standardized convereation-intervieus.
Therefore Tisher (1962, 1971) reports a stGp in the development, validation and 
use of a Piagetian questionnaire with secondary school pupils with respect to 
concrete and formal operational thinking. The objectives were: to develop a
simple pencil-snd-pnper test which could be used to determine a pupil’s stage of! 
mental development; to use the test to survey the distribution of stages in e 
group of secondary school students? and to compare the results obtained using 
the questionnaire with those obtained using the conversation-interview technique.
(i) Methodology
A group of 232 pupils, 138 nrnies end 94 females, formed the experimental 
cample, representative of pupils in Australian grades, seven through nine, the 
distribution of ages being as follows:
■ — r...... — . “
j Number of Pupils
Age (in years) Male
!......
female 1 Total
1
12.0 12.4 4 4
|
! 8
12.5 - 12.9 17 17 j 34
13.0 - 13.4 23 17
!
j 40
13.5 13.9 27 16 | 43
14.0 - 14.4 18 16 j 34
14.5 - 14.9 25 8 ! 33i
15.0 - 15.4 13 10 j 23
15.5 - 15.9 9 5 1 1* 1
16.0 - 16.4 1 1 1 2*
16.5 - 16.9 1 -
1 1
j 1 |
-y- Total 138
'
94
i !
! 232 1♦ i
1 • \
IQ ranges were from 71 - 135, mean IQ 102.8, standard deviation 12.9 on the basis 
of ACER Ounior B tests. Pupils were pieced in one of three culture! enrichment 
groupings based on the ocaupations of parents and the investigators assessments 
of the pupilo ond their home environments.
The Piagotian questionnaire (described in greater detail Inter) was administered 
to the experimental sample during two consecutive 40-minute teaching periods 
and was divided into four phases coinciding with four sets of questions, each 
phase being initiated with a demonstration of the relevant phenomenon.
fifty-seven pupilo, 19 in each grade, were randomly selected from the experimental 
sample and were involved in a "conversation-interview" situation following the 
approaches of Inhslder and Piaget (1958). The tape-recordings of the interviews
were transcribed end all transcripts were analysed using the criteria 
established by Inhelder and Piaget to classify pupils os either "formal” or 
"concrete”.
(ii) The Questionnaire
The pencil-and-paper questionnaire contains 24 multiple-choice items based 
on four scientific phenomenon, or tasks used by Inholdsr and Piaget (op. cit.), 
namely: "the bouncing ball"? "equilibrium In a balance”? "water levels in
connected containers”? and "shadows of rings”. The concepts needed to explain 
these phenomenanare respectively: the angle of incidence equals ths angle of
reflection? the sum of the clockwise moments equals the sum of the anti-clockwise 
moments? the horizontal water level in each container is the same? and the size 
of the shadow is proportional to ths size of the ring and the distance of the 
ring from the light source. The questions based on the aforementioned are shown 
in tho complete Questionnaire reproduced in the Appendices. Diagrams of the 
apparatus used for the demonstrations are included in the Questionnaire as shown. 
The form of the Questionnaire was of the objective type end was chosen for its 
relative ease of administration end scoring.
Inhelder and Piaget*o investigations (Inhelder and Piaget 1958) indicated that 
when subjects experimented for example, with two communicating vessels containing 
water, they found that at the concrete stage, the subjects discovered that water 
levels in both containers returned to a common horizontal level after one or both 
of the containers were raised and lowered. At tfee formal stage, the subjects 
could give a correct explanation for the observed equality of the levels and could 
predict what would happen to the water level in one of tho conteiesre A, if A or 
the other container were raised or lowered. Similarly, Inhelder and Pieget 
found that subjects experimenting with a balance arm (ibid, pp. 164-181) did not 
discover the principle of moments until the formal stage of mental development.
At the concrete stage, the subjects realised that equal weights at equal distances 
from the fulcrum balanced each other and that a smaller weight, a greatardiotance 
from the fulcrum on the left-hand aide balanced a larger weight closer to the 
fulcrum on the right-hand cide. The subjects did not discover the proportional 
relationship between weights and distances, characteristic of the formal stage. 
These findings were taken os criteria to eet tho concrete and formal type problems 
in Sets Three and Two respectively of the Questionnaire. To illustrate how the 
criteria apply to these problems, two of the questions in Set Two are discussed*
, Centre of A r m
A ten pound weight is hung at C. To balance the arm again with another ten 
pound weight,
(a) the weight must be hung at H.
■(b) is impossible
(c) the weight must be hung at E.
(d) the weight must be hung at 3.
(e) the weight must be hung at I.
(f) the weight must be hung at K.
This question could be solved by a subject in the concrete stage of mental 
development since a subject in this stage would realise that equal distances from 
.. the fulcrum balance each other. • '
A ten pound weight is hung at C. To balance the arm again using a fifteen pound 
weight,
(a) the weight must be hung at K.
(b) the weight must be hung at I.
(c) the weight must be hung at G.
(d) is-impossible
(e) the weight must be hung at E.
(f) the weight must be hung at H.
This question could be solved only by a subject in the formal stage of mental 
development since the question requires that the subject has discovered the 
proportional relationship between the weights and their distances from the fulcrum.
The criteria used to design the questions in Sets 1 and 4 are summarised as 
follows:
PROBLEM Concrete Stage Formal Stage j
Bouncing
Ball
Subjects can establish 
e correspondence between 
elope of incidence at 
path and slope of 
reflected path. Do 
not construct laws angle 
of incidence « angle of 
reflection
!;
Subjects discover 
law of equality of 
angle of incidence 
and angle of 
reflectionj
Formation
of
Shadows
Discover that size of 
shadow depends on size 
and distance of object 
from screen? no inverse 
metrical relationship 
between size end distanci
discovered |
]I
Discover inverse J 
metrical relation­
ship between the | 
size of the object [ 
and its distance from 
j  the scresn j
(iii) Demonstration
Before each set of questions was attempted, tho investigator performed,a 
demonstration ©a follows*
"The Bouncing Ball”* A tennis ball was bounced on the front wall of the 
room and the subjects asked to observe what happened* Several angles of incidence 
were used*
"Figments or Equilibrium in the Balance"; A metre rule pivoted at its centre 
of gravity was displayed and e 0*4 pound weight pieced 5cmc. from the fulcrum on 
the left hand arm* Equilibrium was restored by piecing firstly, a 0.2 pound 
weight lOcms* from tho fulcrum on the right hand side end secondly a 0.5 pound 
weight 4cms. from the fulcrum on the right hand side. Weights end distances 
were mentioned and the subjects asked to observe carefully as the demonstration 
was performed.
"Water Levels": Two connected water containers were moved, one at a time,
and the pupils esked to observe what heppenod. A horizontal metre rule held 
behind tho containorsmarked the position of the original water level above the 
table.
"Formation of Shadows": Three rings of different diemeters were placed at
different distances from a source of light and their shadows allowed to fall on to 
a screen. Ths pupils observed the shadows as the distance of each object from 
the light was varied. The demonstrator commenteds "watch what happens ao I 
move these objects beckwards end forwards".
(iv) The Interviews
The three experiments chosen for the interview were based on those used by 
Inhelder and Piaget (1958) and included "Invisible Magnetism" (pp. 93-106). 
"Combinations of Chemicals" (pp. 107-122) and "Equilibrium in the Balance"
(pp. 164-181).
"Invisible Magnetism"* The problem was to determine why a metal bar attached 
to a non-metallic rotating disc ©topped with the bar pointing to one pair of marked 
boxes instead of three other pairs of marked boxes pieced around the circumference 
of the disc. The crucial poir contained alnico bar magnets. Inhelder end 
Piaget used this problem to show how children in the formal stage of mentel 
development utilise disjunctions end exclusions to solve the problem. The large 
board divided into pairs of sectors, each pair with a different colour, could be 
removed to allow pupil© to inspect the boll-bearing pivot and axle on which the 
black bar rotated. The marked, covered boxes were filled with materials of 
different densities. When the bar is rotated it spins but with decreasing 
angular acceleration due to the effGct of the magnets. Theoretically, there 
ore two equilibrium positions, one with the bar pointing to the magnets and the 
other, with the bar in a position at right angles to the line joining the magnets. 
It can be shown that the most likely position to be taken up by the decelerating 
rotating bar is the former, but there will be a feu occasions where it takes up 
the latter. This introduces on additional factor to bo excluded in order to solve 
the problem* Pieget does not comment upon this factor.
"Combination of Chemicals"* Four identical reagent bottles, numbered 1 to 4 
contained dilute sulphuric acid, distilled water, diotilled water with hydrogen 
peroxide and a solution of ©odium thiosulphate, respectively. A fifth smaller 
bottle, labelled "g" complete with eye dropper contained a solution of potassium 
iodide. The problem was to determine the combination of reagents that would 
liberate iodine and hones produce a yellow colour. All solutions were odourless 
and colourless. The combination 1 end 3 and g gave the required colour.
Inhelder and Piaget used the problem to investigate children*s ability to construct 
two-by-two, three-by-threo etc. combinations and to determine whether this ability 
occurred prior to 11 - 12 years.
"Equilibrium in the Balance"* The purpose of this experiment was to investigate 
subjects* notion of proportions and the emergence of what Piaget call© IWRC group 
of operations (ibid. p. 175). A metre rule was pivoted at it© centre of gravity 
and numerous weights, each of 0.1 pound, could be hung et eny position on the 
right hand or left hand side of the orm. The problem was to return the balance
arm to a state of equilibrium after the examiner had upset the equilibrium by 
placing one or two weights on the left hand side of the arm.
(v) Analysis of the Results
Clnssif5.catlon of Subjects8 Tisher with respect to the obvious 
challenge concerning guessing in a multiple-choice situation, elaborates that in 
the case of a subject presented with 10 formal test items, each containing five 
choices, the chance of correctly guessing the answer in one item, independently 
of the other items, is one fifth or* 0.2* The probability of him correctly 
guessing i answers from the 10 items is p^, where,
n i /, sn-i 
p. = ci • p u -p )
(c.f. Dixon and Massey, 1957, pp 335-40) 
and where p a 0.2 s the probability of correctly guessing the answer in one item.
If the probability of correctly guessing x or less answers from the 10 items is 
p^ then,
x «
For the 10 formal items of 5 choices each,
p15 » 0.98? p1^ a 0.95; p13 = 0.87; p12 = 0.63? p ^  ~ 0.38
and for 14 concrete items of 5 choices each 
p15« 0.92; p1^= 0.84; p1s « 0.67; p12 t= 0.41
Thus the probability of o subject correctly guessing 5 or more answers from the
groups of 10 formal or 14 concrGte items, each containing 5 choices, is extremely 
small. If the subject is in the formal stage of mental development it is to be 
expected that he will do better than by gueseing on both the formal and the 
concrete items. On the overage the items in the questionnaire contain five 
alternatives and hence the values quoted above may be taken to represent the 
order of magnitudes of the p ^o. It wee assumed fchat subjects scoring 5 or more 
on the formal items and subjects scoring 7 or more on the concrete items were 
doing better than by gueseing end those two scoreo were taken as criterion levels 
for classifying subjects.
Inhelder end Piaget (op. cit.) distinguished between subjects in the early and 
late phases of the concrete stage and formal stage of mental development. A 
similar distinction was initially made in Tisher*o study. A score of 7+ on the
concrete items end 5* on the formal items use taken to indicate that the 
subject was in the formal stage of mental development, while a score of ll* on 
the concrete items and 8+ on the formal items was taken to indicate © superior
achievement. In the latter cos© the subject was assumed to be in the later
%
phase of the formal etage* Similarly, a score of 7+ on tho concrete items and 
4 or less on the formal, wore taken to indicate the subject use in the concrete 
stage of mental development* A ©core below 7 on the concrete items and below 
4 on tho formal items were taken to indicate the subject was in tho early phase 
of the concrete stage*
Criterion Scoresfor the Classification of Subjects 
into Stages of Cental Development
Score on
Subjects classified into
Early Concrete later Concrete Early Formal teter Formal
Concrete
Items
0 — 6 7 - 1 4 7 - 1 4 11 - 14
f ormal 
Items
0 - 3 0 — 4 5 - 1 0 8 - 1 0
Tisher reports that it is of interest to not© that all subjects scoring 5+ on 
the formal items scored 7+ on ths concrete items. The table below show© the 
distribution of formal versus total scores for ©11 subjects classified into the
formal stage of mental development* The data in the table presents additional
evidence for the validation of the questionnaire.
dumber of Subjects in the formal Stage gaining certain Formal
and Total Scores: flinlmum total ©cor© obtained 15
^ \ F o r m o l
TotGl'N^ ° ro
Score
5 — 6 7 - 8 9 - 1 0
10 - 14 2 - -
15 - 19 30 1 -
20 - 24 7 19 7
Distribution of Pupils In Concrete and Formal Stages
The following tables show the distribution of pupils in the concrete and formal 
stages with age and school grade (the numbers in parenthesis refer to the number 
of females in each category)*
Stage of 
1 Development
j
i
3
|
1
Age (in Years)
Totals
12.0
to
13.4
13.5
to
14.9
15.0
to
16.4
J "i]
1 Concrete
L  - ... . . ...... - .....  -. -...
74
(37)
71
(25)
21
(12)
166
(74)
1|
j Formal
7
U)
41
(14)
18
(5)
66
(20)
I|
81
(3S)
112
(39)
39
(17)
232 i 
(94)
Stage of 
Development
Grades
Totals
VII j VIII tx
Concrete 112 I 30 24 166
(50) J do) (14) (74)
F ormal 7 1 17 42 66
(1) | (?) (12) (20)
119 47 66 232
(51) (17)
I
(26) (94)
The chi-square test was applied to various groups of colls in the rows and 
columns end o number of the signiflcent (5;b level) findings ore reported below* 
When chi-square values wore calculated it was found that there wore no significant 
differences between the number of males and females in each of the stages* In
subsequent analyses males end femaleo uere combined* For the distribution of
pupils by age, it was found that there was a significant difference between the 
number of pupils in the concrete end formal stages for tho 12.0 - 13*4 age
group (chi-square - 56.9, df » 1, p < 0.005) end the 13*5 - 14.9 age group (chi-
square e 0.1, df ss 1, p <0.005). Also when a chi-square was calculated for
columns 1 and 2, there was a significant difference between the numbers of 
pupils in the cello of the 12*0 - 13*4 and 13*5 - 14*9 age group (chi-square =
19*3, df ss lf p <  0*005). The data were interpreted as indicating that for
the 12*0 - 13*4 and 13.5 - 14*9 age groups, although a significant majority
were in the concrete stage, there was e marked increase in the proportion of 
pupils in the formal stage at age 13*5 - 14.9. In the letter group there was 
a significantly greater proportion of pupils in the formal stage than in the 
former age group (37^ compered to 9%)* In each group there was a significantly 
greater proportion of pupils in the concrete stege compared to the formal stage. 
Beyond 13*5 - 14.9 years there was no significant variation between the numbers 
of pupils in the concrete and formal stages and there was no significant difference 
between the 13.5 to 14.9 end 15.0 - 16.4 year old groups. There was no evidence 
to suggest that the majority of Secondary school pupils aged 13 plus would be in
the formal stage of mental development. On the contrary, a large proportion,
61$o of this age were in the concrete stage. This refutes Piaget’s implications 
that at about 13 years, the majority of adolescents will be in the formal stege 
of mental development. The results further showed that a sharp age boundary 
between ,!a significant majority of pupils in the concrete stage” and a Significant 
majority of pupils in the formal stage” does not exist. There appeared to be 
on age zone during which adolescents enter the formal stage rather than e sharp 
age-line boundary. At each oge level pupils in either stages of development 
were found. (This is in agreement with many of the studies cited in Chapter 
Two)* Tisher concludes that while it appears to be a fallacy to speak in terms 
of an overage age for the emergence of a stage it does seem that the order of 
succession of the stages is important. Tisher additionally reports that when 
the responses of the pupils in the formal stage of mental development were 
considered, it emerged that when ths average formal score expressed as a percentage 
is recorded against CA with increasing age there is e levelling out of this 
average score. This adds support to Pieget*s view that there is an equilibrium 
or levelling out phase in the formal stage of mental development - a period of 
genesis followed by a period of equilibrium*
Average Score on Formal Questions for Pupils in the formal Stage
of Development.
Age in Years j 12.0-13.4 s 13.5-14.9 j 15.0-16.4
F ormal^Score \ \ ^  \ ^
Uith respect to cultural enrichment group, Tisher reports e significant 
proportion of pupils in cultural enrichment group 3 were in the concrete stage 
of mental development and that there was a significant difference between the 
number of pupils in the concrete and formal stages in groups 1 and 3*
for the distribution of pupils by grade, it was found that there was a significant 
difference between ths number of individuals in the concrete and formal stages 
for grade VII (chi-square « 4*9, df = 1, p < 0.005) and grade IX (chi-square »
4.9, df = 1, p < 0.05). In grade VII the majority (94^) were in the concrete 
stage end in grade IX, the majority (64^) wore in the formal stage. Also there 
were significant differences in the numbers In each stage between grades VII end 
VIII (chi-square » 18.3, df e 1, p c 0.005) end between grades VIII end IX (chi- 
square « 7.1, df = 1, p<0.05). The results were interpreted es indicating that 
grade VIII acted as e transition, or “bridge” grade w&th no significant differences 
between the proportion of pupils in esch stage.
That the results are not at variance with those of many other researchers was 
regarded as an indication of tho success of the Piegetian questionnaire.
Further indication of ite success was gained from a comparison of the preceding 
results with those obtained from tho conversation-interview.
(vi) Analysis of Results IIs The Interviews
The 57 interviews were analysed by two investigators and the solution to 
ooch problem (“hidden magnetism”, ‘’chemical combination” snd”equilibrium In ths 
balance”) classified as ”C” (Concrete) or ”F” (Formal). The criteria used 
were taken from Inhelder and Piaget (1958) end ere summarised as follows.
Criteria used to Classify Subjects* Solutions
Concrete Level Solutions Formal Level Solutions
1. Trial and error ettempts to solve 1. Work systematically on the
problems? no systematic analysis. available data.
2. Hypotheses not proposed or tested* 2. Propose and test hypotheses.
All available possibilities not tested. Test for implication, non­
implication and incompatibility.
3. Usually try one - by - ono combinations. 3. Cen work with two - b y  -two
combinations.
4* Fluctuate from one answer to another. 4. All possibilities or combinations
Hold one solution although disproved by tested even though one may supply
some instances. solution*
5. Can order serially, can classify objects. 5. Cepsble of proportional operation.
CRITERIA USED TO CLASSIFY SUBJECTS* SOLUTIONS
FOR THE THREE SPECIFIC PROBLEMS
PROBLEFi
Hidden
Magnetism
Chemical
Combinations
Equilibrium 
in tho 
Balance
CONCRETE LEVEL SOLUTIONS
1. Trial and error attempts to 
solve.
2. flay pick weight as the causal 
factor.
3. Rough forms of disjunction 
and exclusion appear.
1. All factors 1 to 4 ore 
combined with g.
2. Two-by-two combinations may be 
tried et random? colour may be 
obtained by chance.
3. Do not cross over between
situations, e.g. 1x2;, 2x3, try 
1x2, 3x4.
1. Known weights required on both 
arms* Equal weights at equal 
distances.
2* Establishes equilibrium by 
trial and error.
3. Realises a heavy weight near 
fulcrum balances a lighter 
weight further out*
FORMAL LEVEL SOLUTIONS
1. Tests possibilities 
systematically.
2* Weight eliminated as a 
causal factor.
3. Formal operations of
disjunction and exclusion
are used.
1. Factors 1 to 4 are 
combined with g although 
may bs omitted and two-by- 
two combinations substituted.
2. Tuo-by-two combinations 
tried systematically.
Subject knows what has been 
done*
3. All possible combinations 
tested.
1* Knows weights required on
_ _ _ _  r-_. .— '5 . j - L l -
u u . i i  fc ji-iuu* t i j u a *  tu c jx y n i /v
at equal distances.
2. Way initially establish 
equilibrium by trial and 
error but discovers the 
proportional relationship 
between weights and distance 
from fulcrum
The subjects were classified into the concrete or formal stage of development 
on the number of problems solved at the formal level* Two criteria were taken? 
subjects solving one or more problems et tho formal level and subjects solving 
two or more problems at tho formal level. Both sets of classification were 
compared with the classification made on the basis of the Questionnaire scores.
Interviews end Questionnaire Compared
mmmmrn+rn m »m i n  w n tm'm u m t m . t w mmam**
Interview Criterion? one or more F classifications
l Questionnairef Classification
i
Stage j Concrete 1 Formal
Interview
F j
Concrete^ 19 3
Classific­
ation F ormal \ 12 | 25
Total e 57 
r f s 0.51 X = 14.B p ^  0.0005
Interviews and Questionnaire Compared
Interview Criterion8 two or more F classifications
j Questionnaire Classification I£
. ?
Stage Concrete Formal ]
Interview
Classific­
ation
27 9 |
4
— *" mTm.1
17 !
1rl TTU
r^ = 0.54 x2 e 16.7 p^ 0.0005
Tho distribution of tho 57 pupils in concrete ond formal stages with ago and 
grade wore similar to those indicated in the Questionnaire situation and when 
chi-square values were calculated, findings were obtained identical to those 
reported in the preceding section. The reoulto from the conversation-interyiew. 
substantiated those from tho Questionnaire# The agreement obtained was token 
as an additional indication of the success of pencil-and-paper tests in studies 
o§ Piaget’s theories. There was a 71% agreement in classification between ths 
two techniques. Using ths Questionnaire, 26 of the 57 pupils were categorised as 
belonging to the formal stage, whereas on the basis of the conversation-intorview,
21 were categoricod ae in the formal stags* 24 pupils were placed 
In the seme category by both Questionnaire and interview# Tisher 
concluded that ths high percentage of agreement between Questionnaire 
and Interview classification indicates that both techniques are 
measures of the same variable# The Tisher study therefore provided 
contrary evidence in relation to those regarding the conversation- 
interview os the only technique to be used to check Piaget’s 
theories e.g* Moore (1950 op.cit#)* Tisher acknowledges that further 
research might well lead to the establishment of a higher correlation 
between Questionnaire and interview results# (Dotailc of the 
experimental procedures used in tho present investigation are given 
In tho Appendices)*
(vil) Further empirical validation of the Plsgstien Questionnaire
Tisher1© Plagotion Questionnaire has been examined by tho 
Australian Science Education Project (1972) in an attempt to establish 
an ’’understanding in science tost1* to assist teachers in determining 
the Plagotion level of thinking of students# Although Tisherfs 
categories for classification of subjects into otagee of mental 
development wore noted, to facilitate categorisation each subject 
was given a Tisher test score according to tho formulat
Tisher tost score *= concrete score x 1 * formal score x 2 
Tho categories wore then modified as followss
early concrete late concrete early formal late formal 
Score range 0-10 11-19 20-26 27-34
Tho Australian Science Education Project concluded that tho 
Questionnaire had validity as a measure of Piagetian developmental 
level*
Field and Cropley (1969) in on investigation into cognitive stylo 
and science achievement employed Tisherfo questionnaire to yield a 
measure of stage of mental operations, among 17B fifth and sixth 
form pupil© with © mean IQ of 117* They report that ths Questionnaire 
placed 30 of the subjects at tho Concrete, 104 at the Formal end
44 st Lato Formal levels qf operational thought* High science 
achievement appeared to be associated with the ability to apply 
formal operations in processing science information.
In a study with respect to Formal Operations involving 78 
subjects {32 males and 46 females), 6th (representative of early 
adoloscante) end 10th (representative of middle adolescents) grade 
students, nose (1974) employed Tisherfs Questionnaire as a measure
dem onstrated thinking a t  the  formal level, while £2%  * f  the "sixth-.Hish"subjects
of formal operational thinking* Virtually no "eixth-tafc^riteaubjecte^ 
operated formally. At the tenth grade level, 40^ of the moderate 
achievers functioned formally and 43^ of the high achievers wore 
classified et the formal level* The general and significant increase 
in formal thinking from oarly to middle adolescence can be said not 
only to support Piaget’s theory of adolescent cognitive development, 
but to give credibility to tho Questionnaire of Tisher in its 
ability to discriminate between varying levels of logical ability*
It further supports other researchers and Piaget’s (1972) modific­
ation of his petition in otating that in contrast to ths earlier 
stages of cognitive development, e*g# concrete operational, there ic 
likely to be decalage or delay in the onset of the formal operations 
and that wo might expect much development in formal thinking during 
the ages of 15 through 20# Ross (1975, in private communication) 
comments that tho Tisher Questionnaire appears to stress the formal 
operation of proportionality rather than the dissociation schema*
Ross considers the dissociation schema is more central to the formal 
operations#
(VIU) Psychometric and Questionnaire Approaches and Piaget’a 
“Clinical*1 Method
Many writers have commented upon the common ground between the 
approaches of developmental psychologist© such as Piaget and the work 
of psychometric!©• Elkind (1969) for example, point© out the strong 
omphaoi© that both place upon the process of logical loosening# 
bard (1972) considers that provided a liberal psychometric attitude 
can bo adopted, come of Piaget*e experimental situations form a 
potential source of items which possess the advantage of having a 
definite rationale# For this reason, the new British Intelligence
Scale (uarburton 1970) provided for the incorporation of materials 
end procedures from developmental psychology into a multi-factorial 
framework.
Tuddenham (1970) comments that Piaget’s influence upon tho 
mental test movement has boon negligible as his “methods Clinique”, 
which enables one to shape the dialogue to the responses of the 
particular child, is almost antithetical to the traditional mental 
test emphases upon objectivity, standardisation and quantification. 
However, when one’s purpose is not to formulate or substantiate 
s normative theory, but rather to compare different children under 
identical conditions, the method of inquiry must not Itself risk 
introducing variability into the results. Moreover, the interrog­
ation required to elucidate the qualitative subtleties of a child’s 
thinking about a single problem, takes too long for the psychologist 
to sample any variety in a session of reasonable length. When 
interested in human variability, related to Piaget, it seomo 
appropriate to convert Piagetian experiments into test items 
meeting strict psychometric criteria, while conserving in so far as 
possible tho essence of ths original problems* Tuddenham’c method 
therefore attempted to synthesise Piagetian theory with methods 
derived from mental tests.
Shayor and Uharry (1974) acknowledging the advantages of the 
Piaget-based task in giving insight into the mental strategies 
of tho individual person, focus on the difficulties of assessing 
the mental levels of a class of children oven though the 
individual topicc of the Nuffield Foundation Courses have been 
assessed in Piagetian terms* They therefore attempted to develop 
a method of testing e class which would reveal the level of thinking 
of the invididual pupil in tho context of the ecionco teaching that 
the pupil was receiving.
The criteria employed in Sheyar and Wherry1©
approach appear to follow veyy closely the qualities 
inherent in the Tiehor test, the most noticeable 
exception being that Shayor end bharry’e assessments 
follow the opportunities pupils have during various 
class practical activities in connection with tbo 
Muffield Foundation Combined Science Course to develop 
concepts and lews# Tho results however, supported 
Piagot’s contentions that o child’s attainment of a 
concept is dependent upon hie stage of readiness#
Dulit (1972) attempted a paper and pencil simulation 
of ths “Combinations of Coloured end Colourless Chemical 
Bodies11 experiment in view of the time-consuming nature 
of the actual experiment and concluded from a scrupulous 
analysis of the reliability that the approach could bo 
identified os a “different but related” method ascosoing 
the oamo underlying capacities#
Other etubies attempting psychometric and 
questionnaire approaches and Piogot’o ,,cllnlcsl,, method 
includes Bort (1972)5 Burgooo (19SB)j Pool (1971) 
Tanka, Campbell and Helmick (1970)| and uinkelmann 
(1974, 1975).
2* Measures of Modes of Moral Dudqement
Over fifteen years research into the development of moral judgement has led 
to Kohlberg’sthBory that individual’s acquire and refine their moral judgement 
through a aeries of invariant stages. LongitudioaJL studies, studies in 
disparate cultures, with children and adults of widely divergent socio-economic 
backgrounds have supported this developmental theory. Kohlberg commenced his 
studies fifteen years ago with the notion that there were universal ontogenetic 
trends toward the development of morality as it has been conceived by Western 
Moral Philosophers and that the development of such “rational” or ”maturo”morality 
is a process different from the learning of various “irrational” or “arbitrary” 
cultural rules and values. While these notions were assumptions fifteen years 
ago, Kohlberg claims that longitudinal end cross-cultural research has now turned 
these assumptions into well verified factual conclusions. The stages briefly 
stated are as follows:
1. An orientation to punishment and rewards to physical and material 
power*
2. A hedonistic orientation with beginning notions of reciprocity, but 
with an emphasis on on exchange of favours.
3. A morality defined by individual ties end relationships, where the 
approval of others is paremount.
4. An orientation toward authority, law, duty, the maintaining of a 
fixed order, whether that order be secular or religious.
5. A social contract orientation, with emphasis on equality and mutual 
obligation within a democratically established order.
6. A morality of individual principles of conscience which are 
comprehensive and universal. The highest value is placed on justice, 
the value of human life, equality and dignity.
(Further discussion of these stages is included in Chapter Three- Review of the 
Literature: Tho Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Morality).
While concern with justice and fairness, affection and tho need for rules may 
be within a child’s comprehension at en early age, it is Kohlberg’s contention 
that such concerns have a “point of entry” into the stages of moral reasoning*
Thus ths preschooler may spend much time dealing with sharing and fairness notions 
but it is only at stage-two that tho child first thinks of property rights within 
an economic system. The young child is extremely responsive to affections! ties, 
but it is only at stage-three that he thinks of affection beyond one-to-one 
relationships. At stage-three tho child has b high need for affiliation and 
thinks of how to behave in e moral dilemma in terms of the trust that others
hove in him. In imagining how others might respond to his needs, he now thinks 
not only of whet would be "fair” but of what e ’’nice*’ person would want to do. 
Compared to principled levels of moral reasoning, stage-four thinking maylook 
petty and limited, however it is important to remember that et stage-four, 
morality is seen in society’s perspective for the first time. This is on advance 
over stage-three thinking, which reasons just in relation to individuals.
This is true despite the fact thet principled persons will piece the rights of 
individuals ebove the rules of society on some occasions. Not only is stage- 
four thinking “respectable" and well-suited to the needs of many everyday decision 
in s genuinely just society it might be unnecessary for individuals to grow beyond 
x t.
It is important to note that while the issues mentioned are the major concern of 
that stage, they ere not the only concern. The difference is one of emphasis.
The stages are not mutually exclusive, but it is possible for e person to be in 
transition between two of them, or to be predominantly at one of them, but 
exhibit some thinking at the level immediately above ond/or immediately below.
Each stage incorporates certain features of the previous one, rather than making 
a complete break with the previous stage.
Kohlberg (1958) has devised on instrument through which to measure moral judgement 
hypothetical moral dilemmas arc presented, followed by c series of questions 
which ask the subject to resolve the dilemma and then probe into the reasons 
leading the subject to make his decision. Kohlberg (1971) describes his hypo­
thetical rnoroi dilemmas as deliberately "philosophical", some found in medieval 
works of casuistry.
Kohlberg *s floral Judgement Stories
1i
MORAL FORM A 1
III Heinz steals the drug - Lew vs. Moral - Life }
IV The wife wonts euthanasia - Lew vs. Moral - Life
I The father brooks his promise - Family Roles vs. Justice - 
Property
II The son tells a lie - Family Roles vs. Justice - Truth
j MORAL FORM B
1 V The captain orders e man to his death - Authority & Justice - Life
| VI
i.. ...
Choose the sickman ,or the troublemaker - Justice - Life
| VII
L..- ... -
One brother steals, the other "cons" - Law vs. Justice - Property
| VIII
i
The reformed criminal hasn’t served his jail term ~ Law vs.
Justice - Punishment
Forms A and B are equivalent forms. Additional stories on sox end civil rights 
ore provided for each form plus five further stories if required. (Tho details 
of all the above stories together with the range of probes devised by Kohlberg 
are included in the Appendices).
Scoring
It is the reasoning process which is of interest and Kohlberg has delineated 
criteria by which responses can be scored on a variety of dimensions according 
to a developmental scale of maturity of moral j/udgements.
Kohlberg is developing his methods and techniques continuously and has changed 
his approaches throughout the years. The most recent guide to Issue Scoring 
focuses on the three methods of scorings by story; by issue and by orientation 
(aspect). Story scoring is considered sufficient for students and educators 
interested in understanding moral research, issue scoring being a more reliable 
and valid method for formal research. Complete aspect scoring is the method 
required for longitudinal and cross-cultural work.
Issue Scoring
Kohlberg stresses the special demands moral judgement interviewing end scoring 
Makes, not mado by other forms of psychological testing and scoring. If the
thinking of the social scientist in tho moral domain is not organised at tho
principled level, he will not easily recognise or understand principled thinking 
in his subjects.
Structural scoring depends upon the concept of the issue. Kohlberg relates that 
the initial tendency in the earlier work was to develop a global stereotype of a 
stage and then apply it to one story after another: this sometimes led to
generating 0 score of Stage-6 for Story III and Stage-2 for Story IV. Of further
concern was the extreme mixtures of stages found within a story, e.g. Stage 1 (4)
or 2 (5). Further analysis indicated that these inconsistencies were due to: 
different stories tapping different issues, each story tapping more than one issue.
The individual, it was found, could be at different sieges on different 
issues, but he could not be at widely differing stages on the same issue on 
different stories. This was proved by correlation, factor analysis and 
scaling studies. A single story did not yield enough information for an 
accurate stege classification on an issue. Accordingly, the notion of using a 
two-story unit, then a total four-story unit to assign a stage score on on issue 
was initiated. Typically, it was found that when the stance on life in Story 
III was put together with a stance on Story IV, a single stage score emerged* 
Accordingly it is assumed on individual is stage consistent across stories on a 
particular issues i.e. varies over no more than two adjacent stages. The 
fundamental purpose of the issue system therefore is to define the unit on which a 
person is stage-consistent. Moral situations are os a consequence thought of 
os moral situations involving recurrent issues in conflict with one another.
The procedure as a result therefore calls for: labelling issues on stories and
assigning a simple stage score on each issue across scores (as well os scores 
on the issue for a particular story). If adult subjects are questioned with 
respect to the issues involved in a moral conflict situation, e.g. "Heinz steals 
the drug", they will tend to answer in terms of the list of issues provided by 
Kohlberg: the need to save a human life (Issue H); the druggists property rights
(Issue I); and the law against theft (Issue A). "Issues" can therefore be 
clarified as defining the concrete objects of concern or of value in the situation. 
Secondly, they are "the things to bo defined end chosen between in the situation", 
they define tho moral conflict. The moral conflict situations are conflicts 
between concerns for one issue and for another. "Heinz steals the drug" is for 
some subjects, a conflict between the issues (or values) of love relationships 
versus law etc. These issues are also what ore called "values": a person values
law, property and life and these values may come in conflict, with one another.
Kohlberg*s detailed Issue Manual (1971b) includes s short-form definition of 
Stages by Issues, then a lengthier definition of Stages by Issue: the Detailed
Issuo Manual. (The Short-Form definition of Stages by Issues is included in the 
Appendices).
Scoring proceeds through analysis of 2-situation units es both situations tend 
to focus on many of the same issues; two, two-situation units ere grouped together 
to make o form. The groupings hove been illustrated previously within this 
section and aro further detailed in the Appendices. Initially, the protocol 
is read as e whole, issue labels being tentatively assigned in the mocgin adjacent 
to the main responses in which the Issue is being discussed. In order to clarify
and unify the various ideas which lead to a stage score on a given Issue, 
the issue os a whole is paraphrased. Having arrived at a paraphrase on an issue,
it is then compared with the general definition of the stages on the Issues 
(Short-Form and Long-Form).
The final issue scores are given a stage and a weight. Ufeight-marked percentage 
scores on each stage are then generated, from which a modal score and a moral 
maturity score are derived. The major score of the individual is that on which 
he has more than 50/s response, A minor score is given if 25/> or more of his 
responses are in a second stage. A profile of each subject is therefore formed 
from the percentage of statements given at each stage. In addition to classifying 
the subject in terms of the stage most used, this profile of percent usage of 
each stage yields a moral maturity score ("HMS"). The ’TIMS1' is the sum of the 
products of the percentages in a "profile” multiplied by ordinal value or number 
of the stage. The maximum RRS is 600 (1007b Stage 6), the minimum is 100 (IGG)b 
Stage l).
Standard or Short Form Scoring
In this scoring method, two issues only, per story are scored. The issues 
ere as followst
(Story III - Heinz steals the drug Issue - G, Issue - H 
/
Form (s o^r  ^ “* wants euthanasia Issue - G, Issue — H
A (Story 1 - The father breaks his promise Issue -C , Issue - f~
jstory 2 - The son tells a lie Issue^ C, Issue-F
(Story VII -One brother steals, the other "cone" Issue ~ B, Issue - F 
Form S^tory VIII-The reformed criminal hasn’t served his jail term Issue - Issue G 
8 (Story V -The captain orders a man to his death Issue - D, Jseue - H 
|Story VI -Choose the sickman or the troublemaker Issue - 0, Issue - H
The moral maturity ccorc is computed by e solid stags score (indicated by a clear 
stage number, e.g. 3 for Stage 3) receiving a weight of 1. An ambiguous score 
indicate by "A" inserted before the queried stage number, weighted I;* The Moral 
Maturity Scoreiis as stated before, Q computation which represents tho percentage 
usage at various stages. Moral Maturity Scores range from 100 to 600 (100 
corresponding to o pure Stage-1 and 600 corresponding to a pure Stage-6). A 
pure stage is allocated whan et least 75>- of reasoning is at that stage. E*g.
RMS of 376 = Stage 4. A minor stage is given when reasoning amounts to at least
2S% at that stage e.g. MMS of 360 is Stage 4 (3) (40/' Stage 3, 60% Stage 4). MRS
of 330 is a 3 (4) (30)' Stage 4, 70)-' Stage 3).
validation
It might bo expected that subjects would respond most enthusiastically to 
realistic dilemmas; perhaps to dilemmas closest to real-life situations that 
they have experienced. The experience of Kohlberg end his colleagues has 
proved this assumption to be unfounded. Even when a genuine moral dilemma is 
currently in the news, discussion groups have tended to respond with greater 
involvement - and with greater contrast of opinion - to the artificially developed 
dilemmas.
However, the present investigator considers that some reliability can be given to 
several of the situations presented with respect to their authenticity to everyday 
situations. Euthanasia has always been debated and recently was prevalent in 
the news through the writings of a retired Senior Surgeon who described the large 
number of "mercy-killings” administered to terminal patients at their own request. 
He admitted the illegality end the unethical nature of euthanasia but that it was 
merciful to the people concerned. A further incident concerns the Hursing 
Sister sentenced to life imprisonment after being found guilty of 'murdering" an 
elderly patient in the geriatric ward, by illegally injecting her with insulin.
The motive was not discovered, the Sister declared passionately that euthanasia 
was against her principles. It is interesting also to note that a recent bid 
to bring in the death penalty for terrorists was rejected by a 152 majority in 
the Commons. Dr Christian Barnard in hie autobiography writes of hie experience 
of the drive towards carrying out euthanasia by "the same impulse that causes 
a man to be a doctor", end the wrestling with the memory of the Hippocratic Oath 
end personal ethic together with the lows of social man.
The question hes been raised concerning whether or not subjects can tailor their 
answers so that they will "rate” higher on the moral judgement stage sequence. 
Interviewers at Harvard feel that the number of dilemmas they present, and the 
variety of responses they elicit when they ask subjects for opinions if the 
circumstances in the dilemmas are slightly altered, make this kind of "pretence" 
unlikely. They also point out that no one response determines a stage placement, 
but that fifty per-cent or more of the responses tend to cluster within one etsge.
Kohlberg (1971) cites his longitudinal study of American boys at ages 10, 13, 16, 
19 and 23 as evidence for the invariant sequence of stages. (Kohlberg, 1963, 
1969). The cultural universality of the sequence of stages has been shown 
from studies in various cultures (Kohlberg 1S71) suggesting that the esrcs basic 
ways of moral valuing ore found in every culture end develop in the same order.
Ho important differences have been found in the development of moral thinking
among subjects of varying religions suggesting that religious factors 
are not unique causes of the development of basic moral values. Research by 
Rest, Turiel and Kohlberg (1969) and Rest (1973) imply that the stages constitute 
a hierarchy of cognitive difficulty with lower stages available to, but not used 
by those at higher stages. Further, that stages constitute en order of moral 
adequacy: from studies by Turiel, 1966; Rest, Turiel and Kohlberg (1969);
Blatt and Kohlberg (1971 end Rest (1973) it has been "clearly and consistently 
verified" that subjects assimilate most moral judgements one stage above their 
own, and assimilate much less those which are two or more stages above, or one 
or more stages below their own.
Furthermore, moral judgement has generality as a measure of morality in that it 
has been shown to relate to measures of guilt (Ruma end Mosher 1967) and shows 
a positive correspondence with morality of behaviour (Kohlberg 1965). Kohlberg 
(1969) reports a product moment correlation between maturity of moral judgement 
scores and ratings of conscience of .46. Kohlberg (1969, 1971) reports a study 
by Brown et. al. (1969) in which principled college students appear much less 
likely to cheat than conventional subjects. Further, a study by Krebs (ISGT^J^M 
that 75/.: of the conventional and preconventional children cheated on at least 
one of four experimental cheating tests while only 2% o f the principled children 
did so. Haan (1963) reports that 50% of Stage-5 subjects and 60;) of Stage-5 
subjects sat in at the Administrative Building of the University of California 
to preserve the rights of political free speech on tho campus, with only 10/' of 
students at the conventional level protesting. Freundlich and Kohlberg (1971) 
report that 63)) of 15 - 17 year old working-class delinquents are preconventional 
whereas only a minority (23>)) of working-class adolescents who are not delinquent 
are preconventional. Although Kohlberg considers that more research needs to be 
conducted existing evidence clearly supports a positive relctionship between 
stage of reasoning and moral behaviour.
Grimley (197lf) in, a cross-cultural replication of Kohlberg*c work reports that 
although the parameters in moral development (e.g. rate of development, dispersion 
of moral maturity scores etc.) were found to very among subjects from Zambia, U.S., 
Hong Kong, 3apan and England, no significant differences between nationalities 
were found in the development of moral judgement. Similarly religious background 
did not account for any significant differences in the development of morel 
reasoning. Further replicatory and extension studies of Kohlberg*s research heve 
been discussed in Chapter Thr*e- Review of the Literature: The Cognitive-
Developmental Approach to Morality.
Administration of the Kohlberg Dilemmas In the Present Investigation
Dilemmas III, IV, V* Ui» M U  end Vtll wore administered to ell 
subjects in the Sample in School Groups# Copies of tbs dilemmas were 
presented to each subject and ware followed by the range of probes, 
as set out end devised by Kohlberg for use in group testing or as 
a standardized guide for questioning in individual interviews, to 
which the subjects recorded their responses# The dilemmas were 
presented in the order sot out in Chapter four, Each dilemma 
was introduced end read to the group as a whole and further elabor­
ation was undertaken with respect to anticipated difficulties with 
vocabulary or understanding of what was required* Subjects wore 
allowed to ask for further clarification of the meaning of 
particular probes throughout iho testing situation if necessary#
The responses wore not timed and were completed after the session 
time was fulfilled if necessary# As described by Kohlberg, tho 
situations were motivationally stimulating to the subjects although 
tho frequency of being required to respond to 11 why” had to be 
acknowledged by the investigator sympathetically end its importance 
justified# Copies of the dilemmas and the respective probes ore 
included in the Appendices# It will be noted that the dilemmas 
presented include the uholo of form B* plus two eituationo from 
form A, duplicating the tapping of the lifo end punishment issues#
It was considered this would add further reliability to the written 
form of testing. Scoring was in accordance with Kohlberg*o Standard 
or Short-Form scoring described earlier#
CHAPTER SIX
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ANALYSIS Or TIC RESULTS ’
ft. PXADCTXAM OPERATIONS IN RELATION T- ROSRL -DEVCLOPflSHT*
A TEST OF THE HAIN HYPOTHESIS..
1. Statistical Treatment of the Data*
2. Dusntitativo Discussion and "ualitntivo Observations
of the Piagoticn Results in raletion to Fioral 3udQamont.
S. Discussion and Interpretation of the Results.
B* SUBSIDIARY HYPOTHESIS
C.t ADDITIONAL ANALYSES
1* Statistical Treatment of the Date
Criterion for Groups
The overall design for investigation involved the administration of 
Kohlberg*s Moral Oudgement Interview to populations contrasted in respect of 
Piegetian "Concrete” and "Formal” operativity (Tisher 1962, 1971) and precision 
matched in terms of extraneous variables, namely IQ, age, sex and socio-economic 
status*
The total sample of 231 subjects represented a range of intelligence levels, 
socio-economic status categories, an age range from 14 to 15+ years and both sexes* 
Differing criteria (as defined below) were employed to establish matched-pair 
groups of varying sizes* This necessitated the inclusion of some subjects more 
than once*
Group 1 "Concrete” and "Formal” (N = 55 + 35 = 70); represents groups contrasted 
according to lower ("Concrete") and upper ("Formal”) levels of logical thinking 
(patterned after Tisher*s Piagetien Questionnaire op* cit*) and matched according 
to Raven*s Categories (meanoscores for "Concrete" end "Formal" « 51*0, 51*2, 
respectively); Mill Hill Vocabulary Categories (mean scores for "Concrete" and 
"Formal" « 50.5, 50*7, respectively); within 6 months of chronological age (mean 
age for "Concrete” « 180*3 months and mean age for "Formal" = 181*5 months); sex 
end socio-economic statue*
Group 2 "Concrete" nnd "Formal" (M = 53 + 33 s= 66): represents groups contrasted
in terms of the lower ("Concrete") end upper ("Formal") regions of logical thinking 
scores (the cut-off point being established by cross-tabulation) and then matched 
on Raven's Categories (mean scores for "Concrete" and "Formal" *= 49.9, 50*3, 
respectively); within six months of chronological age (mean age for "Concrete” = 
180.8 months and "Formal" « 182*0 months); sex end socio-economic status; all 
matched eccording to "tight bands" within end across level© of logical thinking*
Group 5 "Concrete" and "Formal" (l\i = 46 + 46 « 92)s represents groups contrasted 
in terms of the lower ("Concrete") and upper ("Formal") regions of logical reasoning 
(the cut-off point being established by cross-tabulation) and matched according 
to Raven's Categories (moan scores for "Concrete" and "Formal" = 49*6, 50*1, respect­
ively); within oix months of chronological age (mean ago for "Concrete" and "Formal 
a 181.0, 181.8 months respectively); sex and socio-economic status.
Group 4 "Concrete” end “Formal" (N - 65 -?• 65 ~ 130)? represents groups 
contrasted in terms of the lower ("Concrete") end upper ("Formal") of logical 
reasoning scores (following the "weighting" procedures of the Australian 
Science Education Project 1972, 1974). Subjects were then matched on the basis 
of five Raven’s points (mean scores for "Concrete" end "Formal" = 47*7, 49.6, 
respectively)? within 8 months of chronological age (mean ages for "Concrete" 
end "Formal" = 179.3, 180*7 months, respectively)? sex and socio-economic status.
Statistical Treatment
The data were subjected to the following types of enalysiss
(e) Student’s t - test?
(b) Correlations coefficients? and
(c) Stepwise Multiple Regression Analysis.
To test whether the performance of the Piagetien Stage groups were statistically 
different when compared with each other, Student’s t - test was used. Table 6.1 
shows the levels of probability values of t. If will be seen that Moral Maturity 
rejected the null-hypothssis of no difference for the performance of tho 
Piagotien-Stege groups 1 end 2 at the 1$ significance level or below and groups 
3 and 4 at tho .1/S significance level or better. However, group 4 shows a 
highly significant difference on Mill Hill which could be due to relatively less 
precise matching.
However, the use of the matched groups technique introduces} an element of selection 
and cannot be considered representative. Correlations coefficients were therefore 
computed to indicate the strength or absence of associations between pairs of 
variables. These correlations coefficients,extracted from the main body of data, 
are presented in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 (the complete correlation matrix, Table 6.5 
is likewise included). Means and standard deviations are presented in Tabic 6.2.
It will be seen (Table 6.3) that the "Concrete" level of thinking is positively 
correlated to age (r « .202), Raven’s (r » .482), Mill Hill (r - ,462) and Moral 
Maturity (r = .429). Similar patterns are indicated for the "Formal" level of 
thinking: age (r ~ .247), Raven’s (r = .503), Mill Hill (r - .404) and Moral
Gi/v\ci *“ ' 0 0 8  •
Maturity (r = .427). Sex shows no correlation (r = -.074),^ Neither does 5ES, 
as measured by the Registrar General’s Classification when compared with "Formal" 
operativity (r « -.086). However, at the "Concrete" level of thinking SES is 
negatively correlated (r *s -.179).
Inspection of the correlations reported in Table 6.4 demonstrates that the 
variables of "Concrete" end "Formal" (combined) thinking are positively correlated 
to age (r «= .255), Ravens (r = .548), Mill Hill (r = .469) and Moral Maturity 
(r e *472). Sex shows no correlation (r = -.036). Neither doss SES indicate
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any significant relationship (r » -.132).
The most obvious danger of the correlational method is a tendency to infer 
causality when only association has been established*
Whereas tho correlation coefficient measures the linear relationship between e 
dependent variable and one independent variable9 multiple regression techniques 
measure the relationship of the dependent variable with several independent 
variables* The variables were included in a Stepwise Regression Analysis which 
might accurately predict Moral Maturity (Kohlberg)* Summary Tables (6*6, 6*7) 
are reproduced for interpretation* The Moral Maturity Total was used as the 
dependent variable and "Concrete”, "Formal”, Mill Hill, SES, sex, age and Raven's 
variables were used as the independent variables* The independent variable 
(Table 6*6) which accounts for the greatest amount of variance is the on© which 
has the highest correlation with the dependent variable* In this case, it is 
"Concrete"* Stepwise Regression procedure then introduces the further variable 
which in combination with "Concrete”, accounts for the highest emountof variance* 
This combination is arrived at by elimination of intercorreletion between independ­
ent variables. In other words, that proportion of the second variable which 
measures essentially the came characteristics as the first is eliminated and only 
that part which measures a different characteristic is retained. Table 6.6 shows 
"Formal" to be the best variable in combination with "Concrete". The table shows 
changes in P. occurring with successive independent variables included. The
third variable is Mill Hill (vocabulary). This factor, however, accounts for a
2 2 
very small percentage increase in the value of R . The increase in value of R
associated with the addition of further variables is negligible* So that any
characteristics these variables possess have already been accounted for by the
combination already described (i*e* "Concrete”, "Formal" and Mill Hill)*
In this analysis therefore, e combination of the three cognitive factors, "Concrete" 
"Formal" end Mill Hill, effectively encompass the whole spectrum of Kohlberg moral 
judgement as measured by the remainder of tho variables. An Individual adolescent 
exhibiting a combination of such cognitive traits of verbal fluency, concrete and 
formal (abstract) operations is likely to be more morally: mature than en adolescent 
with verbal doficite and poor reasoning.
Stepwise Regression need not yield the optimum combination of independent variables 
although it always produces a very good approximation. To discover whether better 
solutions existed it was decided to combine the "Concrete" and "Formal” variables? 
psychologically end statistically it was folt that the formal scores might be of
greater importance ond therefore appropriate for them to be weighted twice 
to the concrete scores* and further, to see whether a different combination 
of independent variables was produced* However, in operational terms, no
differences wore computed ond the seme combination and order of variables was 
exhibited as in the previous analysis* However, it will be observed that 
Multiple R for "Formal" in combination with "Concrete" in Table 6*6 is .477, 
whereas in Table 6*7 it is .472.
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Ousntitotiva Discussion and Dj&Xitstiva Observations of the 
Plsgotian Results in RoJ.nt5.on to Modes of Moral Oudqemant
The distinction between quantitative end qualitative 
differences in cooniiivo processes among different groups in 
this Investigation is also basic to the thinking within the 
Piesgotisn frsmswork* Piaget has mainly been concerned with the 
qualitative aspects of intellectual development? basic 
structures of processes and their organization into a hierarchlel 
succession of stages* Further, in elaboration of Piaget*s work 
Kchlhorg has been intent to determine a differentiated scale of 
levels of moral judgement, developmental in nature* Of basic 
concern in this section Is therefore an investigation of the 
qualitative*, occurrence and sequence of the logical stages* the 
determination of differences In the rotas of development among 
individuals of i\ similar chronological age, and a comparison of 
various specified groups in relation to modes of moral judgement*
The eesinsrativo approach «i.nn • enablso a ousntitativs analysis of. 
this development*
The section is divided into four main- parts* each corres­
ponding to the four experiments in the Piagotian questionnaire* 
Preceding the main disaussicn of each tost ere Tables which 
•sumorire the percentage distribution of subjects in each 
experimental group representing higher levels of logical thinking 
(nformaIn) end lower levels of logical thinking (^concrete11) with 
respect to their scores on tho specified test and in relation to 
the various stages of moral judgement* An additional - section 
reports tho overall Piagciisn results in relation to moral judgement 
and further* to other repllcatory concroto/formal operational studies*
Tichsr’s {1252, 1271) criteria baaed an Inheldor. and Piaget* 
(1953) for scoring and classifying the logical.responses ware 
emp&yod* together with Kohlbarg’s Standard Short-Fono Scoring 
approaches to assessing the moral Judgement responses. A 
selection of protocols* totalling 60 dilemmas (30* 2-aituatian- 
story units) were reassessed by a staff member in Kohlberg*g
laboratory of Human Development at the University of Harvard 
and a high inter-judge reliability was obtained# The percentages 
in the.Tables are expedient in describing the nature, quantity 
(number) end quality (logical) of the.main relationships under 
study*
In taking each Piaget test in turn* It is proposed to make 
further divisions according to the following patternss the 
rationale of the various Plagsii.cn tsfeks, together with the 
procedure and general characteristics of the.task? the procedures 
followed in the present investigation! discussion of. tho difca 
■ summarized in the Tables? the extent to which tho results of 
tho present investigation substantiate or refute the views of 
tho Geneva School and subsequent researches* and the relation 
•of the logical thinking results' to the mgdoq of moral judgement# 
Boyover*.. there is no guarantee that the Piagotisn results in ths 
various reported researches are strictly comparable* for -tho 
techniques* snoring^ methods* age ranges* the extent to which 
verbalisation is taken.into account end indeed ths whole 
conceptualization of Piaget’s framework* very o groat “deal from 
one investigation to the other (cf* Goednow* 19-59)*
Cash Piagefclen test is preceded by four Tables which 
correspond to tho various matching procedures and criteria 
utilized in forming the PlaQofcian Stage groups# .The total saspls 
of 231 subjects represented a range of intelligence levels* 
socio-economic status categories* m  age range from 14 to 15* 
years and bath sexes# It was therefore essential to exorcise 
controls on tho bsris of matched pairs# . The Piagofeien Stage 
Grrupo included :(£hs statistical analysis with respect to tho 
groups hoc beer, reported in -a previous section)
Table 1 (H & 35 *' 3&« « 70) s represents groups contrasted 
according to Tiahor (op.cit*) and matched according' to Haven’s 
categories; Hill Hill Vocabulary categories? uiithln 6 months of 
chronological age? so; and socio-economic statue*
■ ' 33 rf OS) i tupireeente groups falling , .
Into the upper end lower reglens of logical thinking scores .
(the cut-off point being established by crces-tabulatlon) 
’’tightly1* matched according to ’’bands*1 within each region?
Raven’a categories?within 6 months of chronological ago? m x  
and cocio-aconomio status#
fefels S , {ft..n .46 ..4. .46.«*.f 2) *• represent a groups falling 
Into, the upper and lower regions of logical reasoning (the 
cut-off point feeing-08080110000’% ' cross-tabulation) matched 
according to Ravan’s categoriess within. 6 months'of chrono­
logical ago? m x  and socio-economic status*
- fable; 4 tU «■ 65 4-- 6S-m. 130) % represents .groups falling . 
into the upper and lower .regions, of logical reasoning scores 
(following thsproceduresof the Australian Science education : 
Project* 1972/1974). Subjects ware then matched Oft the bade 
of S Raven’s points? within B months of chronological age? 
esx end socio-economic status# .
it needs to fee emphasized that when referring to tho 
subjects displaying higher levels of logical thinking os ’’formal11 
and those subjects displaying lower levels of logical, thinking 
as ’’concrete’1* in the main, (unless otherwise stated), ’’early 
formal ** stages and wlaie concrete** stages ore feeing referred to# 
the majority of .the subjects In the total sample "displayed . 
thinking diecerftlfele et these pertlculer levels#
' The categories iof o upper and lower for the Picgstlan scores 
were patterned after the Australian Soiehoe Education Project' 
(1972| 1974) and Tishsr (1962, 1971)#
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ANGLES Of INCIDENCE AND REFLECTION»—non»iii^m>i »wwi»i<ph» iwi >iimii«in>ii»i<»»>ii<»«iiii nfi.iw.ii,» »w i»i>win
Piaget ( "Piagai 1958) comment© that , his elm in the ■ ■ ■
Chapter on fch© Equality of Anglos of Incidence end Reflection and tho . .: 
Operations of ReciprecGl Implication (pp.3-19) m& not a systematic 
study- of the equal it y of two angles, fm  ha already wm aware that : 
this concept is first esquired at the level of concrete operations ■ 
(Piaget end Inhiltier, .1P86)* it is howsver precisely tho fast that 
the concept is already as mil known by the titnc the formal level is -.V;--;.v 
reached that makes the reasoning process involved in the discovery 
of the equality between two angles of incidence and reflection so ' 
Inetruotivet: one of the'aims of tho study was therefore to isolate 
the' operational mechanisms involved In tho 'for?sal reasoning process 
I ts e l f *  when .this reasoning teste on notions already constructed at 
■'the concrete leve l* The experimental. apparatus consisted of a
' M
’’kind of billiard 9000*** Belle .were launched with. a. tubular spring
7- 5 :■. ,iy 7 
'7-7-7-7- ■' .'A' T.^V-■ f4
: device that could be pivoted and aimed in various directions around 'ih^USlMWS 
■a fined point# .The ball was shot against a projection wall "(with M M u m & i & i u
‘"robber buffer") end rebounded to the interior of the'apparatus# ■ ^
 '■target was placed -auooaesively at different points end subjects
eskori simply to aim at it# Afterwards, they reported what they 
observed* ' Piaget reports that the equality between the angles 
incidence mtl reflection is discovered only at Stage lll-A 
.(11-12 to 14 years) .and is often not-formulated until Stage 
.(14-18 yestre}* Piaget*e problem -was to understand why a concept 
familiar after 7-8 years m  that of the equality of-two angles 40; V ; 
utilised in .the Induction of m  elementary law only at this later dote
=■-'■. V- 7. ; .■ ■•',.;:7.',.7r ;.1v;7 ::
and especially, why formal, operations ore necessary for its- use* ■■■■■^
Piaget concludes (p.XB) that the content of Stage III reactions 4L^.:■ -/. 
quite different from that of proceeding Stages1 reasoning by
.' ' - . .. ,: :\.'>.77S.:7:7.777\^
hypothesis anti a need for demonstration replace the simple stating 
of relations* Thought proceeds from a combination of pom OUlty,
.hypothesis! anti deductive reasoning, instead of being limited- to
deductions from the actual immediate situation. The distinction between • * -
the one-on© corrcspondenc© of the angle© of incline (st Stags-ll) ■. 
anti th© reciprocity leading to tho idee of the equality of snglcs 
(discovsreti et Siege III) involves the ■recognition'that concrete 
©paraiions consist of organised systems serial
ordering,'correspondence© ©to.), they proceed from on© partial link 
to the next in atop-by-step fashion, without'relating each partial 
link to oil the othere* formal oparetione differ, in that all of tho 
possible combinations are eormidared in each case* Consequently, 
each partial link is grouped in relation to the wholej reasoning 
moves continually m  a function of‘ a ’Structured whole". • Tb© 
"discovery of the equality of the angles is the result of the 
-reciprocal implication botween the -corresponding'inclinations ; 
postulated from the start and not the inverse! this reciprocal - 
implication differs■from simple -concrete correspondence by the fact 
that it results from a calculation-of possibilities and not merely 
from-an account of the empirical situation." therefor©, the criteria 
of aesae©m©nt, with respect to. the experiment' focusing on angles of /^  
incidence and reflection involve' the * designation' of Siege il~A,io-V^ 
subjects beginning to verbalize about angle rslationnhipss Stag© 11-B 
when .demonstrating the ability-to establish -so ordering of slope. 
relationships - "if this 'is sharper-, that -will, be sharper"!. when/^ l'Og 
beginning to investigate the'situation by making hypothecs©,
Stage lll-A* and Stage 111-B when an'equal angle law is established 
which covers all cases*
The present investigation employed the Piagctiari Questionnaire 
devised by fisher (1962, 1971), which includes the Angles of ^1- 
Incidence and Reflection based on the experiment® and questions used 
by Inheidar and Piaget (op.clt.)* _ the presentation of the question© 
is preceded by a demonstretion of the relevant phenomena* bouncing 
a ball against a wall from various angles and requesting the 
observation of tho behaviour of the ball* Tho questions based on 
the demonstration era shown in the complete Questionnaire which is 
reproduced in tho Appendices, together with details of the 
administration and demonstration* Accompanying diagram© to clarify 
the questioning era also included in the Questionnaire, A "concrete" 
question expects© to be solved by & subject at the concrete ©tag© of
development# requite© the wstablishmont of a correepofutenee botweon 
the ©Hope of incidence at the path and the elope of the reflected 
path* A formal question require© the discovery of the law of the 
equality of the angle of incidence end the angle of reflections# 
Tieher hen demonstrated a high percentage Of agreement between the 
OuoGtionnmire and interview cloeeificetiona baaed on the tanevan 
“clinical c‘ approach* A 7T percent agreement between queetionnolro 
end interview elasaifieaiidna indicate that both techniques are 
measure© of. the earn# variable*
. Tables 6i8*2* 6*8.2* 6.8*3* 6*8*4# swmmariz© the percentage . 
■dietribution of subjects In the Angles of Incidence and Reflection ■■■ 
taek* in each of’a variety of matched groups* representing lower 
and higher levels of logical thinking* termed ^ concreted or ^Formal 
groups it* relation to mo clap of moral judgemanfc. Tho vsriousmatehing 
criteria and *eui~off,# points' have been expounded in the -introduction 
to this Section* It is observed in all the--fable©--' that nearly. 
©UbjeatB categorized as demonstrating higher levels of logical. : 
thinking on the questionnaire as a whole obtain the higher category 
of scores on the Angles task* Percentages for ■boy© reach on ■ ...fe 
stable 6&8.1 and Table 6*8*4 and over $Qj£ on the remaining tables* 
dercantagas for girls are over S6^ reaching' PIfC on. fable 6*8*3* '
The parcentag© of boy© in the “Concrete11 group obtaining the higher 
category of acoree on the Angle© task is particularly -high on 
Table 6*8.1* reaching 68^ * fables' 6*8*2* 6*8*3* and 6.8*4 record 
'■percehtag®© of 36*- 86# and so respectively* Percentages for 
are coneiderably lower* 27*- 28* 19 end 28 throughout the tobies =,-v;l 
.reapactivity. .Corns ©ex differences in response to this task are 
- therefore evident# particularly revealing mipsrier performance fcy^.y:^- 
boy© on this particular task* when categorized within the lower 
■level© of logical thinking for the Piagetien task© m  a whole* -
An ©nalyeie of 6he protocol# broadly confirm© -the Piagetiih 
modal of qualitative difference© In development* Further probes 
were added to Tieher1© PI age lien Questionnaire in the present.; 
investigation* requiring subjects to Justify their “multiple-choice 
©©leofcion for each question by responding to © Why dp you think ©o?“ 
probe* together with three “cognltive-conflict-produclng items being 
Integrated into the questionnaire at various point©*
These allowed in f or mat ion to be .gained with respect to the thinking
behind the cholcos made by the subjects* thereby allowing
.'qualitative analytic to be mode in-addition to quantitative * i^ rtcl
the UuesUonnaire in this investigation therefore followed ©yon
nore closely the approethos of the Geneva School* Subjects
classified at the “concrete*1 stages respondsd throughout tho seven
items Of the teat#'-with -ouch justifications m  “tha aano. cinglo from
the well*1! “boomjoe;tho-angles■ from the.wail, are the-earn## “because ■
of the'angle which is the mm® m  how i t  wont on*1! “angle of in end
cut are equal so 1© middle angle14 or “the angle the ball is  thrown
;%t-:iho wall la  the com© a© the angle that i t  w ill coma o ff  the
wall**1 . fa riy  formal “subjects showed signs of beginning to formulate
a law in ..their own terms and investigating the situation by making
- 0hypethesest “the angles from fi-C add up to SO * so the opposite angle 
must add to thesame numberw| “toeoeuee 'the.ball rebounds a i ih i  ©erne 
-angle as i t  h it the wall*1 or “i f  i t  i#  h it  accurately* ^there .shoiild;;. ■ ; 
bo m  rebound at a different angl#* Lets formal subjects - wore able 
ftm m &M v  a law* for examples “as before* t?ie -< of incidence 
SO0 t»vh has to equal fcho < the ball bounces off .a t  -80° DVA“f 
-**hpoaueo the < .between the wall and path « SflP-* cbotwson new 
path and O---90-SO « 40°“? 20° 4 30° •» 80° and the angle mad© with CY 
by £Y .must equal the angle made with CY toy AY“| “so that the angle 
,bf -'incidence » angle of refraction1** These qualitative rssponsss dd. ' v 
tint appear to d iffe r from the varying stags responses recorded toy; - f f; 
;inhetdsr and Piaget ■ within a s lig h tly . differing .experiments! situation*
;■'./ , Expnrtnental replication© of this experiment or© -not -opparsnfcs 
. the only traced study including the task of ongloo of incidence m d  \
.-reflection in in© tasting battery is  toy Grsytoill (1074)* This £*,•••. v 
published in Dissertation Abstracts end f e l l ■details are no t:available# 
Graybill was mainly conoawsd to lnvsstigsts sex differsnces in the 
transitiun from concraia to formal thinking patterns and reports sox 
differences* in  favour of boy© for the four formal operations problems 
investigated* This reported finding would appear to indicate similar 
trends for osx differences with respect to the Anglos teak as those 
commented upon earlier in connection with the present investigation*
12$ subject© from the total ©ample of 231 successfully completed 
ell five concrete item© end the two formal It mm for the Angles task* 
This percentage would- aeem to he considerably higher-then for the 
remaining tasks end it is speculated# supported by coma evidence ■ 
from the additional information obtained from the school©# that this 
particular teak had received treatment in a different form within 
the school curriculum* however# it f m  frequently been shown 
©xperimsnially that teaching hat little effect ohlese the relevant 
■operational eohema art developed and thl© la borne out on a number 
of protocols# where subjects 'have recorded m  the back of their 
■ quittlonnairt that they have met a similar situation within their • 
school eyllebus# but have not successfully completed the items*
M a p l  and Inhiider and Piaget {©p*©it*f p*l35) in similar vein 
'comment©! “acquired knowledge may Intervene#' but we ©till want to-. 
know' how well the- ©dolsesnt can. undszeiand end make m ®  of this 
knowledge# so the' problem of formal operation© remains decisive ■ - 
'here-'and the influence of school is no bar to our analysis*”
Tsblse 6*8*1# 6*8*2# 6*8*3 end 6*8*4 further indicate the 
'relation of logical thinking to moral ©tags©# lit*# to‘the varying ' ;- 
'modes of moral judgement* It is observed that eutojoofce categorized :' 
'm demonstrating higher- level© of logical thinking on the testae 
a whole display greater evidence of Stage 4 moral thinking than 
eubjecte categorized ©a being at the “concrete” level* Percentages 
for boys# are 29£# 42 #^ 32j$# and Mf4 for- girls# 36$# 37$# 88$ and 
22$ for the “formal” group os compared with 21$# 12$, 28$ and 12$ 
for boys, 8$* 0# s$ and 3$ for girl© m  Tables 6*8*1# 6*8*2# 6*8*3 
and 6*8*4 reepeetivtiy*
there is evidence that greater numbers of sub jests attain 
Stage 4 moral thinking with higher ©cozes on the Angles task than 
-those with lower scores .on the teak* The six percsnt of adjects 
displaying stags B tmmX thinking are all high scorers On the Angles 
task* It is further apparent that m  subjects categorized a©
“formal” on the gueetlonnalre a© a whole ©how no evidence of stag© 2 
moral thinking* “Concrete” subjects revealing Stage 2 moral 
thinking are apparent in higher percentages in the low scoring 
category on the Angle© task than those ©coring within the higher
category on tho tack* Thcrsfcrs In all the Tables there in © .trend .
between the attainment of higher ©core© on the Angloa oflnoidanc©
and fteflecUch task and indications of Stage4 moral thinking and 
'iouereely indications of Stage 2 moral thinking in -eaeociaiiop with 
lower levelc of .attainment on the Angles .of' incidence: and .Reflection 
■teak* It can beepoculated that ae the subject moves nearer to the
equilibrium of f©rm&.operation© he is more logically capable of '
considering.mere :poaeihilltlos* This ability to . consider., snor© 
alternatives'and to evaluate -them could assist the subject to take 
a mere global view when faced with - a .moral dilemma* - Due to .greater, 
mobility anbflexibility efthought at the more advanced stage It 
cen’-he suggested that feelings can become decentred from person© 
or material realities and become more adequate for dealing-with 
social realities and oven ideal - realities* it© -{op*©it*} included 
that.the concrete operation components of cognitive functioning I© 
beet .related to ■ authority typo responses .independent of -op. and to 
-oencomitant Increae© in reciprocity response in the moral ■ mods of 
conceptualization* The formal operation componorit of cognitive • 
functioning beat predict© the increase of “societal" -moral response*
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EQUILIBRIUM IH THE BALAMCE
According to Piaget end Inhelder (1969) the notion of proportion 
appears at eleven m  tuelve years in several different areas oluay© 
in the eemo initially qualitative form# These areas are* among others* 
spatial proportional (similar figures)* metrical epeads* (S/f■« NS/r4T}» 
probabilities (x/y « nx/ny)t relations between weights and lengths of 
the arms of a balance* Concerning the balance* the subject first by 
ordinal reosaoing discover© that the greater the weight* the lower the 
atm and the farther from the line of equilibrium* this leads M m  to 
discover .© linear junction and to understand a first condition of 
equilibrium (the quality of weights at equal distances from the central 
point)* Also by ordinal reasoning, he diecc* c^s that e single weight W 
pulls the arm down more, the farther It ie placed from the pivot# from 
this fit also derives a linear function and understands that equilibrium 
is attained for two equal weights provided that they are equidistant 
from the pivot* however long the distance t may be* The discovery of 
the inverse proportionality between w # 1 is also obtained by a 
qualitative co-ordination of these two initially ordinal functions* 
Comprehension begins when the child discovers that the result stays the 
seme if he increases a weight without changing the distance from the 
centre on the one aide* while increasing the distance without changing 
the weight on the other# from this he derives the hypothesis (which 
he verifies in an ordinal manner) that whan you begin with two equal 
weights at ©quel distances from the centre* you maintain equilibrium 
by decreasing one weight but moving it farther away or by increasing 
the other weight and moving it closer to the centre* It is only then 
that he grasps the simple metrical proportion w *= jgw* etc** but he
diecovera this by beginning with the qualitative proportion? that is* 
that decreasing the weight and increasing the length is equivalent to 
increasing the weight and decreasing the length* The scheme of pro­
portionality ie derived directly from the "four-group11* The subject 
begins with two transformations, each of which involves cn inverse i 
increasing (or decreasing the weight or the length (* U and * 1)*
Then he discover© that the Inver©© .©f an© (decrease of weight* or -u) 
may be replaced by the inverse of the other (decrease ef length,
©r *4) which i© not identical tothe fizei inverse but leada to the 
same result by compensation end not by cancoilatien# If-fH I© 
regarded ©a the basic operation (l) end -y asthe inverse (N), then 
-t is the reciprocal (R) -of and *L ie its correlative (C)« -Since 
two pair© of direct and inverse transformations are Involved, along 
with e roietion of ©quivelence (but not of Identity)* the system of 
proportion must derive from the "4-grbup" and takes thefermi/R « c/fcj 
■ (or by oroseed products' lit' *■' SC)
Inheldsr end Piaget*© experimental situation (1958, pp*184-161) 
.involved the use of %  simple balance-type weighing instrument, a ■ 
©©©-saw balance," withvarying weights uiiicb could be hung at 
different points, along the crossbar* Subjects at Stage II-A piacalhe 
weights , randomly in an attempt to attain balance* Weights ©re added 
and moved with no evidence of an underlying cyetosn, subjects usually 
finding an arrangement of weights that balarma, but are not able to 
generalize# At Stage 11-0 subjects try to balance the apparatus by 
rudimentary logic (i*©* by mowing the lighter weight further out, 
often formulating a general rule that the heavier weight must be nearer 
the middle and the lighter weight further out* A strategy is sometimes 
adopted such as 3 * 2 « 6 without underotanding propertionality* The 
proportional relationship that exist© between weight and distance Is 
. discovered at Stags Ilt-A and .*t a number of;examples which can bo 
given for eech situation explored# Indications are given in subjects 
explanations that one variable compensates for another, however there 
is ©till difficulty in transforming information and generalizing it to 
theoreUcal situations* It I©.only at Stage If1-6 that the prop- 
portionel relationship which exist® between distance and weight is 
quickly discovered, allowing generalization to theoretical situations 
end an adequate explanation of proportionality*
\ ■ • V I.'.'.'..''..".'
The present investigation employed the Piagotianquestionnaire 
devised by Tiaher (1962, 1971) which includas the Equilibrium In tho 
Salaries Task booed on the experiments and question© used by Inheldor 
and Pisgst (op#cit#)» The presentation of the question© is preceded
by a demonstration of . the relevant phenomena #• returning a balance \ 
arm. to a ©tat© of equilibrium using.weight©; placed,oi .various.,, 
distances along the arm* The questions based on the demonstration 
m o  shown in the complete Questionnaire which in reproduced in the 
Appendices together with detail© of the administration end demon- 
©iraticrh* A diagram of the ©ppsrsiu© ueed for the demonstration. 
is included in the Queofclanhatrcu A C^onccoto". question -expected 
to bo solved by a subject at the concrete ©teg© of development* . 
since a subject in this stag© would realize that equalwoighto at 
"•equal distances from the fulcrum balance each other# involves ten. 
unite ofwoighb being hung at the third position on the left arm 
and tha subject being required to ©tats which Of .the positions, 1st 
on the left arm# fourth, third# fifth on the right# together with 
the option impossible# another ten units of weight must be hung* A 
q^uestion to- be solved by a subject''in the formal stege of manial 
vdavelopwit# since It requires that the subject has discovered the 
proportional relationship between their weights and their distance© 
frcmtha fulcrum, involve© ten units of weight being hung on the 
left'arm and the requirement to cite the- position for-fifteen units 
of weight to foe hung in order to balance the arm* fisher has 
demonstrated a high percentage of agreementhc tween the Quoetionnaire 
and interview classifications based on the Genevan "clinical11 
approach* A 74^percent agreement between questionnaire and interview 
classification indicate© that both techniques are measures of the 
oame variable*
tables 6*9*1# 6*4*2# 6*9*1# 6*9*4 summer!z© the percentoge 
distribution of ©ubjeet© in-the Equilibrium in the Balance'task#- in 
each of -a variety of matched groups# representing lower , and higher - 
levels of logical thinking# turned "Concrete" or "formal1* groups in 
•relation to ■modes of moral judgement* The various matching criteria : 
and "cut-off" points have been expounded in the introduction to this 
section* It will be observed in Table 6*9*1 that go percent of the 
boys and 72 percent of the girls in the group demonstrating higher 
levels of logical thinking ability on the Piogetian test© m  a 
whole# achieve the higher category of ceoro© on the test of Equili­
brium in the Balance* Only B percent of the boys and 18 percent of 
the girl© in the group demonstrating lower level© of logical thinking
:a b ility  on th© Piagotlen testa 'm e'whole# achieve the’'higher 
-.category of scores on the teat of Equilibrium In the Belefifce# •' ■ 
tables 6*9*2# 6*9*0# r&prseenting groups formed by’ d iffering  
matching c rite ria  chow -similar trends* However# in  the largest 
criterion  group {Table 6*9*4)-reproeBnting'higher levels o f logleal 
thinking a b ility  or. the Plarptian teats as a whole, i t  io  observed 
that tits percentage of boys obtaining' the higher category m  
■this test in" considerably lower#- with the pazceniop far g irls  
.remaining sim ilar -'to other criterion  groups* Thors are no s ig n ific ­
ant m x  differences although a slight trend in  favour o f boys with . 
;rs0pect to  the obtaining of higher scores, on th is teat*
■;’ :--■:' m  .analysis- o f the protocols broadly confirms .the Piaget Aon- 
model of qualitative differences in development* .further probes ■ were 
. added to  Tiaher*© '-Piegetlgn- Questionnaire in  ih© present I m m tigetlsn  
requiring subjects to ju s tify  their "m ultiple choice*1 taloot>ion; for- 
oach .question by responding io' a "why do- you think #0?"' .pofo@*-:- 
togather withfcbrea ”co o n itiua-con flic i"- producing i tm o  boing 
integrated into the Questionnaire at various points* ■; These allowed 
Ihformatiori to be gained'with respect to the thinking'behind the 
choices made by the subjects thereby allowing qualitative analysis 
to bo made in  addition to quantitative and the Ouestlonnelra in  this  
investigation therefore followed oven more closely the approach©© of 
the Geneva school* Subjects classified at the "csncroiDu stages 
responded throughout the seven items of the test# with such ju s ti­
fications as"***.* because the distance from the pivot is  equal*♦**"* 
because to balance i t  the weight must be put- on the corresponding 
peg m  the other side"# deteriorating to "just a good gyeea"*"
* * * • i t  balances out-, th is way In  theory"#'' » hoping the distance 
is  enough to awing the odfit"* "**'** to balance i t  m l  and make I t  more 
etabia." "Concrete" 'Subject© eometimea gave Indication o f adopting 
efcrategsr?.iee involving the cdculaUon o f figures ouch as reeponet to 
.item five t "Side M Q  m d  aide 8 must ,be 40# but Bib # 6  « 40 and • 
there io m  8." I t  was evident from further w riting on this  
particular protocol that the positions on the arm had bean ordered in  
the reveres direction# I*©*# S# 4# 3* 2# 1# from the ■fulcrum* There 
was therefore evidence o f . the .realization of the proportional .■relation 
showing emergence but unable to bs fu lly  developed and .applied*
Subject© categorized in the "early formal" stage© of development 
offered explanations, for example wiihrespoet to. item six* ■
"10 x 2 * 6 x 4 *st 40 « 10 x 4 »* 10 Ifoa ot 3 or in reopen©© to 
item four the weight© and forces of both ©idee must equal 
10 x 3 » IB x 7 *# 2(0), therefore the weight must be hung at 8*" 
One of the nine subjects!© the total sample categorized as "late 
"formal11 on the basis of the Quostiofinair© m  a whole justified her 
responds to item six aa followst "10 h % + S n 4 « d-Ku# ■
40 » d m w? d *» 4 w » 10, therefore a ten .pound weight must ■ 
he hung at 3#"
■ to veil *© ■{1961) finding that few subject© could verbalize- the- 
operative principles governing the situation was borne but in this 
Investigation* He found few subject© who could verbalize the rules* 
tee (1971)-' reports that the verbalization of the operating principle© 
was attained by less than 68 percent of the subjects even at age 
17 years* ' An analysis of the protocols In the present investigation 
adds further credence to toveil4© comment that despite the majority 
of protocols showing much of the same kind of reasoning m  those of 
Inheldtr and Piaget (op.ciU) and supporting many of their statements, 
no subject replied like Inhslder and Plagat4© "Bam" (1958, pp#174*176) 
whs csfmeniedi "If you want to calculate, its beat' to consider it 
(distance) horizontally, If you want to understsnd it, vertically is 
bettor*" tovell elaborate©, "In other word© we did not find anyone 
who understood that force end height compensate one another, so that 
the work done is the same in both instances, as did the authorfs 
subjects at Stage Backemn (1963) likewise focusoe on the
neceeeity for m m  -critical examination of children4© comments end .- 
test behaviour#
. tovell further report© that the least ©bio children remain'at © 
lew level of logical thought even at IS years of age and many of these 
do not oeom to pass beyond tha -216*118 ©tags of thinking* As tovell 
commente this is a finding not mentioned by Inholder and Piaget and 
"it lead© ms to suspect that the school population In Geneva which 
they examined consisted of able children*11 As has been indicated 
earlier only nine subject© from 231 aged 14 to 15 year© in the present 
investigation could be classified at "tat© formal” and only 3 subjects
from ih© total eample successfully completed oil ih© 3 concroto and 
4 formal itoma for ibo toot of Equilibrium io the Balance* ' IS ©object© 
:•■#*?em the total sample successfully completed 3 m m m i o  and 3 formal 
items from the total of 3 conereta end 4 formal items for this teat 
{34 subjects! $ concrete and 2 formal items)* Jackson (ap»eit*) ■ 
reports that among children with IQ1© between SO to 110 comprising 
four boys and four girls in each of the age gouups 5* .7# f# 11# IS and 15 
the following stages in the Equilibrium in the Balance situation were 
derived! M  If 1-0 M| 2~A Sf ' 2-0 : 19f. 3-A m  ' and' 3-S 1*:
' However* ■although the ages of the children categorized at the various 
stages m &  not given# it can be speeuiaied from the derivable' facts that 
-'from the 16 children aged 13 and 15# 7 can be categorized as being at ■ ■
the formal stage (I being at lots- formal}* ■ This may bo considered to 
'be a -higher percentage'that in-'the present investigation# : ■
. ■ . .Boss (1973) among 65 undergraduates datsrminsd ths following 
frequency end percentage of subjects at mch eubstago for the Balance 
tsoks
'■ 0once©i@ 1 ' Concrete & " formal' 1
4 ■' 1? 33
: ’6*2$ ' ' ' 26*2$' 50*8$
Ross conoidaro that his data agrees with Tomiinsen-KeaBey *c (1972) 
findings that a college-educated sample has significantly mors than 
BB% of the subjects functioning at the formal level* On three of the 
four formal tacks investigated# -the peroahtagesepproaehed or were 
greater than'the 75$ norm used by Piaget {cited in Elkind* 1961a) to 
indicate that an age group had reached a particular :0togs of. development* 
Past research has shown that younger andmore typical adolescent camples 
usually have 50$ or lesarftho saisple operating at theyformol- level* :
Such results have led Piaget {1972) to admit that the original oormecf ■ 
sample might have been drawn from a ^ privileged population from the . 
bettor Banova Schools ,M* In the earn© Paper# Piaget theorizes that
due to varying social environments the development of the formal 
operations may bo delayed until 15-20# rather than the originally stated 
11*45 period*
formal 2
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Tables 6*3*1, 6*9.2* 6*9*3# 6.9*4* further indicate the relation 
of the logical thinking to morel stages* i.e. to the varying modsa of 
moral Judgement. It will be observed that in the Tables the groups . 
representing cubjecto displaying higher levels of logical thinking on 
the Piagatian teats as a whole and obtaining higher score© on the 
equilibrium in balance task* further display in greater percentages ■' 
than subjects scoring lew in the/balance task# evidence of Etags-4 
thinking on the moral dimensione* however in  the groups representing 
the lower' levels of logical thinking in the Piagstlsn tost'm. a whole*' 
wore subjects scoring lower on the ielsnc® task display evidence of • 
moral Siago-4 thinking than the few subjects in  each of'the groups 
scoring at higher levels on.the Balance task* . A significant trend 
in however confirmed from all four Tablesi ; no eubjectc in the groups- 
displaying higher levels of-logical thinking m  the tost, as a whole . 
indicate any' percentage of $teg©-2 »ral thinking whereas- the groups- 
displaying lower levels of logical thinking on the complete Piegotian 
test show indications of Stags-2- moral thinking* It'is interesting to 
record that with the exception of Table.6*7*4- (where only 3 percent of .-, 
girls deviate)# all subjects-in the lower levels;of logical, thinking'; 
groups indicating' seme Btege-2 moral thinking reveal the lower range 
scores on the Equilibrium in - the .'Balence ..task* ■ ..Only sub jests-in the 
'nfoWRaln group display any elements of Stage-5 moral thinking and 
scores on the Balance task do m i indicate © clear relationship# ■ 
Therefore In all the tables there is a trend between the attainment Of 
higher scores on the Balance task and.indications Of Stage-4 moral 
thinking and inversely indications of-Stage-2.morel; thinking in 
association with lower levels of attainment tm the Balance teak* 1i": " ' 
can be speculated that as the subject move's nearer to- the equilibrium ' 
of formal operations he is more logically capable of considering more’ ■ 
possibilities, this ability to consider mtu alternatives and to : 
evaluate them would assist the subject to take a raore global view when 
faced with a moral dilemma* Dus to greater mobility and flexibility 
of thought at'"the .more advanced stage it can bo suggested that feelings 
can become decentred from persons or materiel realities and bmcotno nor© 
adequate for dealing with social realities -and even ideal, realities*
ie© (op.cii*) concluded that the concrete operation component© 
cognitive functioning io boot related to authority typo raepoheee 
Independent of ago and to oonooml,tsnt £ftg$©&sa in reciprocity 
ttmpmm .in the marel mods?. of concoptusliratian. The? formal 
operations eontponsnt of cognitive functioning boot -predict© the 
Increase of r?eDcioteltf laorai responses*
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The experiment involving Communicating Veseslo I,a © problem of 
equilibrium# loheldar'Shd Piaget (1958* >*133) eieboriiie that in 
ovary equilibrium the two possible forma of reversibility operate 
oiisuX'tanQDuelyi -inversion* uhich;:corresponds to:the additleoe or ' 
-eliminations of footed in the parte of the eysism which cone into •
' equilibrium, and reciprocity*' which corresponds to the symmetries or . 
compensations between these parts (thus to actions which -are.both 
equivalent os regards their: respective. products and oriented in. 
opposite; direcilerm}* Inversions and reciprocities are part of the ; . 
Group "of; four: transformations which, are at the ■ centra. of the 
mechanisms of formal .thought* This group in of psychological Jtm* 
portends because it correspond© to certain fundamental structures 
of thought* for inversion'll..expresses negation* reciprocity & 
expresses symmetry (equivalent transformations oriented in opposite 
directions).* end correiaUvA&y is symmetric with negation* **This 
explalna'why .the notion of equilibrium* which at a very early age 
;riee • to certain rough intuitions (balancot .ate*)* is not really . 
understood before the formal level* when the eubjeob can both dis­
tinguish end co-ordinate inversions* recipricities and correlativities 
(Inversion*a* for example* increase or diminish a force in one of 
the parts of the system* reciprocities* compsnaate for a fores by.on 
■equivalent force* thus ensuring symmetry between the partsf : 
oorrelotivitiess"reciprocity in negation)*” Although they may be . 
relatively simple, in certain concrete esses,* thee© transformation© ■
' actually''require thinking and statements of -a very abstract eorfc in 
most problems involving action and reaction* for the difficulty lies 
In grasping that X in at the same time equal to Y and acting in the 
opposite direction from it* It is then that if is necessary-to go 
beyond prepositional logic to include its fundamental group/lllHC*
In th© case of vessels* reciprocity serves to express the compensatory 
actions between ©operate vessels5 transformations by invarcion express 
the rise.and fall of the water level*■ Changes in water level are-
brought about m i  by adding m  taking amy water# but by minim 
m  I m m & m  the rscepWilss# In Inhsidar and Piagal1© 
apparatus A flowed the .©object to raiat or lower the mumXn by . 
bond* by adding or taking away the ©tends chi which thay $$$tddf In 
apparatus © the % m  vessel© could be raised or lowered tliih-louoro 
and apparatus € allowtd ilia movement of -only on© of ifeo-vase©!©* the 
other feeing ©taiioaaty# Sine® if# t m m t m l m  'had neither ih# © w  
■ ©hape nor the ©am# volume* it we© noosssary to mttlurn ibm® two 
fOCiirt to find the law* However* Plapi emphasises that air 
prossiir© can fee disregarded* for It m m  ©quivslertt for the two 
: columns of liquid* Pitgei provides a footnote (ibid p*13S) dotting 
. out the formula to illuatfate the lack of M?forane® in c&noiiy between 
the coftliOi# of -$h© two' vessels. At Slap £Mi too oufoj^fe or© aM© 
to m i m  and I m m  tft© container© with ® vim toward m M n &  Of 
;. toeing torn m i m  level* a preliminary invtfelon (raisin© and louring)
- and reciprocity (ft# water $oe© tfcNfr in on# v m m i  m  li. tim® in iho 
other) war© present* Out locking* m v  the condition of oquivalonct* 
union ©lone would ©How the ©Ufejsci to- coordinate these m w w t m m $ 3 m m  
the final actuality of ft# two m t m  lovoit* st-ago UMI subjects die* 
cover both One equality of water levels end the w  of verifying thin 
equality once © reference ©yatam feisesd on it# coordinate of 
immediate physical opoc© (vortical and feorlEonial) ie astsblishtfd* 
©erlfiQ&ttot i« effected niter fey ©Making whether the line uniting 
Vih# two surfaces in m  by measuring their rospactiuo heights#;
The conceals operations aveileblo to- the subject at. this Mage do not 
: however allow M o  to discover the feittir© of the metente of it#©© 
transformation® although fey their temporal end spatial ©oriel Offering : 
end correspond©*#© they ellow M o  to detorMn© the canditione of 
oquiiiferium* At In© first f m M  level* lSi«*A* m  contract* on 
' important reworking of the operation® end the explanation 1© observed* 
iquillferium in ooommicating vseesls ie no longer conceived of ©o Iht ■ . 
simple flow of w©t©r ttm © higher leva! to o lower on® until equality 
Of levels ie ©chlovod# but m  0 eysbera of action© and teoMon® whose 
invsreionevcnd raciprocltle© or© otatecl in mechanical and not rmm%y 
■in cpotioteporol terms* Subjects esquire ©quality of uoi|fit feted . 
on equal volumes before' they m ®  willing to talk afeout equality of ^
level8t and deny that two vessels of unequal -capaeiiy can verify 
the law# They fail to imdarstand the cxwnpenaaticn resulting --from .. 
the relationship between the weight of the vertical column of water
■ .©ms'&he surface m m  of the fees© of this column# They outline an ■ 
interpretation ;ba©eii on oompanaation* on the fact that each of the 
two quantities of liquid oxer is- a pressure m  the other* th© two. ■ 
pressures being9 by this vary fact* ©riento&ain opposite direction©*' . 
but the subject does not km® M u  to qsnsrMize.it to the case of 
unequal quantities. Piaget suggest© that the tection© of -Stage ill*B 
MMSmtB m®- HntlumnM by academic knowlcdg© (which* moreover* has - 
vfeosn aoeiailotod only to the extent that it fit©; into-the ©ebsma whoso 
‘;.'d©velopm^ >t w© have just noted)#” finally* at.stag© .111*8* ,9fcho .
©pontanQous schema of explanation outlined during 1IJM 1©’ filled 
; With, information gained through educations thus the contradiction 
between' th# ©quality of water level© and the eventual Inequalities of V:- 
te-amount© of liquid is eliminated# But one c m  easily see that this 
. ccntributioiii from without does not modify the structure of the. : 
reasoning”# Having a more or less clear understanding of the fact. ■:
: that the pressuroof the liquid ie relative • to the surface or ©a of ■
-the vertical column at it© baoo* the subjeot ©plains the phenomenon
■ of'commuriicatifrg vessels in a fashion analogous to that used.at 
Stage-'lll^ A* but generalize© to the case of unequal quantities# fh© : 
©aoanUal point in the explanation is that ©van in the case of unequal t 
volumes the pressure© compensate each other in function of the height 
of th® column© Hs© equilibrium 1© reached*1*
The present investigation ©mployad the Piagotien Quostionneir© 
devised by Tisher (1962* 1971) which includes the Communicofclng Vessel© 
based on the experiments end questions used by tnhaldar and Piaget 
.(ibid)* lb©'presentation of 'the question© I© preceded by a demons 
etrafcion of the relevant phenomena * involving varying the water level 
in ibo connected water container©* The question© based on th# demon** 
©tration are shown in the complete questionnaire which i© reproduced 
in the Appendices* together with detail© of the administration end 
demonstration. A diagram of the apparatus used for the demonstration 
A diagram of the apparatus used for the demonstration i© included in
'the -toationnaire# A ^ Concrete” question expected to be ©sivod-by 
■« subject at the concrete-©tags^of development# sine© a ©ubjte in 
-thi© Mag© - would discover that the mate lev©Is in both ■ contain©!?©
- returns to e< common, horizontal level- ©ffcor one m both of the eon** - 
tainte wea?® raised or lowered involves ©toting what would - happen • 
when containers A ©.rB are mxmti up m  down# A-question to be solved 
by n subject in the formal stage of-mental development •= alneo it 
' requires; the■ correct applanation for the observed equality- of the ■
• levels anri the-prediction of--utiot .would happsn.to the wate level in 
. one of the containers* #f if A or the other container • u m &: rained or 
■ lewste# .'Invoite 'otatinq. the ©suss of the-level of ths'Misr In the 
container A bping obcorved to .rise* Tisharto; dsmonsirokad a high - 
; porcoritsqo-. of opeowit between the quaatlanhato.-and-ihtorview .-• 
clecrdficctl.0r.r3 bate on the Genevan ”cllnlcal” approoc-h* A ?/<? 
porcont agroomrnt between Questionnaire and Intorylw oleooifiooticm ' 
indicates that both techniques era msasurem of the oonio-teiabio*
: foblei 6*tD#lt 6*10,2* 6#(0#3* 6ti©*4* iiimmsriz^thO'PMosntai© 
distribution of subjects in the Communicating Vassals task in each 
•of a .variety of matched ■ groups* representing I mm' and - higher level© 
of logical thinking* termed ,fConcrate” or F^orinol” groups In relation 
to modae of moral thinking# The various matching criteria and 
”cut~off” points have been expounded in the introduction to this 
section# it is observed that only lew percentages of even subjects 
demcnotreting higher levels of logical thinking on the basis of the 
CUBSiionnaire aoa whole* ware able to eucccsofuXly solve the one 
formal problem In this particular task#- The percentages for-boy© are 
,43$*. 24%  m b  W i  fb* ‘04«l®»-¥ $  ¥$ *¥9 M b  l¥. m  Tables 
6*fo*l# 6#fd*2* iMevB and 6#f0*4* respectively* for subjects demon­
strating lower levels of logical thinking on the basis -of-the tact 
as a whole no boys are able to eucccesfuIXy complete the formal 
question and only 9$* 42$* - lfi$ end 3$.of girls on the fourTable©•' ••• 
respectively*
An -analysis of thescsrss for the total ©ample nf 231* reveal© 
that only 13 eubjoefcs successfully completed the four concrete 
questiena and the one formal question* However* a further V subjects 
failing to successfully complete one of the four concrete questions*
wort able to respond to the format item. inly 19 cubjecfce ft ora 
the total sample solved oil tom m m m i ®  items and it it apparent 
that tbs majority of those Mere the subjects completing the formal 
item* 39 subjects solved three of the concrete questions and 82 
subjects two concrete items* It is therefor© suggested that this 
particular task proved to be the most difficult task for the 
majority-of the subjects* It i© unfortunate that there is little 
evidence of ropllcatory studies# The only study traced which 
included the Communicating Vessels in its battery of tasks* is that 
of Backaon (1963)* H© reports the following numbers of subjects 
reQchin9A©Watag© among four boys and four girls In each of the 
age groups* 5# 13 and IB as follow©!
U  IB m  28 3A SB
0 0 22 12 4 1
Bn the basis that there were IS subjects aged 13-XS yoar© there 
is the indication that numbers achieving the formal operational level© 
war© low# although it appears* not a© low as in the present investig­
ation* Subjects in the present investigation indicated on the 
reverse of their Questionnaire cheats# that they had not met a 
similar situation in their school curriculum end attention may be 
drawn to Piaget*© comment concerning the reactions of Stags 111-8 
sub jects being ^influenced by academic knowledge#*5 m  a tentative 
attempt to explain the particularly low level of response on this 
particular' test*
however# an -analysis of the protocols broadly confirms support for the 
Piagotian. model of qualitative differences in development, further - 
probes were added to Tisher*© Plagstiso Questionnaire in the present 
Investigation requiring subjects to justify their multiple choice 
©election for each question by responding to a Wwhy do you think soM? 
probe# together with three wcognitivcvccnflicfcn - producing items 
being integrated into the Questionnaire at various points. These 
alio wad Information to be gained with respect to the thinking behind 
the .choice© mad© by the ©injects* thereby allowing qualitative 
analysis to b© made in addition to quantitative and the -Questionnaire) '
In this invoGiigation therefore followed even more cloeely the 
approaches of the Censve School* Subjects classified at the 
■ "f^mozete" ©tag© responded with such justification© m  "beeau©©
.•'■they must lovo! out”# %ecauso:it is a known fact that whatever 
•water always seoka i t s  own leval"! %eomiia the: water w ill, go m b  
of container B end into- container A(l| "equal movement"§ %oesue© 
when moving |bothj the contain ore the water level will aluey© stay 
the com©11 or "becsuae the amount of water lost in A will b© gained 
■by Bw* Subject© categorized in the "early formal41' sieges of 
ctev.olopment offered explanations characteristic of the responses 
described by Piaget j "beceue© the pzcceuz© In nmb container would 
have to be equal aid m  the higher level drops ©lightly arid the 
other rises slightly until both, level a ere equal11? "because the 
decrease ©qyalo the InezeaGQ41! "in order to equal the gravitational 
pull44 or "because of the pressure of the air*4’ Subjects classified 
' as "late formal11 on the test as a whole end successfully completing 
the formal question showed lack of .ability in verbalizing their 
Justification and still tended to respond In terms more characteristic - 
of the early formal stages "because the pressure on the ■surface of 
liquid in container A will be equal to pressure on the carrosppnding 
point in container B® or "the pressure in container f changes and the 
water level drop© to bring both pressures equal*" Again focus'can 
bo placed on Picgatfs reflections concerning "Influence by academic 
knowledge" and "the spontaneous schema of explanation* being "filled 
in with information gained through education41 as explanation for this 
particularly poor t m p m m  m  this test*
Tables 6JO,it 6*10,2f 6*I0*3P 6*10*4* further indicate the relation 
Of logical thinking for moral stagac ** d»e* for' the varying modes of 
moral Judgement* It is observed from the Tables that all subjects 
dicplaying Staga-2 moral thinking are those also scoring in the lower 
ranges of ©coze© on the Communicating Vessels task* It I© further 
observed that subjects categorized m  "formal*4 m  the basis'uf the 
Cuselionr.aire as a whole display no Stags«2 moral reasoning* Only 
subjects in the’"formal" group display evidence of Stage-S morel 
thinking* It is apparent that there is not ©;. significant relationship 
between success m  the one formal question for the Communicating Vessel©
task and Btags-4 moral thinking* for among the "formal" 'group'the 
pOrcefttftges of boys displaying Staged thinking but not solving the 
,formal tiara on this particular t&st arcs 29, 29* 24* aid 24 and 
parcantagoQ of girls* 27* Si, S3* and W  fox? the 11 formal15 poop on 
fables 6.10*1, 6*10*2, 6*10*2, 6*10*4*'' mnpmhlmly* f m  Urn "Concrete" 
group- the percentages are lower for boya. and considerably lower for 
girls# Thara is however © trend with respect to the mlniiamhip' 
baluoen level of logical thinking and stages of moral thought and 
it can bo ©peculated that as the ©object moves nearer to the • 
equilibrium of -formal operations ho is more logically capable of :
■ considering mam' possibilities* This ■ ability • to consider more 
alternatives and to evaluate them would assist the abject to take 
a mete global view when faced with a moral dilemma* Duo to greater 
mobility me! flexibility of thought at the m m  advanced stage it- 
can " be auggeot&d that feelings can become' decent?ad from pereane or 
.material realities and become more adequate for dealing1-with social 
rsalities -and even ideal realities*' i m  (op»eit«) concluded that the 
concrete' operation component© of cognitive. functioning "is boat related 
to authority "type responses' Independent of ago and to concomitant 
Increase' in reciprocity response In the moral mode of conceptualization* 
The formal operations component of cognitive functioning beat predicts the 
increase' of "societal" moral responses* ' "
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THE PR03ECTI0M OF SHADOWS 
TABLES -  6.11.1, fc.11.2. 6>ll.3. 6.11.4.
" \ . the operatlono Involved in understanding proportionality are 
further described by Piaget (Inhelder and' Piaget* 19S8* pp*199*209) 
in an experiment1 in ©bleb ih© Shadows of a number of circular rings '
' of different ®lzm <5# 10* IB* 20 era©* in diameter) m m  cast by a . , 
point of light onto a ©or sen*. in© problem net to cacti subject was 
to make th© shadows coincide* fleetly with two cinpandf subsequently 
with more * increasing to five or ©Ik* If it is supposed that a child 
■ has arranged on© ring to cast a shadow on th© screen and in Voiding 
' 'what to do with a different mm ho mayargu© that if,the shadow of ; 
ths second ring is too big it can be reduced by saving the ting 
fur ther frem the light $ if it is too ©amll it can be enlarged by 
moving the ring nearer th© lights alternatively# if the shadow is too 
' ■big it'could b© replaced by a smaller one or# if tea small by a ■
' longer m m  • the subject thereby takes into account four .possible 
’ actions and ’since he represents thm  mentally* has considered four 
- operations*; At 'the level of formal operations* he does not make any 
adjustmonte by trial, and error* but proceeds by measurement with 
calculation of proportions* The groups of fouroperationo referred 
to in the discussion of Test 2 occurs in ail .problems of proportion** 
©lity as well as in other related problems* Proportionality is 
central to the Shadows experiment* The numerator end denominator in 
. a -ratio (i#e* a proportion) bear a reciprocal relation to one another 
(one can compensate for increase in one by increase in the other)* 
Reciprocity is a characteristic acquisition of the formal stage* 
Comparing two ratios (which is fundamental in- using ratios for problem 
solving) ©mount© to setting up a relation between -relations*. Insofar.- 
as the concrete stage tends to be restricted to thinking about 
•’thing©" it would be expected that operations involving a •’relation
between relations" would have to await the formal stage*
■ \
The present investigation employed the Piagation GuWtiermair© 
devised by Tiohor (1962* 1971) which includes the Projection of 
Shadows Task booed on the experiments and questions used by Sohelber 
and Piaget (19SS)* The presentation of the questions Is preceded by
e demonstration of the relevant phenomena with three rings of 
different diameters being pieced at different distances from a 
source of ilght and their shadows fcllouod to fall on to a screen*
The cubjocto observe the shadow© as the distance of each object 
from the light coerce is raised. The questions based on the 
demonstration are shown in the complete questionnaire which ie 
reproduced in the Appendices* together with details of the 
administration end demonstration. A diagram of the apparatus used 
for the demonstration ie included in the Questionnaire* A “concrete" 
question expected to b© solved by a subject at the concrete stage of 
development* requires the discovery that the size of the shadow 
depends on the size and distance of the object from the screen; no 
inverse metrical relationship between sirs and distance would bo 
involved* A "formal" question requires the necessity of the dis­
covery of the universe metrical relationship between the sire of the 
object and its distance from the screen. Tishsr has demonstrated a 
high percentage of agreement between the Questionnaire and interview 
classifications based on the Genevan "clinical" approach* A 747- 
percent agreement between the questionnaire and interview classifies 
ation indicate© that both techniques are measures of the same 
variable.
Table© 6*11.1* 6*11*2* 6*11.3* and 6.11.4* summarize the percentage 
distribution of subjects in the Projection of Shadows Task* in each
e
of a variety of matched groups* representing lower and higher levels 
of logical thinking tormsd "Concrete" and "formal" groups in relation 
to modoo of moral judgement* The various matching criteria and 
"cut-off" points have boon expounded in the intooduction to this 
section, it ie observed that subjects categorized on the Piegotian 
measure a© a whole as demonstrating higher levels of logical 
thinking consistently obtain the higher category of scores on the 
Projection of Shadows teat* Of particular interest is the significant 
sox difference on this toot; of the subjects obtaining the higher 
category of ocoros* the higher psreentages are represented by girl©* 
This ie particularly focused in the group© representing subjects 
categorized on th® Piegetian measure as o whole as demonstrating
lower levels of logical thinking where 27 percent* 43 percent*
39 percent* end 31 percent respectively (Tables 6#H*1* 6*tU2* 6*ti*3* 
and G«H*4) of girls obtain higher scores on the teat of Projection 
of Shadows as compared with 4 percent* 0 percent* 0 percent and 
9 percent of boys* respectively#
An analysis of the protocols broadly ccnfirmstho Piagetian
model of qualitative difference© in development# further probes were
added to Tieher*c Piagotian Questionnaire in the present investigation
requiring subjects to justify their "multiple-choice" selection for
each question by responding to © "bhy do you think eo7" probe*
together with the “cognitive-confXiePproducing items being integrated
into the Questionnaire at various points# These permitted information
to be gained with respect to the thinking behind the choice© made by
the subjects* thereby allowing qualitative analysis to be made In
addition td quantitative and the Questionnaire, therefore followed
even more closely the approaches of the Geneva School# Sub jacia classified
Concrete" still tended to focus on aspects such as "because
this is the way the light ie aimed"* "the dimnooo of tho light"* end
"prominent and fading light*" They offered explanations* for example*
"the further ©way the ring is the larger it becomes* but ia moro than
double C"* "they ©re right because I think they,d bo equal being at
different distances from the screen"* "the shadows will be equal as
tho smaller is further throwing a larger shadow"* or "Yes* because
0 i© further* tha ring is larger*" Subjects classified as "Early
Formal" justified their choices in terms* "dua to proportions of ring
size and distance of shadow", "Yes* they could be right ee it ie
diotancs divided by size"* or "difference in size but counteracted
by difference in length"* "tote Formal" subjects supported thsir
responses with formulae* "as the ratios ere the same* 1*4 » 3*12*"
•Cf ■•A*
for item 3f "diotancs « 4 «fe 12 »*> for item 3 and for item
size 1 3
4* "8 e 4" "Lot© Formal" subjects were ©loo ©bio to justify the last 
2 1
item in the following terms* "£ = £  * 16 = 3X * *** X « S§#"
3 2
The "cognitivs-conflict" probe tended to bo supported by subjects ©bis
to eolve tho problem correctly or rejected by those reaching an 
incorrect solution# "Late formal1* subjects responded to tho 
"cognlfcivo-conflict" item by setting out tho formula and emphasized 
that an actual experiment would bo needed to prove it so together 
with tho necessity for exact measurements and oxoct sizes# Although 
it hae been possible to cite examples of tho responses of "late formal" 
subjects it ie necessary to record that only 9 subjects from the total 
of 231* were able to successfully complete all the items on the 
Projection of Shadows test - 7 of the subjects being girls* 76 
subjects from the total sample' successfully completed 2 concrete and 
2 formal items from the possible total of 2 concrete and 3 formal# 
therefore the qualitative differences described by Inholder and Piaget 
involving the increase of the ability to consider both distance and 
eize simultaneously In order to solve the problem have been confirmed 
In this study, tee (1971) has also substantiated the qualitative 
differences among subjects of 6 through 17 years# She comments with 
respect to the few subjects (loss then ${$> of subjects even at 
age 17) who could verbalize the operative principles governing tho 
solution to the problem* previously commented on by Lovell (1961)#
; the prosent investigation substantiates these observations#
Lovell (op#cite) reports that out of a total of 24 least able 
comprehensive echool pupils of varying ©geo* no subjects reached formal 
operational thought and fonm a group of 26 "ebiset'1 subjects only 
three cubJoctc reached formal thinking in the test of the Projection 
of Shadows# Oulit (1972) reports the following findings for tha 
Projection of Shadows Experimentt
Average younger adolescents Boys 0
(N « 21) (14 year©) Girls 0
10
XX
Average older adolescent© Boys 11 
(N « 40) (16,1? years) Girl© 3
8
18
Gifted older adolescents Boye 12 
(N « 23) (16, 17 years) Girls 1 5
Average adult© Rsn 3 
womn 1
3
5(U « 12) (20#S5 yrs)
Percentages of subject© functioning at the fully formal level 
on the Shadows experiment wore younger adolescents older 
adolescents 35$$ older gifted adolescents S7$; and average adults 33^ # 
for boys In the group of gifted adolescents the percentage of fully 
formal was 75£ the highest percentage in the investigation* Uhon 
"relaxed" criteria were introduced, i»o* including the "almost 
formal" subjects with fully formal subjects, no significant change 
in the broad outline of tho result© was apparent, there being only 
a modest rico of only some of the percentages* Oulit reports that 
boys functioned at tho fully formal level significantly mere 
frequently than did girls* For tho three older groups (whsro the 
numbers acorn large enough to support the generalisation), tho 
percentages for boys ware from two to four times m  great a©'those 
for girls (Dulit is also referring to the liquids experiment in 
these findings#) Trends in the present investigation tend to favour 
girls# Oulit ie unable to offer an explanation for th© reported 
cox difference© except that the finding is consistent with similar 
cox differences noted in virtually all studies of abstract thinking# 
Tisher (1971) report© no sex differences in hie investigation as a 
whole*
Tables 6«h*l, 6.H.2, 6.11.3, and 6.U.4 further indicate th© 
relation of the performance on the Projection of Shadows task to 
moral stag©©, i.e., to varying mods© of moral judgement# It will be
observed that higher percentages of subjects ©coring in the upper 
category of scores on the Projection of Shadows task in tho groups 
representing higher levels of thinking on tho Questionnaire as o 
whole, reveal stege-4 moral thinking* However, in the "concrete" 
groups thoro ie a tendency for small percentages of Stage-4 moral 
thinking to be jp^aont when scores on the Projection of Shadows tost 
ere in the lower category* Those percentages however tend to be 
small* It I© observed that no subjects categorized as "formal*1 on 
tho Piagstion tests as a whole reveal stage*# moral thinking* Of 
further interest is the indication from Table 6*if#4 that of tho 0> 
of subjects indicating Stage-5 moral thinking, ell ere in the 
"Formal" Group end all hove obtained the higher category of scores 
on the "Shadows" task* Further, in tho groups representing lower 
levels of logical thinking there ©are higher incidences of lower 
ccores on the Shadows tack in £n relation to Stage-2 moral thinking. 
Therefore in all the Tables there ie a trend between the attainment 
of higher score© on tho Shadows task and Indications of Stage-4 morel 
thinking and inversely indications of Stage-2 moral thinking in 
esoocietion with lower levels of attainment cn the Shadows task*
It can be ©peculated that a© the subject moves nearer to the 
equilibrium of formal operations he is more logically capable of 
considering more possibilities* This ability to consider more 
alternatives and to evaluate them would assist tho subject to take 
e more global view when faced with a moral dilemma. Due to greater 
mobility and flexibility of thought at tho more advanced stage it 
can be suggested that feelings can become decentred from persona or 
materiel realities and become more adequate for dealing with social 
realities and even ideal realities* too (op.cit.) concluded that 
tho concrete operation components of cognitive functioning io best 
related to authority typo responses independent of ago end to 
concomitant increase in reciprocity response in the morel mode of 
conceptualization* Tho formal operations component of cognitive 
functioning best predicts the increase of "societal" moral responses*
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fcT the Planet St no eg Groups on;' for the Tate?. Sample*
Subjects categorized aa ,?Fdrrn?2lJ? do rot rovsal any Stags 5 moral 
judgements (there is sn exception of one subject for the total sample)* 
There is considerable overlap among subjects categorized ea C^oncrete*1 
and ,?FornjaItf in relation to Stage 3 morel judgements* 1‘ousver inspection 
of the Tables reveals that thorn i t  a trend for lonar percentages at 
Stone 3 to be .associated with subjects categorized ao !Tcrnal<J* Isfithin 
the realm of Stage 4 moral judgementsf higher incidences occur among 
the ”Forffir,l5 subjects* Any indications of Stage 3 moral judooiaanfcs . 
occur only among subjects categorized as ^formal0.
(oil four tpets) in relation to riarnl 3u
Quantitative Discussion and Qualitative Observations of ths Overall
Plaqetian Results in Relation to Other Studies
Genevan resulte suggested that between 11 to 16 years the adolescent 
makes a gradual transition from the concrete to the formal mode, beginning 
on average at 11 or 12 years and forming a stable, formal system of thought 
structures about 14 or 15 years. The emergence of formal thought in the 
adolescent has not been so readily confirmed by replicatory studies, relative 
to other Piagstian levels, and as the formal stsgs becomes increasingly s focus 
of interest, it is subject to further debate. Piaget more recently (1972 op. 
cit.) has acknowledged that the Genevan sample mey have been based on a 
privileged population and that the formal stage may need review.
Tabledreveals that of boys and 9% of girls ere still at the early concrete 
level. 53% of boys and 53^ of girls are at the late concrete stage of 
operetivity, with 39^ boys and 31$S girls revealing early formal thinking. Only 
3$ of boys and 6% of girls are categorised as reaching ths equilibrium of formal 
thought. This can be considered as revealing little sex difference in logical 
thinking within this sample. When boys and girls are combined, the percentages 
of the total sample at the various operational levels aret early concrete, 1%% 
lot© concrete, 53^| early formal, 36f&? and lets formal, 4^.
Ross (1974) for "moderate achievers", moan age 15.10 years, on the basis of 
Tieher’s Piogetien Questionnaire, employing throe experiments, reported percentages 
of 10, BO, 40 and 0, for early concrete, late concrete, early formal and late 
formal, respectively. For "high achievers", mean ags 14.11 years, percentages of 
0, 57, 39 and 4, wore reported respectively. Tisher’s (1962, 1971) investigation, 
employing the Questionnaire, reported for the 13.5 - 14.9 years age group, 
percentages of 53% for combined early and late concrete categories and 41^ for 
combined early and late formal categories. For the 15.0 - 16.4 years age group, 
the percentages for the same categories ware 54^ ' and 46j£ respectively. These 
compare favourably with figures for the present investigation, although it has to 
be conceded that these are on the basis of the same Piagetian Questionnaire (in 
Ross’s cose, however, he used three of the four experiments). Dackson (1963) 
reported that 50^ of his 15 year old subjects (IQ’s 90-110) were at the formal 
level, however only 10^ at Stage IIIB. This would appear to be a slightly higher 
percentage than in tho present investigation. Dulit’s (1972) 14 year old sample, 
selected at random, revealed a 10^ incidence of fully formal thinking on the 
"Liquids" experiment, and 19% when using "relaxed" criteria. There were no
incidences to report with respect to the "Shadows" experiment. On the 
pendulum experiment alone, Somerville (1974) reported at 14 years, 54$ at 
early formal level and 25$ at late formal level.
Researches employing subjects at ages either in advance or beyond those of 
the subjects in the present investigation, include Field and Cropley (1969).
Using fisher*s Questionnaire, among 178 subjects aged 16-18 years, they reported 
that of the females, 21% reached the concrete level, 50$ the early formal and 
15$ the late formal; for males, percentages were 9, 59 and 32 at corresponding 
stages, respectively. It would appear that these are considerably higher than 
in the present sample, although it needs to be recalled that Field and Cropley*s 
cample comprised subjects with a moan IQ of 117, all of whom were enrolled in 
science courses. Tomlinson-Keasey (1972) among girls, mean age 11.9; female 
"coode", mean age 19.7; and women, mean age, 54 years; reported tho percentages 
for early concrete, late concrete, early formel and fully formal ass 18, 47, 28, 
4; 3, 28, 41, 26; end 13, 30, 36, IB; for the girls, "coeds” and women,
respectively. Allowing for differences in chronological age, these percentages 
would also eppear to contain similar patterning to the present investigation and 
it is interesting to note tho almost. Identical percentages at the early formal
i i  "Coe/V>v o-w d . "wjov^sn \."  p_ltV\GOjU i/v\cCds/vvCiA t U i  jorrtv^ l sltwjC,
etage^were considerably higher. Dulit among "average" end "gifted" adolescents, 
16-17 years and "average" adults, 20-55 years, recorded percentages at the fully 
formal level to be 35, 57 end 33 respectively for the "Shadows" experiment and 
17, 62 and 25 respectively for the "Liquids". At tho early formol level, 
percentages for "average" adolescents were 50 and 28 for "Shadows" and "Liquids" 
experiments respectively with percentages for "average" adults being relatively 
lower.
Kuhn (1971) discussing formal operational thinking among four age ranges extending 
from 10 to 50 years, commented that on the basis of the pendulum problem, Stage 
IIIB thinking was about equally frequent among the age ranges 16-20, 21-30 and 
45-50, but considerably less frequent among subjects of 10-15 years. With 
respect to tho last age range, relevant to the present study, she concluded that 
the reeulte indicated that beginnings of formal operational thought may begin to 
appear by early adolescence in most subjects (80$ of the 10-15 year group).
fJo significant sex differences in levels of logical operativity were identified 
in the present investigation which gives further credibility to the results 
reported by Tisher (op. cit.) and Case end Collinoon (1962)* These findings are 
however contrary to those described by Field end Cropley, Dulit, Ross and Graybill 
(1974) who demonstrated sex differences in favour of boys.
The analysis of tho various Piagotisn tests included in this investigation 
revealed thot some provod to be more difficult then others with respect to the 
operational strategies involved. This finding is not at variance with 
observations made by other investigators. Three possible reasons can be
forwarded for the variabilityt that there are differences in subjects interest
and experience across content domains, which Piaget has suggested; that there 
are differences within the difficulty of the tasks or that formal operational 
ontogenesis is a relatively slow process of gradual application to different 
kinds of content. Somerville commented that Inheldsr and Piaget suggest that 
certain of the 16 binary operations are easier for a child to discover than
others, for example, the authors claim that it is easier for tho child to deal with
operations "•♦.♦•*...which stato that which is, and establish true implications.... 
(then) those which exclude that which is not end deny the false implications", 
(Inheldar and Piaget, 1958, p.75).
3. Discussion and Interpretation of the Results
While the preceding two sections have presented the statistical analyses 
and the quantitative discussion and qualitative observations of the results, 
the present section presents a synoptic overview drawing together the major 
issues and the results in relation to the MAIN HYPOTHESIS. Succeeding sections j 
relate to the discussion of the subsidiary hypothesis, followed by an analysis 
of individual testing in relation to group testing* !
i
Hypothesis One
"That a relationship exists between Piagetian operativity and moral 
development."
The hypothesis was confirmed using statistical measures which wore all eignificant 
at the 1$ level and indeed the majority were significant at .1$ level or better. 
Tables 6.1, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, 6.6 and 6.7 are relevant to the present hypothesis 
and the statistical evidence has besn presented in a ^preceding section.
Caution needs to be exercised in the interpretation of the results: it is
essential to recall that the results relate only to a narrow age range and that 
"late concrete" and "early formal" levels are of main concern with respect to 
Piagetian operativity and mainly Stages-Two to Four are focused upon with respect 
to Morel Maturity. In the present study although the experimental procedures 
wore aligned as closely as possible to Inhelder and Piaget's (1958) original 
conception, it can be hypothesised that results are not strictly comparable and 
when soen within the sphere of other replicatory studies, variations are bound 
to exist with respect to procedures in the prasentqtlon of the problems and/or 
evaluation of subjects* responses, together with the results being based upon 
different batteries of experimental tasks. However, within the confines of 
the study it is possible to originate interpretations of tho results.
Integral to the study woe the actualization in development of logical oparations 
per so in particular, the actualization of "formal" operations. Genevan results 
demonstrated that between 11 to 16 years the adolescent makes e gradual transition 
from tho concrete to the formal mode, beginning on average at 11 or 12 years 
and forming a stable, formal system of thought structures about 14 or 15 years. 
Replicatory studies however report low percentages of fully emergent formal 
operations in the adolescent stage. Piaget (1972, op. cit.) has acknowledged 
that the formal stags may require revision. However, there is sufficient
evidence of the existence of the trends described by InheJ.der and Piaget 
for comparative analyses to be expedient. This particular investigation revealed 
the patterning of logical development identified in the Genevan ©tudies end 
compares favourable with other replicatory studies in the field. Tables 6.8 
to 6.13 inclusive, are relevant to these results end full discussion has been 
included in the previous section.
Fairly extensive data are available regarding the development of moral judgement 
itself (Kohlbsrg, passim). Therefore the moral judgement data for this invest­
igation are presented in accordance with a considerable body of earlier research 
establishing the hierarchy of moral judgement stages. However, it bes to be 
conceded that only e limited range of stages has been identified due to the 
restricted age range investigated and the full realm of stages bsing en age-related 
developmental sequence. The frequencies of stage usage found in the present 
investigation are comparable to those obtained for other similar adolescent samples 
and the data essentially provide greater evidence for the hierarchy of moral 
judgement stages than for the age-related developmental sequence. Moral maturity 
scores in this investigation ranged frjom 225,j(just falling within the 2(3) - Stage) 
to 491 (falling within Stage-5, the only subject reaching a pure-principled level) 
thereby indicating that the range generally represents Stages -2(3) to Stoge-4 
with small percentages of subjects indicating some principled thinking.
Present Findings and Related Studies
Tables 6.12 and 6.13 report the stage relationships between levels of logical 
operativity and moral judgements for the four Piaget stage groups and for the 
total sample.
Subjects categorised es '"Formal” do not reveal any Stage-2 moral judgements 
(there is an exception of one subject in the total sample - further investigation 
reveals that the relevant stage score is 3(2). There is considerable overlap 
among subjects categorised as "Concrete" ond"Formal" in relation to Stage-3 
moral judgementc. Howsvar, inspection of the relevant Tables reveals that thore 
is a trend for lower percentages at Stage-3 to be associated with subjects 
categorized os "Formal". Within the realm of Stage-4 moral judgements, higher 
incidences occur among the "Formal" subjects. Any.indications of Stoge-5 moral 
judgements occur only among subjects categorized os "Formal".
Considerable momentum has been added to the discussion and interpretation 
of the findings for the present investigation by the recent receipt (1975 
private communication) of an unpublished report of the Kuhn et al. etudy 
(1971. )• The Kuhn study examined the development of formal operations in 
logical and moral judgement among 265 subjects of chronological ages ranging 
from 10 to 50 years, subdivided ee follows: 10-15, 16-20, 21-30, 45-50 years.
The main finding that fully emergent formal operations ere e logical operational 
prerequisite to the emergence of principled moral reasoning but do not in 
themselves guarantee the emergence of principled reasoning, is only partly 
relevant to the present investigation, but the intermediary findings pertain 
to this present analysis. Kuhn reported that early formal operational subjects 
who show eny principled moral reasoning are for the most part still at the pre­
dominantly conventional level. The subjects in the present investigation are 
in the main, at the early formal level and tho low incidence of principled 
thinking would therefore receive credibility from the observations of Kuhn* 
However, it can be emphasised that any emergence of principled thinking that has 
been identified is associated with subjects at the early formal logical thinking 
stage, ons at lots formal. Kuhn's data further suggested in general, that the 
emergence of formal operations is a necessary condition for the consolidation 
of conventional moral judgement (i.e., pure Stage-4). She emphasises howover, 
that such a conclusion is much more tentative on both empirical end theoretical 
grounds. Empirically, it io tentative because of tho email number of Stage-4 
subjects (M = 22). Theoretically it is less tenable that cortain logical 
operations are a necessary condition for ths consolidation of reasoning that has 
already developed than that they are a necessary condition for the emergence of 
a new form of reasoning. In the present investigation Stoges-3(4), 4(3), end 4 
have been grouped within one category, however closer inspection of the protocol 
reveals that 4 subjects reveal puro Stage-4 judgements, of these 3 are at the 
early formal level. These figures do not provide any greater reliability than 
thoso obtained by Kuhn. Subjects categorized as 4(3), the next highest stage, 
produces a total of 9 subjects, ell but one of whom are "Early Formal" in logical 
thinking. When compered with Kuhn’s figures for Stogo-4(3), tho present study 
indicates e more significant trend, for Kuhn reports from a total of 43 subjects 
et this moral Judgement level, 24 subjects at the early formal level (19 at 
concrete).
Kuhn's data further indicate that the majority of subjects who are concrete 
operational or below show a level of moral judgement of predominantly Stage-3 
or lower. Almost all of tho concrete operational subjects chow a moral Judgement
level of no higher then 4(3)* Among subjects within the early formal logical 
stage* in contrast* almost half have moral stage scores of 4 or higher and a 
third show efime principled reasoning* The present study provides further 
credibility for these findings: the majority of concrete operational subjects
fell within the Stage-3 moral judgement category or lower. Further examination 
of the protocols reveals that of the percentages felling into the category of 
3(4)* 4(3) and 4* there is a representation of 16 concrete subjects* in the total 
sample, 14 of whom respond in the Stage-3(4) mode* Figures are not so comparable 
houcvcr with respect to the early formal category as a whole, for it cannot be 
confirmed that almost half have moral stage scores of 4 or higher and a third 
showing some principled reasoning* However* this may in part be due to Kuhn’s 
sample comprising a wider age range*
The suggestion of a relationship between the emergence of formal operational 
thought and the consolidation of conventional moral judgement (for the present 
investigation specifically Stage 4(3), for Kuhn’s study, Stage 4) receives some 
support from a study by Lee (1971)* The latter reported, among subjects 5-17 
years, an overall association between the use of formal operations and the use 
of a type of moral judgement (Level 4: Societal) roughly equivalent to Stage-4.
It is of further interest that a study by Tomlinson-Keasey and Keascy (1974) 
involving girls of 12-13 years recorded that the transition to formal operations 
that begins at this age is accompanied in the moral realm by conventional moral 
reasoning (numbers were however small).
Decalage
Kuhn interprets the association between the attainment of formal operations and 
the consolidation of conventional moral judgement to be a reflection of the 
consistent decalege between levels of logical end moral judgement. As stated 
earlier, it is less likely that formal operations ere a necessary condition for 
the development of a Stage-4 level of moral Judgement, since many subjects show 
some Stage-4 usage, i.e. 4(3) and 3(4) without being at the formal operational 
stage (although this was not completely borne out by the present investigation). 
The high proportion of 45-50 year olds at Stage-4 (25$) suggested to Kuhn that 
there may be a point of fixation at the adult level: i.e., that the moral
judgement level of many adults remains at Stage-4, although these stiulta have the 
logical operational potential for principled moral judgement. The fairly high 
percentages of formal subjects at the Stage-3 level in the present investigation 
can be taken to be indicative of a decalage between levels of attainment in the 
logical and moral domains. Tomlinson-Keaoey and Keasey (op. cit.) also confirmed 
a decalage between the attainment of formal operations and its application to the
ares of morel reasoning and further that formal operations were not a 
sufficient condition for the emergence of principled (moral) reasoning among 24 
College subjects* It will be recalled that Selman (1971* op* cit*) and Kohlberg 
and DeVries (1969* op. cit*) have also indicated a decalege between logical 
operativity and moral reasoning among subjects of younger agoo*
Interpretations
The verification of a relationship between levels of logical operativity end 
moral development leads to speculation concerning the interrelationship of the 
two developmental sequences* Concrete logical reasoning appears to be a necessary 
condition for the appearance of Stage-2 moral thinking (Kohlberg and DeVries op* 
cit.). Awareness of logical reciprocity or reversibility can be related to 
moral Stage-2 which presupposes a view of human beings as individuals each with 
his own distinguishable perspective* although instrumental* There would appear 
to be two conceptual developments that are prerequisites for moral Stage-3s 
firstly awareness of reciprocal role-taking and secondly concepts of generalized 
patterns of interaction or relationships (Selman 1971). The concept of relation­
ship may be described as a kind of "social conservation" integrating a notion of 
over-all social patterning; however* it is confined at Stage-3 to a primary 
concern for tho approval of others in ouch relationships to the self* with an 
emphasis on personal role-sterGotypos* The moral Stage-4 conception of e social 
order requires the Piagetian first-stage of formal operations in which sets of 
relations are first conceived as invariant systems (the present investigation* 
together with the studies of Kuhn, Lee and Tomlinson-Keaoey and Keasey, op. cit*). 
This conception generates a concern for the maintenance of a system of fixed rules 
end for the maintenance of a system of authority. Full formal operational 
reasoning leads to a concern with all possible hypothetical possibilities and to 
an awareness of a given rule system as only one of many logically possible rule- 
systems. This awareness provides the basis for the restructuring of society’s 
rules into moral principles - Stages 5 and 6.
However* it cannot be determined whether the stages of moral development reflect 
the application of successively more advanced logical operations in the moral 
domain or whether logical and moral stages constitute independent* though perhaps 
isomorphic developmental sequences* It can however be acknowledged that there 
is evidence suggesting that development in both the logical and moral domains 
occurs in terms of equilibrium process/auto-regulation mechanisms in which the 
interaction of the individual’s structures with the environment* feeds back to
these structures in a way that promotes their reorganization* In the cose 
of related structures in different domains* the hypothesis may be forwarded that 
it is the interaction of different, but partially overlapping* aspects of the 
individual’s structures, with different, but partially overlapping sectors of 
external reality which leads to disequilibrium* reorganization and change in 
each of the domains: moral development may entail a somewhat (but not completely)
different set of organization-environment interactions then does logical development 
This leads to a further conjecture* that there are actually two kinds of inter­
action which are sources of developmental change* One is the interaction of the 
individual’s structures with the structures comprising the environment* The 
other is the internal interaction among the structures themselves: in other words,
the discrepancy between the level of development of the individual's operational 
structures in one domain and their level of development in another which may in 
itself be a source of disequilibrium, and hence change* Furthermore* each of 
these processes of interaction may influence and regulate the other* An inter­
action between e given mental structure and tho environment* may stimulate a 
reorganization in the internal relationship or coordination of this structure 
end other related structures* This reorganization in turn may generate internal 
disequilibrium which leads to further interactions with the environment, involving 
both the original and related structures* Such relations ore a complex form of 
that typo which Flavoll (1972) in his "An analysis of cognitive-developmental 
sequence” (Genetic Psychology Monographs volume 86* pp279-350), has labelled 
"bidirectional” in his typology of ell the possible reletions between one develop­
mental phenomenon and another*
That logical operations may possibly hold a more central position In the 
organization of operational structures becomes tenable through tho observation 
that logical operations appear to serve as a "pacing" mechanism in moral develop­
ment, such that moral development never exceeds certain limits Imposed by the 
individual's level of logical operations. Beyond these limitations however* 
thoro is considerable variability in the reletions between subjects' logical end 
moral levels. Possible sources of this variability may Include the extent to 
which logical end morel development may proceed independently: i.e. involve only
partially overlapping eoto of organiem-environment interactions, e.g. general 
social experience, os indexed by chronological age may play a greater role in 
moral development than in logical development. Specific personal or social 
experience particular to the individual is a second source of variability: on
individual’s particular life experiences may contribute to the determination 
of hie ultimate moral level in a way that is not the case for logical level*
B. SUBSIDIARY HYPOTHESIS
HYPOTHESIS TUP
"That meesureo of logical reasoning ©re relatively more effective 
indicators of moral maturity than © traditional measure of intelligence"*
The hypothesis we© confirmed using statistical measures* Tables 
6*3, 6*4* 6.5, 6*6 and 6*7 ere relevant, the statistical evidence having 
been presented in a previous section* The correlations confirm that 
both the logical operational variables end the Raven1s intelligence 
variable are indices of mental level related to moral judgement level* 
However, logical reasoning measures are relatively more related to the 
level of morel development then the psychometric index of intelligence*
Kohlberg (1969) reports that IQ scores have only moderate correlations 
with hie moral Judgement measures, that for some stages tho correspondence 
was negligible and that the relationship seemed to be curvilinear rather 
then linear* Simon and Ulard (1973) in an investigation of variables 
influencing pupil©1 responses on the Kohlberg schema of moral development 
on tho disagreements concerning the relationship between moral 
judgement and intelligence end exploring the Raven1© matrices in relation 
to moral judgement, reported that intelligence level was a factor which 
was associated significantly with level of moral judgement* Among high, 
average, and low XQ groups the mean difference© between each group were 
statistically olgnifIC32 .^-©t the *001 level* Graham (personal 
communication) employing the HFER "SVT" Intelligence test© and the 
Kohlberg measures concluded that intelligence was significantly related 
to maturity of moral judgement* The product moment correlation coefficients 
of *53 for younger and *43 for older children were appreciably higher then 
•31 which Kohlberg himself gives for the correlation between IQ and moral 
judgement. The present study report© the seme correlation between Raven’s 
end moral Judgement (Value of r « .31). Likewise, Kuhn et ©1 (op*cit*) 
reported that in her main sample the correlation between IQ (WAIS, UlISC) 
end moral ©core was *30 (significant *01)* However for the subsidiary 
©ample, tho correlation between IQ end moral ©core was only *11
(nonsignificant)* Hoc correlations between tho logical end moral 
werieblcs uora .27 for the «ein saropXa (eignificent, |> < .01) end .30 
for sample two (significant* b ^  *01}#
It would bo presumptuous to argue that the Pisgetien tests measure 
real effective intelligence while the Raven*s tests do not* UJith respect 
to traditional measures* Piaget (1947) in "The Psychology of Intelligence”» 
has argued: "It Is Indisputable that these tests of mental age have on
the whole lived up to what was expected of them: a rapid and convenient
estimation of an individual*e general level* But it is not loss obvious 
that they ©imply measure © *yi#ld* without reaching constructive operations 
themselves* As Pieron rightly pointed out* intelligence conceived in 
these terms is essentially a value Judgement applied to complex behaviour”. 
Piaget (1957* and again in 1959* in "Science of Education and the Psychology 
of the Child”) has further elaborated his views that traditional tests are 
concerned with quantitative measures of behaviour and do not penetrate to 
the actual qualitative operational mechanisms which govern the behaviour* 
Piaget therefore indicates that t®§ problem-solving tasks define basic 
and general thought processaa end asaasa their level more adequately than 
psychometric testa*
Ono of the strongest contrasts of the Piagetian and traditional 
psychometric approachaa to assessment was mad© by Pinard and Leurendeau 
(1964) in a paper entitled* ”A scale of mental development based on the 
theory of Piaget”* published in the 3oumal of Roaearch in Science Teaching* 
consider that the traditional testa produce extremely artificial scale© 
end can hardly aorve to make known the child*a intellectual growth much 
less intellectual ©volution in general* focussing on similar criticisms 
of standardized testa* Wolff (1974* 1975 in private communication) 
hypothesizes the consequence© of the possible development of a "Piaget 
Developmental Quotient”. Leetsr* Piuir and Dudek (1970* p«2SS) in a 
Paper: "Cognitive structure and achievement in the young child”*
subsequently published in the Canadian Psychiatric Association Oournal 
maintain* "Tho Piaget tests seem to measure a range of structures wider 
than that of the traditional 10 test©* Orientational* spatial* and time 
concepts arc involved but also the ability of the child to separate himself 
from the objective world to perceive himsolf from tho objective world end
to perceive himself a© one element in en outside reality*1* Stephens* 
HcLeughlin, Hiller and Glass (1972) maintain that Piagetian reasoning 
tasks involve abilities separate from those measured by standard testa 
of intelligence and achievement.
In commenting on tho conceptual differancee between Piagetian and 
psychometric conception© of intelligence Elkind (1969) in a report* 
"Piegotian and Psychometric Conceptions of Intelligence", published in 
the Harvard Educational Review, maintains that tho differences ©rise 
from tho unique ways that each conception views intelligence and 
that they ere focused on different aspects of intelligent behaviour, 
ouch as* (a) the typo of genetic causality they presuppose* (b) tho 
description of mental growth they provide, and (c) the contributions of 
nature end nurture which they assess* It may foe important to acknowledge 
that these are conceptual similarities between Piagetian and psychometric 
conceptions of intelligence* both approaches share the assumption that 
mental ability is, at least in port, genetically determined* end both 
view intelligence as fundamentally rational in nature. Hathaway (in 
private communication, 1974, 1975) in en unpublished report* nTho 
degree, nature and temporal stability of tho relations between traditional, 
psychometric and Piagetian developmental measures of mental development", 
using 21 traditional psychometric, 10 Piagetian measures end 10 scholastic 
achievement variables, concluded from his research that performance on 
Piagetian measures was related to but not Identical with performance on 
traditional measures of mental development and that the degree of the 
relationship between the two types of measures, was moderate, positive 
and significant* the two types of measures were neither totally distinct 
nor totally identical.
Although the above statements tend to promote the view that Piagetian 
situations measure real effective intelligence it may foe more appropriate 
to speculate rather that the Piagetian tests require the adolescent to 
ecsimilato what is for him a complex body of Information and bring to 
bear on it an information processing strategy which (to him) is not 
immediately obvious, but is nevertheless necessary to account for all of 
the information* Although each problem in the Raven*a Progressive
Ratricec ic a oyotem of thought and includes such problems as 
permutations of figures and resolution of figures with constituent 
ports, measuring fundamental aspects of cognitive performances It may 
be speculated that the Piagetian teaks involve relatively more complex 
form© of responding, osscssing the development of an adolescent’s 
knowledge of the physical world together with hie logico-mathematicel 
knowledge*
It is pertinent to acknowledge the Hill Hill relationships with moral 
maturity in view of the fact that Raven advocates their accompanying use 
with the Progressive Hairless* Likewise, the Hill Hill cannot be said 
to "tap” the complex structures which the Plegatien measures assess*
It can foe suggested that Rill Hill is related to moral development in 
the sense of "tapping11 the individual’s ability to recall and verbally 
communicate his reasoning processes*
As the moral judgement dilemmas also involve complex forms of 
responding it Is not surprising to observe that Piagetian logical 
measures relate rolotively more to the developmental moral maturity levels 
than Ravens* It is suggested that the logical variables reflect major, 
qualitative transformations or turning points (e*g*, the transition from 
concrete to formal operations) which appear to foe of significance for 
moral development and which arc not reflected in a general psychometric 
index of mental advancement*
c. o t h e r  A N A L Y S E S
(d) Relation of Usher1s Questionnaire to the Individual Piagetian Testing
The Piagetien tacks, administered individually to 36 subjects selected at random 
included: "Combinations of Coloured and Colourless Chemical Bodies",
Equilibrium in the Balance” and "The Oscillation of a Pendulum and the Operations 
of Exclusion", Inheldsr and Piaget (1958, pp* 107-122, 164-81, 67-69, respectively). 
Interviews were conducted according to the clinical method developed by Inhelder 
and Piagets further details of the experiments and the theoretical rationale for 
the distinction between stages are given in the Appendices. Subjects were seen 
individually, in a small room for the administration of the Piagetian tasks*
Good rapport was established and ell behavioural responses were recorded verbatim* 
The subject was required to give a reason for each response and where necessary 
additional questions ware asked for further clarification. Throughout the 
entire testing the investigator was aware of the need to avoid giving subjects 
any extraneous or inadvertent clues by gesture, expression or tone of voice*
The subjects wsre classified into an overall level of development on the basis 
of two or more problems being designated to the same level and the resulting 
classification was compared with the stage level assigned for Questionnaire respon 
es. Two comparison procedures were used: initially rdating"early" and "late"
categories for both concrete end formal stages and secondly relating "global" 
concrete and formal categories* The following tables illustrate the resulting 
patterns:
Comparisons of Piaget individual testing to Ti3her Group Questionnaire
(sub-stages)
Substages Subjects
Correspond­
ing
Classific­
ations
Early Concrete (2A) 
Late Concrete (28) 
Early Formal (3A) 
Late Formal (38)
4
11
7
0
j Individual Questionnaire 
j Testing Higher Higher
v Early Concrote (2A)/l.ete 
Concrete (28) 3 1 4
Discrepancies Late Concrete (2B)/Early Formal 
(3A) 4 2 6
Early Formal (3A)/Late Formal 
_____  (301 .
0 4 4
' Total Subjects 36
Comparisons of Piaget individual testing to Tisher Group Questionnaires
(Concrete/Formal)
Stags Subjects
Corresponding Concrete
Classifications 1 Formal
19
11
Individual Testing Questionnaire
Higher Higherj
Discrepancies Concrete/F ormal 4 2 6
Total Subjec^sj 36
Comparisons on the basis of the first procedure resulted in a percentage of 
agreement of 61 between the individual testing end the questionnaire. When over­
all stage (concrete/formal) was compared the percentage of agreement was 83.
It will be recalled that Tisher (1962, 1971) reported e 77% agreement using the 
latter method.
(b) Relation of the Group Testing to Individual Testinn - Kohlbero Floral Dilemmas 
Dilemmas I, II, III and IV were administered to the subjects in the individual- 
interview situation in accordance with Kohlberg’s ’’standardized" probes to gain 
further credence for the group-testing situation.
The two, 2-oituatlon units were administered within one testing session, a 
break being permitted between each unit. All responses were recorded verbatim. 
Copies of the dilemmas and the respective probes are included in the Appendices.
Comparisons were made with respect to qualitative differences between the 
subjects* protocols obtained from the group testing and the individual testing. 
Dilemmas III and IV were administered in both testing situations and no 
significant differences were observed: the same essential responses were given
with varying phraseology. With respect to Dilemmas I and II responses did not 
vary from the overall level of response given in the group testing situation.
There was therefore no evidence that the group testing situation varied to any 
marked degree from the individual interviews.
CHAPTER SEVEN
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A. IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESULTS
The major overall implication of this investigations may be formulated as 
follows
1. Studies of the interrelationship of different variables in adolescent develop­
ment are still rare, yet most desirable if one is to develop a "psychologies! 
theory" of human development as opposed to a "cognitive” or "social" or "morale ; 
theory of human development on an empirical basis# One ultimately seeks to 
comprehend the whole adolescent not just one facet of him# Specific detailing 
of the interlocking mechanisms in the formation of such a theory has yet to be 
spoiled out. The present study has been just one attempt towards the fulfillment 
of such a challenging objective# If the study has but pointed toward a 
significant number of psychological directions it will have fulfilled its purpose. 
Theories ere not static nor should they be (a point which is certainly in the 
spirit, if not the letter) of Piaget*s and Kohlberg*s theory and thinking#
2# The study has given support to the existence of a relationship between logical 
reasoning ability and moral maturity# This implies a differing role for 
cognitive development than has traditionally been the cases rather than cognitive 
actualization being important for intellectual concerns alone, it may be seen as 
expedient for related developmental domains# It would seem therefore admissable 
for teachers in training and in practice to be made more aware of Piagetian 
concepts and to conceptualize cognitive development in terms of e more mobile set 
of criteria. . .By implication then, there is the need for greater diversification 
of the curricula content within Colleges of Education.
3. The study has provided credibility for the cognitive-developmental approach 
and would therefore imply support for the aim of education as being the stimulation 
of the nsxt stage of development, rather than as the transmission of information 
(intellectual) or indoctrination into the fixed values of the school or social 
veluec (moral). A cognitive-developmental approach would stress knowledge of 
the adolescent*o stage of functioning end arousal of genuine cognitive and social 
conflict and disagreement about problematic situations Involving exposure to the 
next higher level of thought: traditional education has stressed adult "right
answers", reinforcing and rewarding "right answers" and "behaving well".
4* The suggested dccalage between logical and moral development and the indentific- 
ation of a possible discrepancy between potential development and actualized 
ontogenesis would suggest a necessity to focus on preventing retardation and
fixation in those adolescents beginning to lag behind.
8. INDICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This io the only known study of its kind which has attempted an investigation 
of logical reasoning in relation to moral judgement among 231 subjects aged 14 
to 15 years. It must be conceded however, that the only other known closely- 
related study of Kuhn et al. (1971b, 1975 personal communication) comprised a 
more extensive age-renge and gave a more comprehensive insight into the relation­
ships under investigation. The two studies are however compatible and symbiotic 
in that the Kuhn et al. study provided a global analysis of the ages 10-50, end 
the present investigation a deeper insight into the 14 to 15 age range. The 
other partly related studies ore Leo (1971) and Tomlinson-Keasey and Keasey (1974).
Although a range of intelligence levels, vocabulary levels, socio-economic status 
categories and both sexes have been included in the total sample and in the various 
Piaget stage groups, with suitable controls being exercised, further research may 
endeavour to look at a differing balance of subjects with employment of differing 
measures and more stringent criteria for categorization which may enhance tho 
magnitude of differences observed.
Although appropriate statistical techniques wore applied to the different types 
of data collected, the rdsearcher has been aware that the investigation has been 
primarily correlational, making inferences of causal relations impossible. The 
fleet obvious danger of the correlational method is a tendency to infer causality 
when only association hao been established. In such an investigation, on aware­
ness of e number of influences in the physical end social environments of the 
adolescent need to be indicated. Thus, the amount of general social experiences 
particular to the individual constitute themselves os potent formative forces. 
Kohlberg (passim) stressed the centrality of role-taking for moral judgement 
development, together with peer-group participation, communication, emotional 
warmth, ehering in decisions, receipt of awarding rosponsos, the degree of tho 
focusing on the consequences of action to others end the amount of parental 
encouragement of the adolescent*c participation In discussion. All of these 
can be taken to be examples of extraneous variables. Attempts to control for 
these variables present an almost insurmountable methodological problem. The 
fact that both hypotheses were fully substantiated, involving a sample of >231 
subjects with rather complex meacures end that the J^ends of some of the findlngo 
tend to be largely in accord with theoretical and empirical expectation, suggest 
that the investigational measures were, to a large extent, suitable for tapping 
the different realms of behaviours investigated.
Although social-class categorizations in accordance with the Registrar 
General’s Classification (1960) were controlled in the present study, a 
finer categorization of social class status would perhaps have led to more 
perfectly matched groups. However, no such controls were reported in either 
the Kuhn ot cl. or Keasey and Keasey studies (op. clt»), or further, in any j
studies investigating primarily, the existence formal operations, e.g. Field 
and Cropley (1969), Dulit (1972) and Ross (1974) etc. end yet they confirm i
most of the present results. It con therefore be anticipated that a more 
analytical approach to e.g., family life-style, peer group participation or 
levels of oopiretions with reference to coreer-after-edhool (Piaget emphasised 
tho importance of the development of a "life-plen" in in relation to the emergence 
of formal operations, (Inhelder and Piaget, 1958) may provide greater insight 
with respect to the relation of the developmental domains under consideration. 
Likewise, birth-orders and fsmily-size (parent-child and sibling-sibling inter­
actions) effects are unlikely to operate independently of other familial aspects. 
However, with a sample of 231 children in the present study it can be speculated 
that there is c representative sample of varying birth orders and family size 
and that this factor, if at all significant would only be of Importance for 
future research.
The results obtained in the present study must be Interpreted with the awareness 
that only 14 to 15+ year old subjects wore involved. Since responses to Piagetian 
tasks and Kohlberg*© dilemmas are developmental in nature, it certainly would 
make jense to evaluate the results of a longitudinal study.
In a future study, a nan-correlational study should be specifically designed 
to link moral development (of the kind studied here or other approaches to moral 
development measurement) to the logical reasoning development in children and 
adolescents across a number of cultures, in order to more adequately examine 
the effects of inhibitory or facilitatory socialization variables on the individual*s 
auto-regulation mechanism. This endeavour,* requires careful long-range planning 
through series of preliminary investigations end may be best undertaken via 
corporate efforts at both national and international levels. This would seem e 
desifcable amplification of the investigation for empirical generality.
If logical and moral judgement development is related as in the present Invest­
igation and further, there is a relation between moral judgement levels end moral 
behaviour Kohlberg (1971), then thore must be ultimate links to be 
established between logical reasoning development, moral Judgement end moral
behaviour* It is encouraging to note that a research, currently in
progress has come to the writer’s attention - Stephens et al*, (1975, personal
communication)*
Integral to the study was the establishment of the existence of the concrete 
and formal operational stages Identified by Piaget. It has been observed in 
this present exposition that the formal operational stage still requires further 
elaboration and review. Indeed Piaget himself (1972) has acknowledged that 
the "period which separates adolescence from adult-hood", raises a number of 
unsolved questions, e.g. more research into special aptitudes and professional 
specializations. Ross commenting on this paper by Piaget suggests that the 
way that research proceeds will be more complex and difficult than beifiore. 
Assuming that the formal structures ere manifested within a particular aptitude 
context, it will first be necessary to Isolate the superior aptitude of each 
individual and then present a formal task congruent with that aptitude. Dulit 
(op. cit.) has suggested that there is a need to introduce into the model at 
least some concept as "dropout rate" or "branching into parallel tracks" one 
main track would be the formal stage, but only some modest proportion of the 
normal population would proceed in this direction. Other tracks would represent 
the development of alternative patterns of thought, those alternative patterns 
involving only partial or minimal development of the capacity for formal stage 
thought. Speculation concerning these recently stated requirements together 
with the preceding observations embodies a multi-dimensional spectrum of awaited 
research.
Whatever the direction future theory end research may assume, it is the writer’s 
hope that the present volume may offer a few rays of enlightenment.
CHAPTER EIGHT
SUIWIARY
The investigation has attempted to show how Piagetian 
operativity relates to moral development. The particular 
relations that are found suggest specific aspects of logical 
reasoning which coexist with Kohlberg moral maturity and possibly 
enhance its development.
Results indicated that:
1. A relationship exists between Piagetian operativity 
and moral development.
' 2. Logical reasoning is a relatively more effective indicator 
of moral maturity than a traditional intelligence measure.
*
It is hoped that further research will serve to unravel and 
expound the experiential conditions responsible for the development
•r
of logical and moral schemas and more generally, cont/ibute to the 
development of a comprehensive theory of maturation by clarifying 
the relation among different facets of adolescent development.
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PIAGlTIAN ti&ASURES
THE PIAGETIAN QUESTIONNAIRE
SET 1
In the diagram on the right, the 
line XYZ represents a wall and a 
tennis ball is hit on to the wall 
so that it always hits at Y;
1 If the ball is hit accurately from C it will bounce to
(a) D
(b) B
(o) C
(d) A
(o) E ■
Why do you think so? . _______________ ________
2 If the ball is hit from E it will bounce to
(a) D
(b) B
(c) C
(d) A
(a) E
Why do you think so?
3 'If a ball bounces from Y to A it must have been hit from
(a) E
(b) A
(c) C
(d) B
(a) D
M \
/ / I \ \
/ / * \ \
/  / I \  \
/  > I \ \
' ' I \ \
y  / i \ \
/  /  < \  \
/  /  i \  \
« 1  v
Why do you think so?
S E T  1 cont.
Here is a new diagram; study it before
doing questions 4 and 5.
v   Z
V d s k s / .  °
^40/* / *1 *at0 \ 
- / / * • V
< / / 1 V \/  ■' r I ' \ ■ '/  / I ' V V
■/ /  '' * V \  N
" 7 ' I t \  \
/ i V \
/  1 1  V \A  8 c j> I f G
If a ball is hit
will bounce to
(a) A
(b) E
(c) F
(d) C
(e) G
Why do you think so?
If a ball bounces from Y to A it must have been hit from
(a) A
(b) E
(c) F
(d) C .
(e) G
Why do you think so?
SET 1 cont
6 In the diagram on the right 
a ball is hit from A to a 
point Y on the mall.
Mark in, on the diagram 
where the ball mill go after 
leaving Y.
flark in the angle the nem 
path of the ball makes mith
CY. C
Why have you marked this angle?
7 A tennis ball is hit from somemhere in the section marked *right 
hand side* in the diagram belom. The ball hits the mall at Y and 
bounces to A. Hark on the diagram the spot from mhich the ball 
mas hit and mark in the size of the angle, from .CY, at mhich the 
ball must hit.
C
People in another school marked the angle from CY as 60°. Do you think 
they are right? Why?/li/hy not?
SET 2
You have been shown a balance scale similar to the one in the diagram 
below. Study the diagram carefully for the questions which follow 
refer to it.
C«ntre of Arm
A 8 c D £ f /  Q H I I K
• . 4% V « • • * ' « *
Pivot
L
Weights which can be used:
|l Pound | |l Pound)
5 Pound 5 Pound
10 Pound 10 Pound 15 Pound 15 Pound
A ten pound weight is hung at C. 
with another ten pound weight,
(a) the weight must be hung at H
(b) is impossible
(c) the weight must be hung at E
(d) the weight must be hung at 3
(e) the weight must be hung at I
(f) the weight must be hung at K
To balance the arm again
Why do you think so?
A five pound weight is hung at D. To balance the arm again
(a) a one pound weight must be hung at A
(b) a ten pound weight must be hung at 3
(c) a five pound weight must be hung at H
(d) a ten pound weight must be hung at E
(e) a five pound weight must be hung:at K
(f) is impossible ' ' ,
Why do you think so?
SET 2 pent*
A five pound weight ii hung at £ anti a ton pound weight at C»
To balance the a ®  again, .
(a) a five pound weight mmi be hung #  G end a ton pound
weight at 3
■(b) a ion pound weight nmt be hung at H and a, one pound
■ weight at k
(c) a fifteen pound weight' tmiat be hung at' I mti a one
pound weight at H
■(d) . a ton .pound weight mist be.hung at I  and a five pound
weight at i
(a)- Is impossible
(f). # five pound weight must be hung it I and a ton pound
weight at $
'Why .do you think ao? /--■:; n-;:. ■■■.-■-.■■-r:- r— -
A ten pound weight ie hung at c* to balance the a m  again ueing 
a fifteen pound weight*
(a) the weight must be hung at K
(b) the weight mmt be hung at I
(d) the weight wuet be hung at G
(d) i$ impossible
(a ) the weight w e t  bo hung at t
(f) the weight must be hung at. H
j
lihy do you think so? ........................ .
A ten pound weight i* hung at o* To balance the a m  again lining 
0 five pound weight*
(e) ie impossible
(b) the weight meet be hung at K
(c) the weight must be hung at I
(d) the weight must be hung at 3
(a) the weight mmt be hung at t
(f) the weight mp&i be hung at H
Why do you think oof     rr...., .,.,.■.. .,,....,;.iv:.., f.-.r: ....
.6 A ten pound weight ie hung at D one! a five pound weight at 0* 
To balanoe the arm again*
(a) a fifteen- pound- weight tnuat be hung at I
(b) m Tim pound weight must bo hung at 3
(c) ie iifipoGoibia
(b) © ten pound weight muni too hung at 3
(#) a five pound weight must ho hung at K
■(f) a tan pound weight must hi hung at I
Why do you think w f  ,T;   .-■.
7 A fifteen pound weight i© hung at D and a five pound weight
ul» H*
(a)
(b)
113 vflw Pew! wy«+i
n fifteen pound weight 
pound weight at 0 
in impossible?
%
must pa hung at H and a ton
(c) a five pound weight .out 
. weight at ■:§
3i be hung at K -end a'SfK' pound
(d) a ton pound weight mad 
weight at H
b be hung at K and a five pound
(°) a fifteen pound weight
ji iHi■/&$* -ft
must be hang at I and a tan
m a one pound weight ouslb  bo hung at K and a tan pound
weight at 3
Why do you think m ?
You have been shown a set of apparatus similar to that in the diagram 
below. Study it carefully, the following five questions refer to 
the apparatus in the sketch.
1 The container A and the container B are moved the same
distance. The water levels in the containers will
(a) stay at the original height'above the table
(b) change so that the level in A is above the original
height above the table and the level B below
(c) change so that the level in B is above the original 
height above the table and the level in A below
(d) change so that the levels in A and B are the same
distance above the original height above the table
(e) change so that the levels in A and B are the same
distance below the original height above the table
Why do you think so? *__________________ ;_____  •_____
m r % 00ft U
■2 ■ Contsiner a and c o n ta in e r. 8 or© m m P  up the m m
'The water levels In the ctmtainere • willf ■
(a) stay1 eb the original height atom the table
(to) change m  that the levels In A and fi ars the' m m
distance be!m  the original height afcsve thr table
(e) change so that the level in A is above ths original
height above the table and the level in 0 below ■
. (cj):' .'change, sc‘that, the levels In A and 0 are the seme •
., distance ©hove the original height ebsve the table 
(a) , ■ change so that the level In & In above the original
height above the tsblf end the level in A below
m m  m  m  think so? .
3 bticn the container A is movsddoujn end the conieiner B stays 
In its origins! pseitiim,. the water level In 0 will*. '
(a) rise above the origins! height above the table and will
be at a different distance. above the original ^ height to. 
the levll in A
(b) drop below the original height above the table and will
bo at a different die tanas below -the original height ■ 
to the level in..A.
(c) ■ will stay at the original height above the table -.
(d) drop below the original height above the table and will
. be the ©sms distance below the original height as the
_  level in A
I'll rise above the original height above the table and mill
be at the same distance above the origins! height m  
the level in A
Why do you think so?
•■feffi-J cent# .
iihtft the container I ie moved down and the container A ©toys ;
in Iho original. position, toe water, lava! in B will,
(©) . dreg below the original Height above the tabic and will 
be at a different distance below the ariginel level 
height to the level In A
(b) rice above the original height above the table and will
be the m m  distance above the original height m  the 
level In n
(c) flee above the original height above the table and will
be at a different distance .above the original height to 
the level in A
(d) stay at the original height above the table
(a) drop below the original height above the table and will
be the same distance below the original height a© the 
level in-A
Why do you think m ?  ,r:^ ^ .
The level of the water in the container A i© observed to tim 
above the original height above the table* This seems that, 
(a) the container A meet have been lowered end container B 
stayed in Its original position 
|b) container© a and a must mm been lowered the m m
distance
(a) the container t must have been lowered end container A
etayad in it© original popltion
(d) containers A and 0 must have hem reiced the m m
distance
(a) the container A must have been raised end container B
stayed in it© original position
People in another school ©aid that containers A and i were at 
unequal height©# Bo you think they are right? tihyT/ttiy not?
SET 4
The apparatus below, which is similar to the set you have seen, can 
be used to throw shadows on to the screen.. Study the diagram 
carefully and then answer the questions which follow.
©
S3
C 
I"
The rings A and B are placed on the line D and their shadows 
allowed to fall on to the screen.- The two shadows that are formed
(a) will be of equal size
(b) will be of unequal size, the shadow of A being larger
than the shadow of B
(c) will be of unequal size, the shadow of B being larger
than the shadow of A
(d) will be of unequal size, the shadow of A being smaller
than the shadow of B
Why do you think so?
get.;* emit.
2. the ringo B end C ere placed m  the line D and their shadows 
allowed to fail- an to the screen* The two shedawn ihef ©re 
. formed 
(a) will'fee of esusi clan
(h) will Pa of unequal size* the Shadow of & bring
' ii&ger than the shadow of
will fee of unequal sirs# the shadow of C feeing larger
than, the shadow of 8
(d) will fee of unequal wlm$ the shadow of 8 feoing emailer
than the shadow of £
the ring C in placed , on the lint f and the ring A on the 
lino 0 and their shadows allowed to fall m  to the screen«
The two shadows that are formed
(a) will fee of unequal tiro, the. shadow of c being smaller 
than the shadow of A
(Li) will fee of unequal tiro# the shadow of C feeing larger 
than the shadow of ft 
(o) ■ will fee of unequal sirs# the shadow of ft feeing
than the shadow of £ 
will fee of equal sirs
People In another school said that the shadows would fee of 
different size* Are they right? hlhy7/why not?
*AP *
SET h cont.
4 The ring a Ac pieced m  the Urn £ end its $fr$deu allowed 
to fail on to the m m m *  To produce another ofooepw-ef 
equal Biz® using tun ring ■ c
(a) the ring £ roust fee placed on the A Art# D
(b) the tins € ttu&t bo placed on the lino' t
(c) the ring C fewei bo placed on the line. f
(«J) Ac impossible
(o) the ping C nuet bo placed i:_1li., :r :Vi. .-v
(write your own answer if rtaeeeaary) 
S the ting /I Is placed m  the lino C and its shadow allowed to 
fall on to the eereeh* To produce another shadow of equal 
Biz® tiding the ring B,
(a) the ring G must be placed on W m  lino D
(b) the ring a must be pieced on the lino t
(c) the ring 8 must be pieced on the line f y
(d) is impossible
(a) the ring 8 tnuet be pieced  .-;.,.,.:i.[..,r.r,.... ..T T .
«»< »n ».l .11 Hfl <Mtf li.l«i>l<Hi^ ww i
{write your own answer if necessary)
. ifCTftucTto&s for mtnmnmmi tnc pmmrmi puesyiot^ Afas:
1# Have available the test pap ess and the equipment to im 
demonstrated*
2* Hand out the pop ora* Instruct subjects to write m m ®  m  tost 
papers#
3* Warn adjects that there ore severeI please at the ends of eefcs '■ 
of questions where they must stop and wait .until told iq turn 
the pegs over#."
4* Demonstrate with the hell for Sot 1# The hall to bo bounced 
,. . against ■the wall* ■ Several angles of Irmlderma to ba used#
S* Tall subject© to.start thi test# complete Set 1 end welt for
■7 .7.7 further- instructions# Request that the .subjects indicate# by - 
7;.- circling or' underliningt appropriate answera in each m m  (on . 
question paper)» and answer the questions **Why do you think so?”
8* ; Demonstrate the equipment .for Set 2 * a balanced or suspended 
rod on which pocltlerta A to K are clearly marked* -Demonofcrat© 
and point out clearly by talking and pointing to.the.places 7 
referred to that - '■--.■ 7.7^
it) the arm pivots freely about its centre
(2) the arm rests hsrirontaliy
■   (a) with no weights on It
(b) when balanced {hang equal weights, from equal 
■ ■ positions from fulcrum on each arm*)
{s) whin.belin^d with.4 units of weight.';
■S positions from fulcrum end % units pt . 
weight laposifions from fulcrum
(d) when balanced with 6 units of weight 4 positions 
from falcrum and 4' units of weight S positions 
from fulcrum ■
fell student© to complete Set 2 and wait for further ■ Ihttrucildhe#
?* Allow time to complete Set 2*
S*,. Demonsirate the f equipment far Sat 3* Clamp each, container ■ oh. a 
tall retort at end* CJoo coloured water (permanganate will do)* ' 
Demonefcrafca and point out clearly that
(a) both containers can bo moved * tm careful , to m m  
thorn difftej&ppt diaiehcoe .
:(b) . whan they arc moved the water I aval tondi to change
0* tall atudento to complete sat 3 and wait far further instructiono* 
Allow tint©'to do go*
10* Demonstrate the equipment■far Sit 4* Allow subjcctc 'to abaarvc 
.■ the ahadawc m  tha diatanca of each abject from the light la 
varied*
11* fall afcudahi® to complete Sat 4 and lock back aver m y  '■'
' Ihcamplatad qiiaationa# ;
12* ' Collect toot papers*
• Ptmtnm  nUEsraoMmsar * m tm m  nmmnn nm  cimBWitktitm-— — —   ‘     —
or stages iwro-Bf/^ces. or mmm, mwt&pv&tft
14 out of the total Of 24 questiono require concrete thinking 
for their correct solution while the- remainder (10) require formal 
thinking#
The correct &mmm one their ratings arc m  fellow®s 
Concrete ■"
formal
Sat 1 ic 2d 3a 4c So
Set 2 in 2c 3d
Set 3 le 2d ; 2d " 40 ■
Set 4 lb 2b
Set 1 a line drawn from V at 40° to VC
V* a line drawn from V at 50° yo VC
Set 2 4f ,Sd Sd 7c
Set 3 Sd
Set 4 3d 4c
So? between E end F or 6*3 $m from lamp 
or 2/3 dleianee from lamp' to E*
floherfe criterion scores for deeoifi cation of subject© into sieges 
of mental development are as follows?
Subjects classification
Score m early concrete late concrete , early formal lata forma
mu**
concrete items 
frontal items
0 ** 6 
0 * 3
?'* 14 
0 *  4
V * 14' 
S « 10
11 ».14
' o'fr-ib--
INDIVIDUAL TLSTBiOPIAGCTIAW DXPEOtFCWTS EMPLOYED tU T
nCombinations of Cclotil- Cclcurlfcsc Chsaic.&I 3c dies1*
Tne problem involves the combination of four odourless* 
colourless liquids with a f if th  activating agent* The right 
combination of ohamleala - plus the activating agent causes a 
yellow colour (Xnhelder and Piaget, 1988, pp* 107*422#) To 
solve. th is problem at the formal leve l, the -operations of 
exclusion, conjunction and disjunction are required*
The subject is  shown the four bottles labelled 1 to 4, 
together with the f if th  smaller bottle containing the activating  
©gent, labelled A collection of teat tubes Is  provided and
the experimenter explains that prior to the entry of the subject, 
chemicals have been poured into two of the test tubes, taken 
from the bottles* The subject is  invited to witness the 
addition of -several drops of chemical from ,{gn to oath of the 
amounts in  the test tubas, using an "eye dropper"* The subject 
is  further encouraged to attempt to reproduce the resulting  
yellow colour by using the materials provided,'
Subject© are asked how the colour 1© produced end i f  there 
are other ways to produce the same result* further, the 
consideration of the effects of the various ehomieaia is  
©ncouragad*
the scoring procedures established re lied  on Inheldor and 
Piagetfo theoretical rationale for the distinction between stages*
Subject© try  Ixg, 2x§, 3xg, 4xg* They only combine chemicale 
when the experimenter .suggests the possibility and then the 
combinations tried  are unsystematic* Subjects ere lik e ly  to 
randomly odd drops to bottles* They therefore can*t reproduce 
the colour once they get i t *  Subjects often try  Ix2x3x4xg 
repeatedly* Conclusions at this stage ere usually wrong*
fttage li«»B
Subjects try  a l l  four nxg combination© and then try  
corabinetlcma r»x nxg randomly and .without system* Subjects 
usually continue experimenting u n til a colour is  obtained* 
they can then reproduce the colour when asked* Experimentation 
with the #ffacto o f chemicals % and 4 ie  rare* Aether the 
subjects conclude that these chemicals have no effect*
gteaeJMafi.
Subjects try  a i l  nxg and most nxnxg combinations* when . 
asked* subjects experiment with the effects of chemicals 2x4 
in  a systematic m y *  ■
Subjects try  a ll  hxg* nxnxg, and nxnxnxg combinations* 
Subjects spontaneously look for the effects o f chemicals 
2 and 4* In addition* subjects find the solution Ix2x3xg as 
well as lx3xg*
tt£ouiIibrlum In  the Balance11
'The task involve© a balance and a group Of weights 
( Inheldor and Pleget* lOSS* pp*164*481}* Subjects are asked 
how they can maintain the equilibrium of the balance* Since 
two unequal weights can only be balanced a t proportional 
distances * subjects are required to attend to the ro le  of 
proportionality, mechanical equilibrium* and the co-ordination 
of two eyetems of reference*
The subject is  shown the supply of varying units o f weight 
bna ih f balance arm in  equilibrium. He is  invited to regain 
the equilibrium of the balance following the experimenter 
placing s*g* four units of weight five positions from the 
fulcrum and 4 units of weight at five positions from the fulcrum 
together with 2 units of weight 2 positions from the fulcrum on 
one arm* The subject is  allowed to reproduce a sim ilar pattern 
on the other arm but then encouraged to use a larger or smaller 
number of unit© of weight than that used by the bxperimerttar* ;
Subjects era asked to explain hew unequal weights can 
be balanced and requested to formulate a generalised rule*
the scoring procedures established re lied  on Inhelrior 
and Piaget’s (1958) theoretical rationale for the distinction  
between stages#
Stag© 11*A
Subject© place the weights randomly in  m  attempt to obtain 
balance, Weights ere added and moved with no evidence of an 
underlying system* Therefore perseverance in  the wrong direction 
is  lik e ly *  Subjects usually find an arrangement Of 'weights 
that balance, but cannot generalize a t a ll*
Subject© try- to balance apparatus by rudimentary logic  
{i*e * by moving the lig h ter weight further out)* They Often 
formulate a general ru le that the heavier weight must be nearer . 
the middle and the ligh ter weight further out* Subjects 
sometimes -adopt a ‘Strategy 'such as 3x2»6 without tmcfarstanding 
proportionality*
Stans lll«*fi ■
. Subjects discover the proportional relationship that exists 
between weight and distance* - They can give a t least two examples 
fo r each' situation*' Subjects indicate in the ir expirations  
that one variable compensates for the other* Their .manipulations 
involve much less guessing than at the concrete level* however* 
subjects s t i l l  have trouble transforming th e ir Information and 
generalizing i t  to theoretical ©ituatione*
Stags lll-B
Subjects quickly discover the proportional relationship that 
exists between distance and weight# Subjects can give m ultiple 
examples and;can.generalize to theoretics! situations* fin a lly : 
an adequate explanation of proportionality is  given#
^Ths Oooilletion of a Pendulum and thaO© ©rations of Exclusion** :
h pendulum is  presented end the subject© ere asked to 
determine which out of-four possible-variable© (weight, length ; 
of pendulum, height o f drop end force Of push) determine the 
©peed o f the pendulum (Inholde.? end P ia p t, 1018, pp* 6?~79)* . 
Strings euspended from a bar, m t m  m  pendulums which can . be 
manipulated singly m  simultaneously for comparison purposes*
. Varying weights jean ale© be attached to the pendulum* The 
eolation o f the problem requires subject© to isolate variable© : 
fo r examination, to test each variable,, and to exclude 
irrelevant variable#
' Subject© ar© asked what factors are important in  making 
the psmdulum go faster, together with the effect Of variable©
not dealt with during, the manipulation period* .
'
The scoring procedures established relied  on Inhelder and
Piaget’a (1956) theoretical rationale for the dietirrotion between 
c tones*
Staos Xl-fi
'
Subject© usually vary a t least .two o f the relevant v a t ie l^ lg jiS iS ^  
The serial, ordering of weight# Is  net yet accurate although 
length- of the string is  ordirod accurately* Explanations g iv a n |K l | | | | l l
by the subjects s t i l l  show 'multiple 'contradiction© about the
: - . . .
results*
.. .: , ~ . ; .......
Stage ll^B
■.■■■■■■
' Subject© can order weight and elevation* They manipulate 
these variables extsnaively* The isolation of- verisfalee; occurs j  
but infrequently end accidentally* when asked to prove a 
atatement, subject© w ill vary the factor in  question with no 
thought of holding other factor© constant* Subject© report the 
data accurately but are unable to transform their information 
or to operate mentally on the data* .
-/ > 
. "■ ■:
■
■
Steos^lllyA
Subject© isolate a t.leas t three of the relevant factors 
make multiple relevant comparisons on thee© factor©* The 
■of manipulation© is  high# The comparieon© are more systematic'. . ;^
than et Stage Xl~8 (i#e#- subjects will take the bc&yiaai 'weighty 
middle* then Itgffsst weight in m $  the effects of that -faster)* 
Subject© are usually able; to -exclude freight- as a factor hut: 
exclusion of ether -factors is  -irratXc* .
Stage ni*B
Subjects vary a ll four factors* Their manipulations show 
isolation o f factors and systematic manipulation of o il 
relevant factors# Subjects can exclude* irrelevant variables /:; 
after examination end can prove their conclusions*
nppztmy. two
keasures of m n m  oevelopfot
KtiHUBSRG *s ..HVPotHtftcat mmi otizmm . 
m m l l a m J i
III Heinz ©teal© the drug L m  m  SHaral * life.
IV the wife wantc euthanasia Law ye (te a l *.
the father breaks hie promise family H o lm  ve Justice *
IX The eon te lle  a l ie  family Rolee ve Justice *  Truth
Auxiliary
XI
XIV
Premarital intercourse family Roles ve sex# Love .
nre*Mebeterte Rooming House C iv il Rights *  Property
V
VI
The captain ordare a man to hie death Authority and
Justice * fclfa 
Chooee the ©ickman or the troublemaker 3uatic© *  |Lfffo
V II
V III
One brother ©tesla, the other cone Law ve luetic©
The reformed criminal hasnft  served hie ja i l  term
Law ve 3u©tic© -  Punishment
X II
XV
X III
IX
X
XVI
XVII
fls rita l fid e lity  fam ily Roles vs Box* Love 
High School Newspaper Authority m  C ivil.
Additional, S torlass 
Abortion Roles and Sex *  L ife
Leaving on©1© poet to help family family Roles va Ilf© 
C iv il Rights Helping ©scaped ©lavs *  C iv il 
Harvard S it*In C iv il Rights *  L ife  
Draft Resistance C iv il Rights *  .^Ife
form A and 8 are ©quivalont forms for test-rctest use* Each form is  
designed to provlda two stories on each of the issues plus ©no story 
on ©ex end one on c iv il rights* Each form is  divided into two Mock© 
of two ©tori©© each* for ©horfc-form teating, the sex and c iv il right©  
©ioties may be eliminated*
In Europe, a woman was near death' from a’ special Idnd of 
disease* There 'was ■on© 'drug that the • doctors thought might .©av© 
her* ■ i t  was a form of radium that a druggist in the i p  town had
recently discovered* . The drug-was -expansive to make, hut the .
druggist wee charging ton times - more than the drug cost him to 
make* He paid £200 for the radium and charged £2,000 for m email ■ 
doe© of the.drug*. The sick womanfe husband, Heinz, went-to everyone 
he knew to harrow the money, hut he could only gat together about 
£ii$00 which is  h a lf of what i t  coat* He told the druggist that 
hie w ife u m  dying, and asked him to m i l  i t  cheeper or le t  him 
pay la te r* .But the druggist said#- *V% I  discovered the drug and 
1% going to make money from i t * #t So Heinz got desperate and broke
into the' man1©' store to steal the drug for his wife*
U  
2*
3*
4*
5*
M J m J i
, Doss that ..moan'the wife has the rig h t to expect him to -Steal 
the drug to save her l i f e  I f  there*© no other way1? Why?
6* I f  the husband does not feel very close or affectionate to his 
w ife, should h© s t i l l  steal the drug?
?* Suppose i t  waan*t Heinz*© wife who was . dying of the di©eae©-but 
i t  woe Heinz1© beat friend* Hie friend tiidnH have any money and 
there was no one in  his family w illin g  to ©teal the drug* Should 
Heinz steal the drug for his friend in  that case, would that be 
different? Why?
Should Heinz have done that? Why?
Was i t  actually wrong or right?
from what ( i f  any) point of view is  i t  wrong for him to do 
that? Why?
Is i t  © matter of going.against the druggist*e rights? Did 
the druggist have the righ t to charge that much when there was 
no law actually setting © lim it to the price? Why?
Is i t  the husband*© duty or obligation to ©teal the drug for 
his wife i f  he can get i t  no other way? - why?
' if Tea* ■ ■
Suppose i t  we© someone dying who wsenH close to you, but there 
was no One ole© to help him* Would i t  bo rig h t to steal the 
drug - for ouch a stronger# is  i t  something he should do for a 
stronger?
9* This is  a m m  of steeling to m m  a l i f e ,  what is  there .about
the wife*© l i f e  which would make a parson think i t  is  rig h t to 
eteel? ■ ■ ~
ID* Suppose i t  waan*b hie wife who wm  dying but the manfe pot dog
which he loved* would he fee ju s tifie d  to steel the drug for 
- the l i f e  - of his- loved pet? why?
11* - Suppose you yourself were dying o f ©disease would i t  fee right#
would you have m  obligation to steal the drug to save your own
12* Heinz broke in the store and stoic the drug end gave it to hie
wife# Ho wee caught and brought before the judge end the jury
found him guilty of stealing* Should the judge send Heinz to 
jail for stealing# or should ho let him go free? Why?
13* The judge might think he would steal too if he m m  the husband*
The judge might also think about upholding the law* How
should he decide between the two?
m u m k  it* *  HORAL FORD A 
The drug didn*t work, and there um  no other treatment known 
to medicine which could ©eve Heinz#e wife# eo the doctor knew that 
she had only about 6 months to liv e * She wee in te rrib le  pain# hut
oho wee eo week that a good doe© of a p a in -k ille r lik e  ether or
morphine would make her die sooner* She wee delirious end’almost 
crazy with pain# and in  her calm periods * aha would ivk the Doctor 
to give her enough ether to k i l l  her# She eald m $ eouldrrt ©tend 
the pain end she was going to die In  a few months anyway#
1* Should the doctor do what she mho and give her the drug that 
w ill make her die? t#*y?
;2*: ■ L ife  is  usually a precious thing to preserve* but in  th is case ■
Oh©*!! die soon anyway* and is  in  pain# and wants 'to die* What*
..if anything, would make i t  righ t or worthwhile to preserve her 
l i f e  in th is case? ■
3* Does the woman have the rig h t to decide what to do with her own 
life ?  Why?
4* When a pot animal la  badly wounded and'w ill die* I t  is  k ille d  to  
put i t  out of lie  pain* Does the same thing apply here?
5. How about m  infant who is  born a hopeless imbecile* what should
on© do in  a m m  lik e  that?
6* tiould you blame the doctor in  any sense for giving the woman the 
i&ug?. why?
7# Suppose the woman asked her husband for the drug* la that the
same a© for the doctor?
8* , some countries have a law -that doctors could put. away a
. suffering person who w ill die anyway* some do not* Isihai would .. 
be rig h t for the doctor to do where i t  wee/ween*t against the law?
9# Should the law permit or prohibit it?
IS* The doctor fin a lly  decided to k i l l  ths woman to put her out
of hoc poin* no ho did I t  without consulting the law* The 
police found cut and th® doctor wee brought up on a charge of 
murder* The Jury decided he had done i t f eo they found him 
g u ilty  of murder overt though they knew the woman hod coked him* 
What punishment should the Judge give the doctor? thy?
11* would i t  fee rig h t m  wrong to give the doctor the do*ch
sentence?
12# Do you believe that the death sentence should fee given in  acme 
00808? Why?-
3cm ie a 14~yeer~olb boy who wanted to go tp.cersp very much*
Rio father promised him he cmtld go I f  h© saved up the money for i t  
himself* So 3o© worked hard at hie paper round and saved up the 
£40 i t  cost to go to camp and a l i t t l e  more besides* Gut just before 
camp was going- to s ta rt, his father changed hie mind* Some Of hie 
father#e friends -decided to go on a special fishing trip# One!-See1© 
father m& short of the money i t  would Obit* So he ’told Sea to give 
him the money be had saved from the paper round* 30© d icM t want to 
give up -going to camp* m  he thought- of refusing 'to give hie- father 
the money#’
1* Should See refuse to give his' father’ the money? my?
2* What would bo the most important reason for, refusing hie 
father the money?
3# -What would bo the most important reason -for giving hie father 
the money?
4* who has the right to the money and the trip# the eon or the 
father? why?
S* What should be the authority of a father over a eon in a case 
like this or in general? Why?
6» tibat should a son do for his father to o  or in  general* what i f  
anything does a eon owe bin father? Why?
?» Sn terms of falrnoao# what is  the important i m m  An. this atory?
G, . Why should & promise bo kept* by the father nr by -anyone?
9# I f  the son break© fsromisoa to hi© father. A© that batter or 
wore© than i f  th© father break© ptomiBoa to hi© ©on? why?
B ttm m  t l  -  .KQ3AL PORK. A
3oe wanted to go to camp but he woo of raid to refuse to give 
hie father the money* So ho gave hie father £10 and told him that 
was a ll ha mad©* He took the other £40 and paid for camp with i t *
He told hie father the head of the camp said h i . could pay later#
So he wont o ff to camp# and the father dic&iH go on the fishing trip *
Before Son want to camp# ha told hie older brother# Alexander# 
that he rea lly  made £50 and that ha lie d  to his father and ©aid 
hefd made £10* Alexander wonders whether he should te ll  hie father 
or not#
1* .' Should Alexander* the older brother# te ll-th e ir-fa th e r-th a t See 
had lie d  about the money or should he keep quiet about what 3oe 
had dona? Why?
2* What would be the best reason for te llin g  his father?
3# feshat would be the best reason for keeping quiet about something 
told you* In  this cose or in general?
4* How does-fairness enter into this cese?
5. Coes whether Alex should te ll  depend on what they*ve agreed 
before or whether So© has told on him in  the poet?
Alexander has to think of hie brother end of hie father in  
thie case. fcJhot should a brother think o f here? Haw should 
he choose between whet he should do as e brother and a eon?
Dlt.EPWfl If - riORfit fDRH B
In Korea# a company of marines m n jpulnumfeered and was 
retreating before the enemy* the company had crossed a bridge 
over a river# but the enemy were meetly s t i l l  on the other oido*
I f  someone went back to the bridge and blew i t  up# with the head 
start the rest of the mm in  the comply would have# they could 
probably then escape* lu t the man who stayed beck to blow up the 
bridge would probably not be able to escape a livef there would fed 
about e 4 Its X chance he would be k illed * the captain himself is  \ 
the man who knows beet how to lead the retreat* He asks for 
volunteers# but no one w ill volunteer* I f  he goes himself# the ■, 
men will probably not get back' safely and he is  the only one who ' 
knows how to lead the retreat*
1* Should the captain order a man to go on th is  very dangerous 
mission or should he go himself? Why?
2* What is  the best reason for saying At is  righ t to send someone 
besides himself?
Why or how do you m y  i t  is  right to save more lives An this  
case# when i t  mesne ordering someone to his death?
3# what is  the beet# or most important reason for saying I t  is  
wrong to send someone else# when ordering someone bias w ill 
save mors lives?
4* Cobs the contain have the .rigfab .o r. the authority be order a 
man i f  ho think© i t  b m i  to? why?
St Would a mao have the tig h t to to fuss such an o tto ?  Why?
6* The captain has a family* the man do not* Should that on to  
into his decision? How?
I f  ho ie  going to pick someone to go* hew should ho pick someone? 
Why?
7# There is  some conflict between fairness and survival here* Which 
is  more important or how can he deal with both here? What does 
fairness mean anyhow and why ie  i t  important?
the captain fin a lly  decided to order one of the m n  to etcy ■ 
behind* Ho thought ho should pick one of hip two demolition moo# ■ 
'Both of these men wore trained to tics dynamite to h im  Up bridges 
or fo rtifica tio n s  at the least risk to themselves* . One of the 
demolition m n  had m lo t of strength end courage but woo m bad . 
troublemaker. Ho was always stealing things from other m n 9 ' 
beating thorn up and wouidnH do his work around camp#
The oaeood demolition mm ho thought 0  had -got a bad t& m n m  ■■;, 
in  Korea and woe lik e ly  to did in  a ©hurt time anyway* though he 
was etceng enough to do the job#
1* ' Should the captain send the troublemaker or the sick man? tJhy?
2* Whose l i f e  in worth -more* the troublemaker or the nick sen? Why?
3« The captain known the sick man has a family* the troublemaker 
doesnH* Should that enter in to  the dicioion? Why?
4. The captain knows that the tick man mn a ooiaoilat in civilian 
l i f e  who m u  doing valuable biochemical tm im n b  toward a curb ' 
for cancer* Should that enter into the dtcleicn? Why?
5« tm ®  the captain have m m  rig h t to send one man than the other 
from the point o f view of fairness? Why ?
Who has mere right to refuse to .go* the nick man or the 
troublemaker? why?
Two. young m ftt brothers, had got into k m in m  trouble* They 
m m  eecceUy leaving town in  a hurry and needed money* K arl, the 
oldar one, broke into a chop and stole £500. Sob* the younger one, 
want to a retired  old man who woo known to help people in  town,
.Bob told the nan that ha was vary 111 and ho needed £500 to pay for 
the operation* BsalXy ho weenH i l l  at a l l ,  and ha had no intention  
of.paying the'man beck* Although the man UlcftHj know Bob vary w all, 
ho Ioann cl him the money* So Bob and. Karl lo f t  toon, each with £500*
1* I f  you hod to eey who did worse, would you day Karl did worse 
/  to break in  the shop and ©teal the £500 or Bob did worse to 
borrow the £508 with no intention o f paying i t  back? thy?
2* which would you rather which would make you fee l .worse 
stealing lik e  Karl or chesting lik e  Bob?
'Si ihen people, cay their conscience bothers them what do they mean?
-What does someone do when hie conscience betm m  him?
Do acme people have mss .carmcien.ee than ©there?
Whore do you f i t  there?
Do you think your ccmeeletite should ho the- bool© o f making 
£ decision* or should you think of ether things?
4* what was the worst thing Karl old in  .stealing? Why? -
B* What wee the worst thing Bob did in  cheating the man? ■. Why?
i * ; D oit that enter into, deciding which win worst? ihy?
7* why ohouldnH eomeena eteei from © then or m m &  anyway?
B# Bob deceived the eld men end agreed to do comething he 
■ ; didn*t* Why ehouidn’ t  oatnoone m  that?
9* Doe® the law enter Into your dedeion in this toe?
ID* Beth m n um  caught and brought before tho judoo,. Should 
one be given more puniohrasnt then the other? Why?
in a country In  Europe# © pem  mm named vaijean could find  
no work* nor could hie sis t o  and brother* without money* ho stoic 
food and medicine that they needed* He mm cep to o  cl end oonttncod 
to prison for six years* After a couple of yosro* he escaped from 
the prison and went to liv e  in  another part of the country un to  a 
new name*. He saved money and slowly b u ilt up a big factory* He 
gave his workers the highest wages and used m®t of his p ro fits  to 
build a fcopalial fo r people who couldn’ t  afford good medical to o * ■ 
Twenty years had passed when a ta ilo r rscognirsd the factory owner 
as being Valjsan* the escaped convict whom the police had been 
looking fo r back, in  his home town*
St Bhould the ta ilo r report Veljean to the, police? would I t  be 
■ ■ rig h t or wrong to keep i t  uuiet? Why?
2 . tihat would fee the feast or most important reason, for reporting 
him?
%  - ' What would be the best or most important reason fo r keeping 
V  hoist?
. 4» i f  Veljean were reported and brought before the judge*, should 
the judge sand him back to ptisan? Why?
S* would i t  be unfair or unjust to send him beck to prison dr 
would i t  s t i l l  be just? Why?
6# Suppose that Hal Jean, had escaped from prison end lived an 
ordinary life *  instead of building a hospital to help other 
■ sick ■people* Should the ta ilo r  report him in  that case? 
Should he he sent to prison? . Why?
7* Doe# e s it  iron have a duty or obligation to report m  escaped 
. convict?
S« .According to the leu# e c itizen is  required to report an escaped 
convict* Is  i t  morally right to fa ll  to report him in  that 
case? .Why?.
9* Suppose Valjean was, a close friend o f the tailo r# Does that 
make a difference in what he ehouXcJ do? Why?
SUMWUW- OF KDHUCRS’S ST ABE OEPlWITIfiM
stag© Os Egocentric valuing *  Sydgmenis of good# had* wrong net" - 
governed by rules » no ©ones o f obligation-to authority and rules, • 
m m  external*
Stage I t  Orientation to efeedlcmca to power and to rule©* Punishment 
or application o f a negative label automatically makes action - wrong* ' 
Concern ©bout avoiding physical damage to person or property but not 
for th e iro v o ra ll wolf arc*
. Crientation to concrete deceit* wrong deed© must’be paid 
for by punishment, heroes end authorities merit special treatment or 
payment* ©to*
Right action consist© of that which Instrumentaily satisfies  
■ one*© mm needs- and the needs of other©# Human relatione are viewed - 
■in term© lik e  those-of the market place* demerit© o f fairness, 
reciprocity* end equal sharing are present* but they are always 
interpreted in  © physical* pragmatic way* Reciprocity is  a matter 
of wyou ocrstch my back and 1*11 scratch yours*** m i of loyalty* 
gratitude* or' justice* A sens© of concrete rights to property and 
to freedom* regardless of authority* Aesmm that the individual 
make© his own choice*
Stano 2~Bt A clear senso of the concrete right© Of others* i*e *  that 
i f  I  have a righ t so does the other and a judgment by c o n c r e t e l y : : ■ 
putting oneself in  the other guy*© place*
ffiafio- J t Orientation to mutual or shared norms o f being good or '
prosocial end o f concern for others* An orientation to e te ree typ te l 
natural or good motives* roles or personality- types# Orientation to 
what others expect* think or approve in  the situation.
Sjags 3*as ■Categorical orientation ■ to m alrittolno fixed rules* to '; - ■ 
maintaining respect for legitim ate authority# though aware o f good 
motive© and role© involved in choice*
Stag© 3-Bs Orientation to maintaining mutual expectations (arc Cho 
other1© expectations that you be good, themselves good)* to deciding 
by Eolden-Rule role*taking (putting yourself in  the other guy1© shoes 
and seeing I t  from his view) and to deciding by reflecting on your . 
mm motives#
-Orientation to .society'1© point of view# to the perspective 
p t  the generalized other or the majority* end to maintaining a ©table 
social system and one1© own character# (Where an epp&rently Stage 3*A 
orientation clearly rests m  th is point of view* i t  Is  scored stage 4#
The Stage 4 orientation need not b e rig id ly  rule-orientated* however.)
A consideration of oonsequencos for' the -group m  society- including 
the -impact o f the act upon the general axpsct&tions o f members o f - 
society* •■-.
siege 4~ffo ■ The orientation ■ to society *© .point o f Vim - involves odiorence' 
to in tern al to ra !*1 values and rights which are fe lt  to  bo - also society *e 
.'valUiO such as -life#  property or liberty# There is  s; mutuality between 
,'fhs :ln b lu ito l*s  point o f vim  and society1©* society*© point o f view 
■must :ehou -some recognition o f the. individual *e rights and point of view*
:Btaes:.4<#i^i ■ Ethical c©iaii\fem and egoism which rejects but ’.is aware ;■ ;./.:■ 
of Stag© 4 morality or ’‘eociety’s point o f view#1* At' f ir s t  sight 'these / / /  
subjects sosm to be mixtures of Stages %-■ 4 and S* Their epism  -or 
relativism# however# is  abstract and philosophical# not subjectivism* 
not Concrete Stage 2 instrumentalism# Social to y  is  understood but 
:quaationed from the point o f view of the individual making a'paroonai 
decision* who can step outside society ga viewp®inl* Decisions tend 
to be made pragmatically by balancing the goods and haves In  the .-/.■
: concrete, situation as they , exist fort- a) the actor* or b) a person /  .
..in-a ro le  o f social respsn^iblllby* . . . .  ■ ■
Sfeaaa4(j5l or, Jf_4.fr t - An orientation toward decision mechanisms 
' balancing • the individual •© point of v im  end the legal or societal' .
.point o f view* This is  to e  by a ra tio n a lis tic  weighing o f values •■;
;or u tilitie s #  ■ including long-range social expeciatiorsaand functions.
■taws'are m m  m  BUtving social functions beyond eocial order and a m ,' 
to fee modified in  this light*. Development o f a perconal point o f 
view on reconciling social conflicts end-upon how Institu tio ns should 
■be defined*
stage, 5 -A* An orientation to social welfare and'social contract ; 
consistent with the rights and welfare of individuals* Right action 
tends to be defined in terms of general rights and in  terms of -standards: 
which have been c ritic a lly  examined and agreed upon by the whole 
society. There is  a clear awareness o f the relativism  -of personal
values and opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural 
rules for reaching consensus* Aside from -what.is socially agreed ; 
upon* right or wrong is  a matter o f personal values end opinion*
The result is  an emphasis upon the social point o f view*, but with - 
an emphasis upon the possib ility  o f changing law in terms o f rational 
considerations of social u tility *  Outside the legal realm* free  
agreement end contract are the binding elements , o f obligations*/ in  
the context of considerations of welfare#
stage S^Bi An orientation to a primary concern for the universal .
rights or the eelf-deuelopmant and perfection o f individuals as human 
beings# Recognizes the Stage S social contract but in tu itiv e ly  feels  
that individual human beings and their' rights take some morel 
precedence over a societal perspective*
Stags jBt An orientation to respect for human, personality (tre a t
each as an end# not o mean©) and to principles of justice, (equity or 
moral equality o f parsons) as principles defining decisions and duties 
As principles* the value© of respect for persons and justice are used 
a© consistent primary ground© of decisions which are univeraaligafoie 
and which represent a universal ’’moral point of There in  m
clear awareness of* and resolution of* the problem o f ethical 
re la tiv ity  end scepticism by appeal to ouch univerealizsble principle  
of. human morality* This viewpoint Integrates the Stags 5 and 5 - i  
perspective©# ;
KOHLflCRfitB. CLASS! riCATIOfi EF .THE “ISSUES” \
■ tmtsrnt *w *he
A* ' l m  *  Jfci&tt&Uoito to Im m  and th© legal ©yetem* •
Bp ponBC f^mts/d *  flcr&Uty and the Choice Proaoso-
.- a The psychological sanctions fo r mm&l. action, both
k
external and internal (punishment, approval* gu ilt)#  ■
Bj j  Tb© opontiniowo tondonoioo to btee* plaits© m  mwtm
the a ie rte *- . . . . . . .
IV
Conoipto of duty# responsibility and « » ra i\te  os* moral ■ . ■ 
righ t os wrong in- a coocret© situation o f ehoie©# m  thee© 
eohfliefc or teneid© mlth -the actorfe uieb* ■
Overall orientation to the deetecnprocesss- I© the hero 
mpB&BG to makes dacioion b i t e  m  rutefeliew irtg# or 
' pregmaiion* or coneciettGe^foiiowlng or on justice or com© 
mixture? I© there an eveeian of t e le te ?  Cn what basic? 
{th is  sub-issue overlaps with i | | |  or information from- - 
Bm  ontsr8 into i t . )  "
By . General -moral theory *  Abstract or general dafin itiono. of 
. %or©X#  ^ ftdutyr<l - General notions about re la tiv ity  versus 
ob jae iiv iiy  o f moral values# and of the relation of, 
morality to , ©gaiem* General .notions of relations: .of ■
- morality to tm or to jvsfctet -
PsrsonalfAf^aotlodbl;.; figlop.. ;Jsftd,.
¥ti Roteafcteotype of good personal roles {fam ily, friendship) 
not involving concepts of of faction and altruism*
C - - Relations of affection and altruioia (concern f m  
welfare)#
0* Authority and Civic .Order .Roles (where not just defined by actual
Dtt  Stereotypes and concepts o f c itlro n  and m ilita ry  ro te *
aJ v
D Relations o f .Authority# Bauer and Respect for Authority*
£• C iv il Rlghte *. Concern© for lib e rty  m  fm> f ill righto which 
are not the rig h t to l i f e  and to property*
; r* Contract^ ..Promloo*, Trust end .Reelnre.oai exchange*
G» Too disposition to punish or not punish and tho reason©
for it#
H* i
1# Property righto and
i l r  U M 4 «  stwwfcyptm end news, 
s* truth*
K# Sexual t&%m and votes and mxuol love* * ; -
m m al short mm rnnmnm or
STAGES ©Y ISSUES
{My imum extracted fat Shori^ Form 
Seeding m 0 Included)
ftcforanc© wee aieo made to the basic Bearing 
document THE DETAILED ISSUE ti&MAt* ten lengthy 
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Stage X t Low only as passive* linking those who give to you ** 
not a reason for doing things for others* hone or very little eons© 
of responsibility to save os? help the wife in Story i n  situation* 
Insofar m  thera is any responsibility at ell* It derives from 
husband1© job m  economic provider* Wo response at all for friend*
Wo cense that father and eon are* or should be* concerned about each 
other*0 welfare or feelings* friendship and family rolat do fiat 
change ’duty*’ ■
5liSSm&i Affection as hodcmiebXeslXy desirable* enjoy affaciitmal
relations* Oriented toward instrumental .needs of having friends and 
relatione*' o*g#* husband’© more or $m& selfish need for his wife is ■"
extension of one’s coif and one’s interests* Aware* also* of 
reciprocity or exchange in service to friend or wife* Wo fixed 
obligation or duty to one’s relations* Wo concept of ’be nice* in 
eon role* Friendship or family determine not telling on need grounds 
(rewards* bribes)* ■ ■
Stone 3s Guaei-obligstory* good end natural to feel affection in 
close relations* Should act out of affection* Sentiment of loyalty 
to family or good friends* Some idea of -feeing .nice* uneelfioh* 
sacrificing* grateful for past care* Orientation of affeeliona! roles ■ 
(husband’s love for wife* friends liking Mm* having good reputation) 
motivita much of fete behaviour* tihether ana steals for friend depend©. . 
on .how good a friend*.hew he feels about best friend* etc*
Stage. 4i A cense of categorical obligation of husband to make .
sacrifices to save wife regardless of degree of love for her* however*
friendship end love do not change duty {give example)* Affection is
not obligatory but loyalty is* Must be loyal to partner or group* 
Differentiates husband from friend role in obligation since more than • ' 
affection and reciprocity ©re involved in husband*© obligations* •.
Sen should Sacrifice interests (may fee in long-range interest to do so) 5 
aware of promise * loyalty.
StageSs _ Oriented to friend and family. role in tome of 
confidentleliiy., trust and to understanding vim ora takes in . 
friend role# Affoction and loyalty m  values Out ©ubopdlnabed to
mimt or individuals and m  dotoac? m m  ecmitf* m m  m t :
have a etrong orientation to husband role ©hXigailono or duty* The 
RATIONAL husband might prefer to ©teal* If fm doe© mi$ from hi© 
value perepectivo* he does net have © firm duty to ateal* 
Ooeontiaiiyt husband and friend folea are matters of greater 
psychological c m m m »  the moral obligation leauea are bated on the 
life involved* Some esnee of father1© obligation to maintain confo 
value of planning, maintaining purpose, m generally legitimate,he© 
to be encouraged*
Stage. J~Bt Agape or universal human love at principle*
i'
ISSUE D « GEttERM.* SHORT-rPM 
Steg£j5s No ©enee of authority, of © elese of person© to bo ©bcyad#
S885JL« »  i© always rig h t, or almost eluay& rig h t, to obey
authorities* Deference to authority le  baaed only on: hi© belonging -I 
to © claao of authorities and to hi© superior power#
Stags 2t tittle regard for respect for authorities* Smm 
authorities as like anyone ©le©# and does not recognise specie! 
rights awarded to authority by the social ©yotara*
Stage 3t Respect for authority based on offectionor belief in his- ' 
personal virtue# hi© concern for subordinated# and'what he ha© done'
In the past for them*
Sjteise.fti An Internal attitude- of respect for authority le ©xpaetecl, 
baaed on the authority representing aociaty and order* the Authority 
has right# given by the order but must olio earn respect*
iSifflf* St Recognizes a functional need for authority role# in
Society but diotinguieheo the authority function from the person 
occupying the role# Sees authority ©ubordinatos a© contractually 
committed to their roles*
stage 6 s Sams m  Stag© 5 except that contractual and ©oaial functional 
.definition© of authority subordinated to a concept of .universal respect 
for persons#
ISSUE r - JUSTICE (RECIPROCITY. EQUALITY) 
GENERAL * SHQRtvrORK
A* Equality
B. Positive exchange
C* Negative exchange
a)ft. No sense of distributive equality *. powerful deserve more*
B* Equivalency of acts, v* than subjective values*
C* Heteronomous compliance V* authority, whether or not right*
(2)A. Simple equality - all should get the same*
B* Simple exchange - do favour in expectation of return*
0* Retaliation, revenge justlfiod as simple exchange*
<3)A* Equality ^considering both eidse? equity - favouring the
needier*
B« Exchange based on gratitude for past favours*
£«, Vengeance disavowed, but other1© deviance partial justification*
(4)A* Distribution according to what earned*
B* Exchange * payment of debt for merit work*
C* Revenge no justification for deviance*
(5)A* Equality of opportunity and fundamental human-civil rights*
B* Exchange based on contract, entered freely and with
foreknowledge*
C* Deviance neutralizes rights, expectations and conformity*
(6)A. Equality of universal human rights end treatment of just claims* 
B* General maintenance of trust*
C. Concept of unjust expectation*
1S3UE F - PROMISE - GENERAt - SHGRT-FORMf i r m r i i » it i< i  i m t i f  n"> i m i  r i— r-> r -ir~ T ~ i *t" ‘I **-- ■ V^lr vr~ rr ~ f  ■. h i i * »iinrww -
(1) A* Promises are concrete expectations* not binding*
B# No reason for maintaining promise* other than avoidance 
of punishment#
(2) A# Promise is personal agreement? in context of bargain or
exchange,
B* Keep promise tc maintain partner#s expectation? avoid 
disappointment#
(3) A* Promise is personal agreement? entered in good faith#
B# Keep promise to avoid partner’s disapproval# disruption
of relationship#
(4) A* Promise is categorical? binding agreement*
B. Keep promise in ordsr to maintain reliable social
relations? avoid disappointed expectation ot others#
Bad example*
(5) A# Promiee is free contract or agreement# foundation of
social order*
B# Keep promise to insure world in which anyone can plan# 
maintain purpose*
(6) A, Maintenance of trust is social ideal# foundation of
moral relations#
B* Maintenance of trust for its own sake# beyond contract*
1
JU 3udgm#nte of punishment.
0*. Ptantslplm underlying fenMv&enl 
1* feiribuUon 
2». Restitution.
3*. Social pwpvm *»■ utility $ mbmmmm# mb&bUitcUm
4 ■ '
{0). Punishment' *» fet of m%%mmtein§. m b  tied iot^n^dothi '\ ' . :
" : :.- :T;; ’ '
(!) p>« PunlchMtfc Ib mscfehieal* mmmmy mmt foUoulftg deviant
$mpmm§ uithout intwiping pBfufmlmXml judgment of : V-;:;:■';■ ■■ 
m  ?elo*t&k£ng
. i t  l*  prim arily to  bum cu lp rit* in  canal mmm®c to  mb ' : 5 ; , ;
2* Its $ m m  of taalitutioit; ■ . /;''’■■
■ I# getting rid of feu pmplm m m  -mmm® puniahmtmt* tmm ;:
#ftmblm it will fe 
|j) A.*- PmiBhmmb I® decided In # dudgeont m m  'no catvlng interest# . 
of judge*. victim*. or culprit (not necessarily- 
c m  think ufei the (subject mould do if jyi^o# jiidp do 
eccuo&d
0# Revenge end repayment arc Ihiofcbanitablc appeasement# be r 
victim Victim in only poreen fee nan sfetaanit tmmm end 
mtmtAm. mmmb*
Specific repayment exempt# m  c m p m m b m  tm m m  f m  covongo*
.' Prevention® limited to specific mb* §®m®*b ouppott 
ptjhiohmorii having no ptivontlvi cfimif if culprit t e n #  
need to m  M  unlikely to m p m b  of#©f$o* don't punish
(i) A* Purjicte-mt it an mptm&im of checcd Judgment of dicppmvat'; : 
of act* a ettaaa upon the pod {or fed) -motive of the ooj^c^Vtv: 
(Attempted coneietcmey b®imm culprit1# and Judge*# end :;. 
victim1# p m m m b l m m )
■ Minimum punishment to oyr&oMt# dlaiipprpfel 
B» pjMohss^t priiaorily.fcf. reoteotton .oncl fetem
1* RsjrfiualstAUttn end defence oplfei vengeance component 
2* toleration involves restoring good eolation# between 
culprit- and victim 
3* Main purpose of punishment I# to reform culfeitf. oti^ngihih; 
hi# desire to bo podf m u  restore eolation# to .victim
{4} A»
. ir
(I) A*
' ‘ 0#
m  a#
i#
Ccicgurieol juit&imt of cot oo-wrong in t m  of f&tot 
ro te #  rog^edtoo of t&otivo dr to o  global h le o ito iliiy #  . 
of which the oohjiol iof fewoto* ■ mM&
In expiation* 'paying coo1# debt to oooioty* cltof than m&a 
brniim or vmBmnm*
0* Criminal cfpmcm m& ogatofc society and cannot bo 
eo^onooto by e to titu tto *  though c iv il c ftm m ®  c m  
'% "  I n 'o d n i t i o m  t o " M & p i o  p f e t o m o n t ; m m m  mb-
.. o *. . to n in g  to o tto a  *  w & in im m m  of: oooloty
. - fc* To- mihf-. c u lp rit tot. roepoofc for rules and :
, authority and to toi mmm to violating ,
■. thorn . .
'Rotiom*! m in im m m  mf m lm  via  conofeotob legal pimootoo 
anti duo process* tooknew top  o f act ots punishable; poof o f 
tic k *
: mpifimtim by oieotetonooo within fefehf!#' of I0|0l ■ ' ' 
tm&inbm&y*
1# ' Oioololmo legitimacy of expiation* vengeance, '■
' Culprit* botoor* -hot loot M o  righfee 
2* ■ ttlmimizsxtim  o f fu to n  # t o  uhilo ontoiilng ttfmlmm : ■ 
suffering of culprit* within limits of etoletei 
' ptootoo*
■. frnmmw® o f  rational frorj-to# .- ,
:. m%&:omotfonal■ t o u i M o o m  to jfe tto #
too m  ($)t OKcopt nov#e Should allow oojuil tuplofeont* 
teopbt (B) v to  of neeoooiiy o f piinloteont, but puntchwif
nmm mpmmmbB m  tiliito o ly - valid  moral .judBr&nt*::
.stage.!* m differentiation between moral value of life fed its 
physical or social status valve* fee should not kill* but there it ■ 
m  general obligation to preserve the lives of' others#
Stop# The value of a human Ilf# 1# aeon a t instrumental to  the ■ 
satisfaction of the needs of its possessor m o f other persons*
Decision to eave life is relative to* or to be made by* its possessor* 
(Differentiation of physical and interest value Of life* differentation 
of its value to ©elf and to other*)
staae 31 - The value o f a human l i f e  la  baaed on the empathy and 
affection o f family members fed othere toward its  possessor* (the  
value of human l ife *  as based on social sharing* oonmsiity fed love*
’ Is differentiated from thi instrumental f e d  hefenlei!o: talus of lift 
epplicObla also to animals*)
stage 4 e . l i f e  is  conceived as sacred in  terms of Its  place in  a 
categorical moral or religious- order or rights fed duties* (The value' 
of human l i f e ,  as a eaiegoriral,member of a fe ra l order 10 
differentiated from its  value to specific other people in  the family* 
.etc* Value of l i f e  is  s t i l l  partly dependant upon serving the group# ■ 
the afcafce* Cod* however*)
Bteqy^Ss l i f e  is  valued both in  terms o f its- relation to community 
.welfare and in  terms of being a universal humfe right* . (fe iig e tfe n  ■ ; ■ 
■to respect the basic right to l i f e  is  differentiated from- generalised ■ 
respect fo r the eocio^aytciiomeea value not dspfedfet upon other 
■'values*')
' .Stags ,&»&* tilhile life is the basic primary huisfe right* its value : ■ 
in the' concrete -case Is decided by the owner In light of hedcmietic 
end social utilitarian coneideratiorio*
Stepp S»8$ l i f e  is  a basic human right* but I t  is  also something ; 
qualitatively  higher or sacred ** th is  sacrifeafe is  independent of ■ 
direct religious-or social authority*
■Bte[nsrjSt l i f e  l& not only a basic right* but there is  a basic 
.obligation toward the lives of any other human* this obligation is  
defined in  terms of respect for the personality of the other rather 
than by the physical survival or hedonistic interests o f the- other 
m  ouch*
in sue s » -pift«8HWEfflr«
fiPECIFlCfllLV fletATffp -ffl llfUAfIfeS.lII. fed lU
Stage I • Situation in
Think© husband would or should bo punished* Doe© not m m  any 
clear reason why punishment ohotild bo minimised or dispensed ■
with in this eituoiion* (M  opposed to Stag© 4 who a©-©#- the 
'■ roeeono for not punishing but takes a firm rulo^iointsining 
. stand*)
Stage I * Situation IV ■ ■
■ Thinks doctor should be punished on probe* Doesn't cermiaet :
■ / .doctor1© good intsntions*
Stag© 2 * Situation ill ■
I ay© lot hte go ftm or minimal eentenea if takes Judge's rale 
. at ©11* though m y  simply predict what m im«brnni or 
■unsympathetic judge might do* Ho reason to punish because 
husband, had to do'it* anyone would# ©to*
Stag© 2 -Situation IV ...
Uo punishment for doctor sine© Oh© wanted it* it was best for her#
Stag© $ » situation'lit
- Believes Judge Should'release husband or give him the minimai 
poeeiblesantsrme because would undcrotond what he did* the 
motive© bohind it# "
Stag© :$-■» Situation IV
fte#fy pfeishment- bocatis© Of fepto'O'fbod iabtiv©©* '
Siege 4 * Situation 111
husband must be punished to maintain the law* m m  though he 
bed acme Justification# '
Stage 4 * Situation IV
Some punlahment required for doctor even though meant wall* in 
order to maintain the law#
Stag# S *• .....
Punishment .1© a matter .of rationally and functionally 
maintaining eeeieiy1© rules in b m m  of a consistent legal 
procedure and due process*
Sees judge'# role as contractually defined to apply the 
legal cods*
Due process to be maintained in punishment even if a guilty 
p m n m  must be allowed to go free that way* 
legalistic concept of intent m  acceptability be foreknowledge 
end free' decision * intention differentiated f$m goodness
fed bafessa of motive* -
Uaii*intfeil0fted culprit had foreknowledge that act was 
punishable - this was part of the risk be took*
Budge should raie**teko community opinion*
Shouldn't punish someone in a situation where would expect anyone 
to. do it*
Punishment modified by circumstancee within demands of legal 
consletsncyf
SPECIEXCAttV M L m t m M  SITUfitlOMS tit AID IV
Siago 1 * Situation III
. Ho© cto clear idea of. the priority of life m m  property# law 
■ or other concrete factor© in tho aityation, -not even lit the 
■ ©sns© (Stag# 2) that the husband himself m m  the wife*© life 
as far m m  important than all other considerations in choice* 
Hay SB88B8 wife's life as a value on the earn© scale ae the 
value of the rug or of property rather than as qualitatively 
higher* Ha© no clear awarfeese that the woman's life should
. . he a matter of feral concern to other people*
Stage 1 « Situation IV
Hay imply some ''projective" value to the woman1© life# or hoy 
as a thing* Doesn't discriminate value of animal and human-' ': 
life though may' recognize it© wort© to kill animals* May see ■
, the right to take the life Of -the woman as belonging to some";- 
external, force whether husband, government, or father whose 
prerogatives ©re being interfered with*
Stag© 2 * Situation 111
■ See© © human life m  worth more than property since anyone 
prefers survival to'property* This value# however, la not a-- ' 
©horseferal value# it is only the parson himself or people who 
■ need him who should or would make groat sacrifice© to preserve 
a life* ■■■.-■
Stag© 2 <* Situation IV
instrumental hedonistic view of life* Painful Ilf© no good* 
Human© different from animals only In being-lass depfedeolcn 
others to put thorn away or in being lass inctrumsntaXXy useful 
to another individual* Seas the woman m  having the decision 
since it1© her Ufa# ©heowo© it*
Stage S • Situation III
Ufa is m m  valuable than property because it it the object 
of much greater empathy and affection*
Stage 3 - Situation 11/
Value of human life rests an ago'a affection for family end 
family's affaction for ago* Expectation of both sympathy for 
pain by all concerned and of arnpathic revulsion for killing# 
Wants to maintain it is better for her to live# Mentions 
woman doesn't know what ©he is doing when oho coke that a cur© 
may be found*
stage 4 .* ■Situation ill
Value of human life is based primarily on the rule "Thou ©halt 
■not kill11# Up* primarily on a negative rule rather than, a 
positive one (save life) fed on a rule rather than the value 
.of a life* within this sphere# . recognizes the value of life 
as categorical and that everyone must avoid unnocassary death# 
This does not takeclearpriority over ail other moral ' 
obligations, however*
Stag© 4 ~ Situation IV
Some eons©-of -tho-leaser of the two evils*. A donee of life f-;, 
as having a value beyond its pleasure, but not ebsolutlstic 
about life being of value regardless of its usee* Sees human 
life is categorically higher ct better then animal life#
Stage $ * Situation IV
A utilitarian view. Concerned about making © legitimate 
practice of euthanasia#- but: can't, rosily object In this ■ 
particular case* Clearly fools woman's life is eventually 
her right to life* to be respected and if she wants it# not 
really wrong when beet for her#
Stage 4 (S)
While fere or less ©ware of Stage 4 obligations it? rules# roles* 
end life# has o mora pragmatic orientation to the. obvious 
necessity of stealing In this m m  based on the obvious greater 
importance of life than property* The orientation to neither 
a purely ©elfish determination of the decision to ©teal to save 
a life (Stage 2) nor on abstract universal principled 
obligation to save life as the cor© of morality# Stealing the 
drug is mors than selfishly rational# it i© © regard for & 
©hared act of obvious community value# The value of life# 
however# I© essentially utilitarian* its value to the community 
and to the possessor#
Stags B~B or 4-6
A choice that It la right to alee! because there is a 
categorical obligation to m m  human Ufa*'that this 
■ obligation derives fro® a ^ higher' law" than steeling Xum 
■ and the ©at of ataallhi la fe tot of conacifefei- Unlike 
stag© 4# the m l m  of Ufa' la tint "zula hound** but ie m m  
aidarad to be an intrinsic quality of life* The aacrednoo© of 
Ufa toivo© from the fact feat li la net that It
i© sonsthlng wonderful end higher* Its value then dariuaa . 
fro® fee value of Bed or of fee. mlmtm* respect for a 
human Ufa derives fro® raspoot to Sod or to ytfo a© e whole* 
The afeaa of conocionda compelling itaaling in olfed? a direct 
fetyiiidrt of the value or a roapact t o  theological law*
DUenime III *• Isays G * Puniehinani Issue H ** Ufa
(I aeora) ' (2 seeroe) ■
IV * Issue $ *  Pmisbtttani ■ , Issue If «*,. Life.-.;: ^ v;;\
(X mom) ': (2 acores)
V r>* Issue D * Authority Roles ' Issue H * life •
(1 SCOte) . ■ |i ©oore);|
VI <>*/ Issue o « Authority Roles■
• *- ',1
■ issue H - life V
(I score) (lscore)-
VII * Issue i * Conscience ■ Issue f * Contract-
(I m mm) , :{2 scores)
VIII- *. Issue D *• Authority and : issue u ^ -:fenieNieni
. Civic Roles —
(2 scores) . , ' ;(l score) ■
Issue H ■■*Life :
(2 scores) ■ ; '
Issue H - iifa
(2 scores)
Issue f *. Promise* 
Contract 
■ (i score)
Issue f «* Premise**
' 'Contract 
' ' (I eeere)
Standard or Short fmm CsorinQ
In this scoring method two issues only per story are scored*
The moral maturity score is computed by a solid steps ©core 
(indicated by a clear stage' number* a*g* 3 for Stago*3) receiving & 
weight of I. An atnbigoous score indicated by # A* inserted before the 
©usried stage numberf weighted §* the floral Maturity Score is $ ■
Individual Testing
. Ill ** Issue 6 ** Punishment
(I ecore)
XV ' «* Issue G * Punishment
(l score)"
I «* Issue C * Personal.Holes
of Affection'' 
(1 scofe) ' -
II * 1 m m  t * Personal Roles
of Affection 
" (l score)
computation which represents the percentage usage of various stages# 
floral Maturity Scores range frcia ICC to COO (100 corresponding to 
a purs Stags-1 and 600 to a pure Stage-6)* A purs stage is allocated 
when at least 75$ of reasoning is at that stages e.g# a MMS of 
376 « Stage-4* A minor stage is given when reasoning amounts to at 
least 25$ at that Stages a* g* a M S  of 360 » Stage 4(3) (40$ Stage 3, 
60$ Stage 4), a M S  of 330 » Stage 3(4) (30$ Stage 4, 70$ Stage 3).
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SET A
W rite down in a  few words the meaning of each of the  following words as it  
has been done for the  first word.
1. C on tinue  — .............................................................................
2. S tartle  ............................................ ................................................................................... -
3. P e rfu m e------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------
4. M alaria ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------
5. Mingle -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. F asc in a ted -------------------   — ------- -------------------- ----------------
7. B r a g ------------------ ------- -------------------------------------------------------------------- ------
8. Prosper — ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
9. Anonymous ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- —
10. V erify __________________________________________ _______________ _______
11. Ruse   ___________________________________________ ____________________
12. Form idable--------------------------- - ------------------------------------------------------- ---------
13. Im m erse___________________________________________ •____________________
14. D ocile-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. Virile — .-----    — -------- .-----        —
16. S u l t ry ----------------  —-------------------------------- ----------------- ~— -------— —
17. S t a n c e ------------------ -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. E fface___________ ______________________________________________________
10. Sensual ----------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------
20. C onstrue__________________________________ ____ _ ________________________
21. Conciliate  ----------------------------  —.......................................................
23. L a ten t--------------------------- ------   *-------------
24. O b d u r a t e ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -----------------
25. C riterion______________________________________________________ _________
26. P a l l i a t e --------------    ._
27. Adulate ------------------------------------------------------------------------- -----------------------
28. Felicitous ------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------
29. A m b it----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
30. R e c o n d ite ------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------
31. C achinnation--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------
32. Exiguous------------------------------------------------  .------------  — - --------------------
33. P u ta t iv e --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------
34. M anum it------------------------------------------------------------------- -----------------------------
SET B
In  each group of six words below underline th e  word which m eans th e  same as th e  w ord in  heavy  
type  above th e  group, as i t  has been done in  th e  first exam ple:
1 CONNECT
accident join 
lace bean
flin t field
2 PROVIDE
harmonize commit
h u rt supply
annoy divide
3 STUBBORN
obstinate steady
hopeful hollow
orderly slack
4 SCHOONER
building m an
ship singer
p lan t scholar
6 LIBERTY
worry freedom
rich serviette
forest cheerful
8 COURTEOUS
dreadful proud
tru th fu l
curtsey
short
polite
7 RESEMBLANCE
attendance fondness
assemble repose
likeness memory
3 THRIVE
flourish try
thrash  reap
th ink  blam e
9 PRECISE
natu ral stupid
faulty
small
grand
exact
10 ELEVATE
revolve move
raise work
waver disperse
11 DWINDLE
swindle pander
diminish wheeze
linger com pare
12 LAVISH
unaccountable selfish 
rom antic lawful
ex travagant praise
13 WHIM
complain noise
tonic fancy
wind rush
14 SURMOUNT
mountain descend
overcome concede
appease snub
15 BOMBASTIC
democratic pompous 
bickering cautious
destructive anxious
14 RECUMBENT
fugitive cumbersome 
unwieldy repelling 
reclining penitent
17 ENVISAGE
contemplate activate 
surround estrange
enfeeble regress
13 TRUMPERY
worthless heraldry
etiquette highest
amusement final
19 GLOWER
extinguish shine
disguise gloat
aerate scowl
20 PERPETRATE
appropriate commit
propitiate deface
control pierce
21 LEVITY
parsimony velleity
salutary frivolity
alacrity tariff
22 LIBERTINE
missionary rescuer
profligate canard
regicide farrago
23 AMULET
savoury jacket
flirtation crest
cameo charm
24 QUERULOUS
astringent fearful
petu lan t curious
inquiring spurious
25 TEMERITY
impermanence rashness 
nervousness stab ility  
punctuality  submissiveness
26 FECUND
esculent op tative 
profound prolific 
sublime salic
ABNEGATE
contradict decry 
renounce execute 
belie assemble
TRADUCE
challenge a tten u a te  
suspend establish 
misrepresent conclude
VAGARY
vagabond caprice 
obscurity vulgarity  
evasion fallacy
SPECIOUS
fallacious coeval 
palatial typical 
nutritious flexible
SEDULOUS
rebellious d ilatory  
com plaisant diligent 
seductive credulous
NUGATORY
inim itable adam ant 
sublime contrary  
num ism atic trifling
33 ADUMBRATE
foreshadow p ro tec t 
detect eradicate 
elaborate approach
34 MINATORY
im placable dim inutive 
belittling quiescent 
depository th reaten ing
2?
26
26
20
81
32
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 ------- —  Test ended, __
A B C D E
1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2
3 3 3 3 3
4 4 4 4 4
5 5 5 5 5
6 6 6 6 6
7 7 7 7 7
8 8 8 8 8
9
:
9 9 9 9
TO 10 10 10 10
11 11 11 11 11
12 12 12 12 12
Time Total : Grade
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